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The Future of Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World

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United Nations

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Correction

In vol. XV, No. 2, in the article "Safeguards: New Threats and New Expectations", two words were omitted from the beginning of the last sentence on page 58. The first part of the sentence should read: "The *end to* domination . . .".

The relevant text would thus read:

> Strengthening the effectiveness and credibility of IAEA safeguards and restoring international confidence in them are central concerns. The Iraqi imbroglio is the proximate cause for such an inquiry, but the inquiry is also dictated by the sea change in international relations. The end to domination of the international political-security agenda by United States–Soviet relations also meant a diminished involvement of the two nuclear super-Powers in conflicts and a commensurate lessening of their capacity to exert an influence over the security policies of these countries. . . .

The Editor regrets this error.

The Future of Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World

Russian Deterrent Forces in the Post–Cold War Environment

Sergei Kortunov

The rapid changes that are taking place in Europe and indeed throughout the world—owing primarily to the end of the cold war and the democratic revolution in the former Soviet Union—will force nuclear Powers to make major adjustments in their foreign policy and in their military-technological thinking. There will be changes in their nuclear doctrines and in their assessment of the nuclear forces both strategic and tactical that will be needed to ensure national security.

This applies fully to Russia, whose nuclear doctrine, like that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is now being entirely revised. To identify the main areas in which this complete revision must take place, we must first understand the nuclear doctrine of Russia and the mission of its nuclear forces.

The Former Soviet Union and the Doctrine of Deterrence

In its public declarations, including those made at the highest political level, the former Soviet Union was strongly critical of the doctrine of deterrence. This, in turn, perplexed and sometimes even irritated those who considered nuclear

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weapons to be the only effective means of averting a global war. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence thus became almost sacrosanct, a view which may have been prompted by Soviet criticism of it.

But was the difference in doctrines really fundamental? Setting aside various ideological stereotypes and emotional attitudes, we must say "No".

Deterrence as a principle of military strategy was not invented in the nuclear age: it is as ancient as war itself. In both terminology and substance, this principle is consistent with a defensive military strategy: rather than calling for an attack on the potential enemy, deterrence implies dissuading him from the idea that he can attain his objectives through war. The deterrence doctrine was initially synonymous with the doctrine of preventing war by creating an adequate threat of retaliation, that is, by discouraging aggression.

Has the nuclear age added any new dimension to this situation? Only one: because of the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, what now makes deterrence valid is the threat of total annihilation or unacceptable damage.

It would be naive to believe that any nuclear Power, unless it is planning to strike first, follows any doctrine other than that of deterrence. The Soviet Union was no exception. While anathematizing nuclear weapons and strongly denouncing nuclear deterrence, it had, in practice, been guided by this very doctrine. The purely military function performed by the Soviet strategic forces had been largely similar to that of the United States strategic forces. The only difference was that the Soviet leadership (former President Gorbachev in particular), in contrast to the United States Administration, believed that further reliance on nuclear weapons as a means of preventing war was hopeless and very dangerous.

From an unbiased historical analysis of the post-war period it can also be seen that military competition between the

Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear field followed the logic of "action-reaction", the constraining factors being primarily financial and technological rather than moral.

The Soviet Union, having gained super-Power status largely because of nuclear weapons, sought in the 1970s and 1980s to keep that status at any cost by maintaining military and strategic parity with the United States. Parity was initially interpreted as numerical equality in strategic nuclear arms and later as rough equality in operational nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the Soviet-American nuclear rivalry continued unabated even after the potential for assured destruction had been exceeded many times over. Such were the tough rules of the game in the bipolar world, where the Soviet Union and the United States deterred each other by acting on the assumption that the other side was an "evil empire".

That the Soviet Union had based its policy precisely on the doctrine of deterrence is confirmed also by the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) Treaty, which limits the anti-ballistic-missile systems of the two sides to purely symbolic numbers. The Treaty has, in essence, legitimized the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence through the threat of the assured destruction of the aggressor by a retaliatory strike.

In terms of strategic stability this situation has not changed, even after the dissolution of the USSR, and it cannot be disregarded. Nuclear deterrence is a *modus vivendi* of the world we live in, and will continue to be until nations devise a fundamentally new system of maintaining international security. The problem is that the nuclear Powers, including Russia, have more than enough nuclear weapons to make deterrence work effectively.

New Dimensions of Nuclear Disarmament

Some well-known, high-ranking Western analysts had been saying for several years that public acceptance by the Soviet leaders of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence would contribute to mutual understanding, strengthen the credibility of the USSR in the eyes of the West, and probably bring us closer to agreements on radical cuts in nuclear arms. Even before the break-up of the Soviet empire, there were signs of an important conceptual movement in that direction. For example, it was admitted at a high political level that the USSR often took an overly simplistic view of the deterrence doctrine. It has also been stated that this doctrine should be given due credit and that it should be recognized that over a fairly long period of history it was instrumental in maintaining peace. There has also been evidence of a willingness to hold an in-depth discussion of the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence at an expert level between nuclear Powers and nuclear-weapons-basing States. Finally, the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is now calling its nuclear strategic forces "strategic deterrence forces" (SDF).

These facts signal a willingness, not only to take into consideration the conceptual approaches of the other side, but also to take them into account in foreign policy, and what is more important, in military and technological practice. For the first time ever, our leaders have agreed that as we move to a nuclear-weapon-free world it is possible, as an interim stage, to reach a level of nuclear confrontation that would correspond to the Western concept of minimum nuclear deterrence. That conceptual shift is crucial in determining the thrust of a new Russian nuclear doctrine and the levels of sufficiency for strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. This shift may appear to be a conceptual concession to the West, but in reality it has been caused by a good number of both international and domestic factors.

First, the end of the cold war makes quantitatively senseless and economically burdensome the infrastructure of the military power confrontation that was built in the years after the Second World War. In the Paris Declaration of 19 November 1990,[1] 22 States, including the Soviet Union and the United States, solemnly declared that they were no longer adversaries. This fact cannot leave unchanged a major component of the above-mentioned infrastructure—the mechanism of mutual nuclear deterrence. A radical transformation of this mechanism is facilitated, not only by the improved Russian-American relationship, but also by other factors, such as the diminished role of the two super-Powers in international relations, the growing interdependence of nations, and the objective need to deal jointly with global development problems. In these conditions Russian and United States national interests can be expected to converge more and more, and their policies will most likely reveal qualitatively new elements of interaction and even partnership. By the same token, the role of mutual deterrence in their relations and, consequently, reliance on it within their respective national security policies, are likely to decrease in relative terms.

Furthermore, for a number of reasons, including an obvious reduction of the reciprocal military threat, Russia and the United States will confront a rapidly mounting tide of economic and international political pressure in the 1990s in favour of radical reductions in nuclear arms. This pressure has already been translated into substantial cuts in military budgets and, accordingly, in appropriations for strategic programmes in both countries. The effect of the budgetary pressure on the military postures of Russia and the United States will probably continue to mount. As for Russia, its transition to a market economy will inevitably compromise its ability to compete effectively with the United States in the deployment of new kinds and types of strategic arms. It should be recognized that strategic parity with the United States was achieved when the USSR was run by a system that permitted uncontrolled funding of military programmes at the expense of the civilian sector of the economy. Such practices are no longer possible. In any event, resources and funds will certainly be allocated strictly in accordance with the national security priorities approved by the supreme legislative authorities rather than in the interests of the military-industrial complex.

There is a new factor that will curb and restrain the ambition of the national military-industrial complex to match the United States in building strategic forces: it is the dissolution of the USSR and the growing influence of the independent States (the former Soviet republics) on the development and even the placement of nuclear arms. In 1988 the federal government met with strong opposition from Kazakhstan (as well as some regional authorities of the Russian Federation) to nuclear testing on their territories. The Novaya Zemlya test range was shut down by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1991. The formal Soviet one-year unilateral moratorium, declared by Mr. Gorbachev in the fall of 1991, was motivated to a great extent by a unilateral moratorium that had already lasted for more than a year. Finally, a very important agreement was reached in Alma Ata on 21 December 1991 that by 1 July 1992 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine would ensure the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons to central bases adjacent to the manufacturing plants for dismantling under joint control. Strategic nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from the territories of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus on the completion of the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), that is to say, by 1998 (and from Ukraine even earlier—by 1995). Strategic nuclear missile forces located on Ukrainian soil, as well as in Kazakhstan and Belarus, are already being de-activated.

Regardless of the domestic developments in the "geopolitical space" that used to be the Soviet Union, the central control over strategic nuclear forces will be preserved. It would be hard to imagine that Kazakhstan or Ukraine would be able to have separate national strategic nuclear forces: they would have to build their own national satellites, early-warning systems and many other things now included in the "military infrastructure" of offensive strategic forces. Although such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out, I have serious doubts that such options would be affordable for some of those sovereign States. I also think that those States will be heavily dependent in the years to come on Western countries, including the United States, which apparently will not watch with indifference the emergence of new nuclear Powers in Europe.

I am far from overdramatizing the situation in the strategic sphere. What is really possible is that for a very short transitional period Kazakhstan and Ukraine would reserve the "right of veto" as regards the strategic nuclear weapons in a retaliatory strike by the central authorities through a so-called "conference-link" mechanism. This understanding is provided for in the Alma Ata and follow-on agreements between the Independent States. These documents also include the provision that the decisions regarding the need to use strategic nuclear weapons should be taken by the Russian President in agreement with the heads of the member States on the basis of procedures drawn up jointly by the member States. The member States also confirm the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

These developments have already compelled the Russian central military and political authorities to revise the existing basing pattern for strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons and to impose severe legal restrictions on relevant military activities. As for tactical nuclear weapons, they are now being moved as a matter of urgency to Russian territory. It is likely that all facilities for strategic offensive arms will also be moved to Russian territory.

In this context it is quite natural that Russia is now already unilaterally introducing certain adjustments in its conceptual approaches both as to the most likely ways of using strategic offensive arms in a retaliatory strike and as to the future development and placement of its strategic forces. Moreover, in the context of domestic instability Russia will be the State most likely to be interested in maintaining much more centralized but much smaller nuclear forces.

Domestic developments explained to a great extent the receptiveness of Mikhail Gorbachev as well as of Boris Yeltsin to George Bush's initiative on nuclear weapons last fall.[2]

On 27 January 1992, Boris Yeltsin proposed cutting strategic forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads along with "de-MIRVing" ballistic missiles—both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

What was even more important was Mr. Yeltsin's proposal that the strategic offensive arms which Russia and the United States will retain after the planned deep cuts should not be targeted on United States or Russian facilities respectively or on those of any other country. In specific terms, that would mean a number of practical steps. We may consider taking off alert status the strategic forces of Russia, the United States and other nuclear Powers, which are targeted on one another's territories or facilities, thus placing nuclear weapons on a "zero-alert posture".

It is clear that in this context there is a need for a fundamental revision of the entire military and strategic situation in the world and consequently of nuclear military doctrines. Ideas that have been formally proposed concerning control over nuclear weapons by an international organization, for example the United Nations, could be reconsidered.

Will Russia Need Nuclear Weapons?

As regards future dramatic reductions of Russian nuclear weapons, it should be borne in mind that it would be unrealistic to expect Russia to abandon its reliance on nuclear deterrence in the foreseeable future. Neither country will be able to ignore for long the existence of other nuclear Powers or the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Russia will also have to face the fact that a number of factors that were not relevant at the time of the East-West confrontation now tend to introduce elements of uncertainty into the situation in Europe and in the world at large.

First, during the cold war the Soviet military threat forced the Western allies to sacrifice certain national ambitions to the need to counter a common enemy. Today, national aspirations may come to the fore again and stimulate geopolitical competition between certain power centres.

Secondly, a new and powerful player has entered the European arena—a united Germany, whose policies will be aimed at vigorously strengthening in every way Germany's position *vis-à-vis* the other parties in this new international game.

Thirdly, the decline of the bipolar security structure in Europe calls into question the role of the United States as the leader of the free world and, accordingly, its military-political position on the continent. Germany may soon seek gradually to force the Americans out of Europe and to claim the role of a new European super-Power—something that the United States would hardly welcome.

Finally, we cannot ignore the factor of regional extra-European risks, particularly on the periphery of the European continent, the areas where fires have been smouldering for years.

Given a very uncertain situation in Europe and in the world as a whole, reliance on nuclear weapons as a military-political safeguard will therefore remain a key element of Russian military doctrine, at least in the 1990s.

Main Parameters of Minimum Nuclear Deterrence

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

The idea of reducing strategic nuclear armaments to the level of minimum deterrence is currently valid for two Powers only—Russia and the United States, whose capabilities far exceed any theoretical limit of sufficiency for launching a destructive retaliatory strike. Even though a nuclear force much smaller than the ones currently possessed by the United States and Russia may always have been sufficient to enable them to deter each other from launching an attack, both sides continued their nuclear programmes on the basis of exaggerated criteria of what constituted unacceptable damage in a nuclear war.

Although the START Treaty is a signal that both sides intend to leave confrontation behind, one should admit that the Treaty constitutes a very modest step towards limiting their nuclear capabilities to the level of minimum deterrence.

It is extremely important, in terms of enhancing stability and moving towards minimum nuclear deterrence, to make nuclear disarmament a continuous process. Moscow and Washington should initiate without delay the next stage of arms control negotiations, which could focus on the reduction of their strategic offensive arms by another 50 to 60 per cent. This could involve the complete elimination of the weapons systems that each side considers to be the most dangerous and provocative.

The next stage of strategic offensive arms reductions would thus be focused not so much on numerical reductions as on shaping strategic force structures in such a way as to deny either side a material and technological basis for delivering a surprise first strike. Thus, Russian SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as SS-N-20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, should fall into the category of weapons systems to be banned. For the United States the MX ICBMs and the Trident II SLBMs would be subject to a complete ban.

If the Russian-United States political interaction continues to develop in a positive direction, Russian nuclear doctrine will be revised with or without any negotiations. In all likelihood its nuclear doctrine will be reduced exclusively to the capability for inflicting unacceptable (rather than equal, as is the case now) damage on a potential aggressor through a retaliatory strike. A minimum nuclear potential with assured survivability would therefore suffice. Achieving this objective, however, will depend on the positions of other nuclear Powers, primarily the United States, and, in particular, on their ability to threaten the survivability of Russian minimum deterrent forces.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is for the most part a political rather than a military one. For instance, the West has always viewed United States tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a deterrent against a potential attack by "overwhelming Soviet conventional forces" and also as "a transatlantic tie-in" with United States strategic nuclear forces. Because of this coupling function, such weapons, as well as French and British theatre nuclear weapons, have always been considered pre-strategic rather than tactical. Russia, with its sufficiently invulnerable capability in strategic nuclear arms, does not need tactical nuclear weapons for either military or political reasons.

The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), which presupposes the elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in conventional armed forces on the continent, certainly opened up good prospects for radical reductions in tactical nuclear weapons to the level of minimum deterrence.

The "disarmament race" of the United States and USSR Presidents in the fall of 1991 resulted to a great extent from that development. On the basis of reciprocity, Russia will take substantial measures with a view to eliminating tactical nuclear weapons. The two sides could reach agreement on procedures and timetables for implementing such measures through consultations. Moreover, Russia proposed to the United States that all naval tactical nuclear weapons should be eliminated on the basis of reciprocity. All nuclear munitions (gravity bombs and air-launched missiles) would be removed from combat units of frontline (tactical) aviation and placed at central weapons storage facilities on the basis of reciprocity. It also proposed that other nuclear Powers should join in these steps with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. However, as in the case of strategic forces, arms reduction in Russian tactical nuclear forces has, in fact, largely been predetermined by the political developments on the continent.

At present, however, the former Soviet proposal for an immediate "zero solution" on tactical nuclear weapons would probably not serve the long-term interests of Russia. After all, Russian aircraft represent the chief element now capable of offsetting the tactical nuclear and conventional capabilities of NATO's naval forces in Europe, to say nothing of the need to cover possible regional extra-European risks. At any rate, it is clear that the residual tactical nuclear capabilities of both sides should be confined solely to the function of deterrence.

The level of minimum tactical nuclear deterrence will tend to go down as mutual trust increases in Europe and other disarmament issues are resolved, and will also depend on the overall evolution of the European and the world situation.

A major problem which has a direct bearing on determining the level of minimum nuclear deterrence concerns the elimination of all non-strategic naval nuclear arms. Unless this problem is resolved, other nuclear disarmament efforts will probably lose their value because wide channels will be open for a massive transfusion of military rivalry to this area and for circumvention of future agreements on strategic offensive arms and tactical nuclear weapons.

With respect to long-range, sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, whose fate has been left unclear, the cardinal solution would be their complete elimination. This is what it would probably take to achieve a situation of "zero tactical nuclear deterrence" at sea.

* * *

In general terms, minimum deterrence is obviously a purely abstract notion as applied to land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and may be considered only as an interim stage in the movement towards their complete elimination. Indeed, minimum deterrence presupposes that the nuclear threshold is as high as possible. Yet this threshold tends to go down as non-strategic weapons are preserved in the arsenals of both sides. Therefore, minimum deterrence in the future should be provided exclusively by Russian and United States strategic forces of 500 to 2,000 warheads each—depending on the point at which other nuclear Powers will join in the nuclear disarmament process—while all non-strategic nuclear weapons should be phased out.

The Concept of Deterrence Is Now in Trouble

In the move, via bilateral and multilateral verifiable agreements, to new levels of minimum nuclear deterrence, qualitative and quantitative parameters of nuclear arsenals will contribute, not only to overcoming past confrontational issues, but also to a deep and irreversible restructuring of international relations.

A phased process of nuclear disarmament does not preclude the existence, at certain times, of mechanisms of nuclear deterrence. However, in this period, the essence of which is a transition from nuclear oversaturation to a non-nuclear world, deterrence through nuclear forces would be transformed into deterrence by politics, law, transparency and verification.

This picture may, however, be assessed as too bright. The most probable development will involve certain braking mechanisms that would switch on simultaneously in the course of this process. As practice has shown, nuclear disarmament is an element of "higher resistance", and after "arms control" ends and the elimination of nuclear arms begins, resistance will increase. In other words, achieving a level of "minimum deterrence" is possible in the first place at the cost of the elimination of excessive nuclear arsenals, but as the process continues, the harder it will be, until a "minimum nuclear deterrence" level may become an unnegotiable barrier on the way to a non-nuclear world. Achieving a minimum agreed level of nuclear arms does not touch the essential basis of deterrence nor does it provide an answer to the question what will be the ultimate foundation of international security in a non-nuclear world.

It would not be possible to jump over this barrier in one leap and to do away with nuclear weapons all at once, as some suggest, unless humanity saw that the world it was entering would be safer than the former one. Building a non-nuclear world under current conditions certainly cannot be understood as simply going back to the pre-nuclear world with all of its problems and contradictions.

One of the major problems that arises in this context is that nuclear weapons are an organic element of the system of international security formed after the Second World War. However great the efforts that might be exercised at the highest political level to go beyond the limits of the cold war, the mutual nuclear deterrence situation that took form in monstrous military potentials will tend to perpetuate confrontational inter-State relations.

The doctrine of deterrence has in it a built-in concept of a fierce enemy, an idea of mutual intimidation and competition in nuclear build-up. The gradual overcoming of these stereotypes presumes, in all probability, a new look at nuclear weapons.

Indeed, until recently, the nuclear threat was *personified*. Each side regarded the other as the bearer of such a threat. From this there arose false assessments of the intentions of the potential enemy which, in turn, led to destabilization. If the "image of the enemy" evaporates, then the nuclear threat is also de-personified. The bearer of the threat vanishes and only the threat proper remains. Psychologically, it originates now, not from the other side, but from the nuclear weapons themselves. The very nature of these weapons is such that no matter how small a quantity of them is left in the world, and even if the threat of an intended nuclear war were to be reduced to zero, as long as there are nuclear weapons there would continue to be a danger that war would break out as a result of an accident, a wrong assessment or provocation. However low the level of nuclear balance may be, it is incompatible with real security, national or international, which, by definition, is the absence of danger. Common sense tells us that it should not be a matter of nuclear deterrence, but of deterrence of nuclear weapons themselves. This means a halt to their build-up and modernizing as well as a gradual but continuous elimination of the stocks until they are completely eliminated and there is a ban on their production.

In this context one may say with confidence that there will be no future for nuclear weapons if mankind moves to a new kind of world in the twenty-first century, a more homogeneous world. Viewed in its broad historical context, the absurd character of the doctrine of deterrence is revealed in all its folly.

Is It Possible to Go beyond Deterrence?

In a divided world the task of reducing the risk of nuclear confrontation seems to be confined to reaching the level of minimum nuclear deterrence. However, to overcome the need for deterrence altogether it will really be necessary to change the current structure of international relations, which is characterized by narrowing, but still profound, differences in the socio-economic systems of industrialized States and by a lack of stability in Europe, including Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in the developing world. Such a change may in fact be possible only by introducing elements of universal federalism into today's system of international relations, that is, a restructuring on the principle of a United States of the World.

Global problems can be resolved only by the combined efforts of all nations. There is a growing understanding that the contemporary world is not composed of several mutually exclusive civilizations, but rather of one common civilization in which there should be common values and freedom of choice.

Important integrative processes are under way in the political sphere, although so far these are manifested in the forms inherited from the post-war period. The European continent is the scene of gradually maturing elements of new international security structures, replacing military blocs. In general, the axis of global conflicts is gradually shifting from East-West to North-South relations. This shift will force industrialized countries into a closer relationship, one that is changed from passive mutual understanding to active interaction and businesslike cooperation.

At the same time, a process of globalization of economic life is evolving that should eventually result in the establishment of an integrated world economy and of a genuinely universal market. In such an environment, the need to maintain deterrence will simply cease to exist.

In this context the well-known American concept of going beyond containment apparently deserves attention. After all, it is predicated on the idea of incorporating Russia and other Commonwealth States into the world community and of jointly resolving global problems. If freed of various ideological and military power stereotypes inherited from the past, and given a truly human dimension, this concept may serve as a basis for the world's progress to a new community of the twenty-first century and therefore pave the way for overcoming deterrence *per se*. Naturally, such an approach presupposes not only Russia's return to the fold of world civilization but also a profound change in the approach of the United States and other Western countries to Russia and to the world as a whole. Overcoming containment and deterrence implies the final renunciation of ideological stereotypes that nations have been living with for more than 70 years. It also implies a vision of not only short-term but also long-term prospects for the development of civilization, and an unambiguous recognition of the fact that the ideal social system of the third millennium will be characterized only by a synthesis of all the positive experiences accumulated by human societies.

Notes

1 "Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to Nuclear Weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States". The text is reproduced in United Nations document A/47/60-S/23329, annex VI, and in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations,* vol. XV, No. 1, 1992.

2 The initiative of President George Bush of 27 September 1991 and the response of President Mikhail Gorbachev of 5 October 1991 are reproduced in United Nations documents A/C.1/46/10, annex, and A/46/592-S/23161, annex, respectively, and in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations,* vol. XV, No. 1, 1992. The message from the President of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 27 January 1992, is reproduced in United Nations document A/47/77-S/23486 and Corr.1, annex.

The Future of Nuclear Weapons
in a Changing World

Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order

Michael M. May

Introduction

Almost universally over the past thirty years (since roughly the Cuban missile crisis), nuclear weapons have been viewed as deterrents of last resort, not as tools of any other policy. This occurred under conditions when the world's large Powers were committed not to make major changes in the status quo by force. The fear that attempting to make such forcible major changes could escalate to nuclear war played a role in this restraint.[1] But, reciprocally, the very stability of cold-war arrangements helped make the status quo acceptable.

As a result, except for the threat inherent in the nuclear standoff, a threat which participants became increasingly confident they could deal with, the major Powers did not face threats of invasion or extinction, such as they faced before World War II. The period after the Second World War has seen wars of national liberation, wars of religion, wars to maintain or marginally change the status quo, but very little of the balance-of-power wars involving great Powers directly which were prevalent in all earlier periods. Such wars have been viewed since

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World War II as not worth whatever policy objectives may be at stake.

These stable cold-war relationships have now given way, to be replaced by others as yet not clearly discernible. The main question facing any analyst of the future role of nuclear weapons is whether any nuclear or nuclear-capable Power will perceive threats to its ultimate autonomy or existence. If they do not, nuclear weapons, given their nature as dangerous and indiscriminate instruments of destruction, are likely to remain in the background, or subside deeper into it, deterrents of last resort against improbable threats. Cooperative arrangements for managing questions regarding nuclear weapons are then likely to be effective. The non-proliferation regime, as an example, will probably be enhanced. A movement towards meaningful international control of these weapons and agreed reductions to very small numbers can also be envisaged.

If, on the other hand, relations are unstable and the Governments of some nuclear or nuclear-capable Powers perceive that there are serious threats to their security, questions regarding nuclear weapons—questions of purpose, national control, size of deployments, modernization measures—will loom larger on policy agendas. Perceptions of such potential serious threats could arise, for instance, from failure of the current attempts to keep Germany integrated into either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or a West European nuclear alliance; from threats by a resurgent Russia against some of its neighbours; from abandonment by the United States of its extended deterrent policy with respect to Japan, together perhaps with new evidence of nuclear developments in Korea. While the details of each Government's reaction to such events is not predictable, the constructive developments noted in the previous paragraph (de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, cooperative security regimes, enhanced non-proliferation regime, movement towards international control) would be less likely to occur.

Thus, the future role of nuclear weapons must be evaluated in the light of the future stability of security arrangements, particularly as they affect the larger Powers. In what follows, we attempt to sketch some elements of such an evaluation. We do this in three sections. The first deals with the nuclear aspects of the United States-Russian-Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) relationship. The second deals with nuclear weapons and other major Powers. The third deals with some characteristics of the nuclear weapons question elsewhere. Given the breadth of this assignment, we will attempt to identify major drivers for nuclear policy rather than detailed options in each area.

The New United States–Russian–CIS Nuclear Relationship

The United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan are engaged in an unprecedented exercise in nuclear force reduction and consolidation, combining technological, bureaucratic, political and economic factors on several fronts. The major elements of the situation may be summarized as follows.

First, all parties apparently wish to minimize the likelihood and dangers of any future nuclear confrontation. The United States and Russia have indicated that their preferred means to that end are the consolidation of former Soviet nuclear forces under a single command and control structure, the accession of the other republics to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear States, and deep mutual reductions on both sides in the numbers of nuclear weapons and weapons systems. The CIS republics other than Russia have agreed to most of this.[2] At the date of this writing, Ukraine and Belarus have agreed to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear States. Kazakhstan has not, though it has agreed not to have nuclear weapons on its territory.

Secondly, President Bush, former Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin have made specific commitments to withdraw and destroy tactical nuclear weapons, to speed up the START timetables for reductions of strategic weapons and to reduce alert levels, with Yeltsin proposing that the United States and Russia stop targeting each other.[3]

Thirdly, the CIS republics other than Russia retain some suspicion of ultimate Russian goals and Russian capabilities. A complex bargaining is going on, involving all four republics, the United States and other Western States capable of giving economic help to the CIS republics. On 12 March 1992, for example, Ukraine's President Kravchuck announced that, while not changing the overall policy that Ukraine is seeking to become nuclear-weapon-free, he was halting further shipments of tactical nuclear warheads to Russia and that Ukraine intended to eliminate the warheads on its own soil, near Chernobyl, with foreign assistance.[4]

Fourthly, the United States Government has made available $400 million to assist the CIS in the destruction, under safeguards, of nuclear and other weapons.[5] Using some of this money, Germany, Russia and the United States have proposed an international science and technology centre that would help support scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union during the period of transition from defence to peacetime endeavours and be funded by the United States and others.[6] The focus, here too, includes especially nuclear weapons personnel.

These developments pave the way to a new United States-Russian-CIS nuclear relationship. How will it evolve? How stable will it be?

The transition period which the CIS republics are now going through poses a number of perils for the relationship among these republics and particularly Russia with the United States and the Western community as a whole. Internal instabilities in the republics arising from economic or nationalist causes, or from simple lack of experience, overbearing or clumsy attitudes on the part of the United States, unfulfilled expectations of help from the West: all these could occur and derail progress towards security cooperation. It would be a welcome development for the Soviet (and former tsarist) empire to adjust to new forms of governance peacefully, and it might be quite meaningful for what it would say about the perceived importance of territorial empires today. However, it cannot be counted on.

Yet, it may be reasonable to speculate that at least some aspects of the nuclear relationship will fare better than the non-nuclear relationships. The reason is that nowhere else is there as clear-cut a community of interest between the United States and Russia as in nuclear matters, and nowhere else is that community of interest so clearly perceived on both sides. Both sides to some extent consider nuclear weapons to be a dangerous bargain with destiny, with far more downside than upside potential. Nuclear weapons were not needed for the United States and Russia to be great Powers, but they could spell the downfall of both.

Thus, the measures proposed for reducing and in so far as possible eliminating the dangers of the nuclear confrontation, retaining only sufficient weapons perhaps to maintain a clear margin over the other nuclear-weapon States, are not fundamentally controversial in the United States, Russia or the other nuclear republics. Of greater political importance are the negotiations among the republics and between the republics and the West about who will control the remaining nuclear and conventional forces, and how many of the treaty-limited forces will accrue to each republic. Nuclear forces are tied to conventional threats to some extent. If Russia were to retain forces more threatening than those envisaged in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the basis for nuclear arms reductions would be changed. This, at the date of this writing, seems an unlikely outcome,[7] but the CFE Treaty was not written with the security of the former Soviet republics (or for that matter of the Central and Eastern European countries) *vis-à-vis* each other in mind.

Disagreements on conventional arms, economic, human rights and other matters will to a degree set the political climate for nuclear decisions. The realization that this is the case is one spur for making rapid progress on the nuclear question in a way that is politically satisfactory to both sides.

In the future, the United States will almost surely direct its foreign policy towards retaining workable strategic relationships with the other major power centres in the world—Russia, Western Europe, China, Japan—at least, in order to prevent the recurrence of the major crises which in the past have led to the kinds of central wars that would now be completely destructive. In the absence of specific local causes for serious disagreements, such as a Russian threat to Central Europe, or a Russian or American threat of dominance over Iran, the two former adversaries will have incentives to make common cause on global security issues. Granted the great uncertainties over the short term at least, a continuation of the current cooperation in nuclear matters between the United States, Russia and the other CIS republics concerned should lead to continued reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons and the associated systems, as well as to continued cooperation in ensuring the safe control and operations of those systems that remain.

The remaining major questions concern the extent to which a CIS with some true control over nuclear weapons will exist; whether Russia will have a nuclear monopoly if the CIS is not effective; and what the United States will do about these issues. In principle, a CIS control structure requiring multiple agreements to carry out any serious action, similar to NATO, would be a stabilizing factor, regardless of where the nuclear weapons are stationed. In practice at present, the choices are hostage to the tactical political relationships among the individual republic leaders, their effectiveness, their knowledge of the questions, and their durability in office. In the short run also, these choices cannot be dissociated from bargaining over other matters.

Eventual numbers are likely to be set by the levels which can be agreed to and verified worldwide. These levels will depend on factors that lie mainly outside the United States-Russia relationship, for instance, European arrangements for deciding nuclear weapons questions, Chinese and Japanese perceptions of their security, and the demand or lack of it for nuclear deterrence elsewhere in the world. We take up some of these questions next.

Nuclear-Weapon and Other Major Powers

The question of what is a major Power cannot of course be given a definitive or clear-cut answer. For the purpose of this paper, major Powers will be taken as those Powers agreement among which is needed to contain worldwide instabilities and conflict. Today these include at least the United States, Russia, China, Japan and the principal nations of Western Europe. The requirements for stable relationships and the nuclear aspect of these relationships are discussed very briefly in this section for China and Japan, and, somewhat more extensively, for Western Europe.

China and Japan

China is now one of the world's five or six most influential Powers, taking into account political, economic and military dimensions. This appraisal is based partly on China's potential: given peace and domestic stability, China's resources, its economic growth rate and its handling of the military dimension of power point to its rivalling the other four Power centres noted in all important respects within two or three decades.

This development need not be a threat to stability, but it may be viewed as such, particularly if the existing competing Powers do not anticipate it and do not prepare to accept it. China's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council should ease the transition in that it provides an appropriate—but only one—forum for consultation. China's foreign policy and its year-to-year variations reflect the requirements of domestic politics,[8] but its pursuit of an appropriate security, and especially nuclear security, posture is likely to remain cautiously independent.

China will have to be considered an equal in resolving questions having to do with nuclear weapons management worldwide, if those questions are to be settled cooperatively at all. As of the date of this writing, it is unlikely that China will agree to reduce or even open its nuclear facilities and forces to measures of transparency so long as the United States and Russia have so many more systems than it has.[9] At the same time, China is showing an increasing inclination to cooperate in nuclear non-proliferation efforts,[10] possibly as a result of the current perceived possibility of a nuclear weapons programme in North Korea.

Japan has a strategic dilemma, with an indeterminate outcome. Japan has stretched a small (relative to other Powers of its magnitude) geographical base, with a medium-sized, if highly talented and disciplined, population into an economic super-Power. Setting aside the question of the extent to which Japan can maintain its economic growth, Japan's strategic dilemma derives from the twin facts of its military vulnerability and the difficulties it would face in remedying that vulnerability.

The military vulnerability consists of having more vulnerable, yet more necessary, supply lines than its fellow super-Powers, and a greater vulnerability to nuclear coercion or attack than at least Russia, China and the United States. Japan has, with United States backing, spent its significant defence budget ($30 billion-$35 billion) on erecting high-technology conventional defences of its home islands and to some extent the surrounding seas.[11] To do more, for instance to acquire a long-range fleet and air force, would have a high likelihood of bringing Japan into at least diplomatic conflict with the United States, China and Russia, and might bring more severe costs. Thus Japan, to an unusual extent for the Powers under discussion here, is dependent on the good will of the other major Powers for its security. This good will, justifiably or not, sensibly or not, is being frayed by Japan's very economic success.

Japan must either retain a military alliance with the United States which they themselves perceive to be reliable under all conditions, or develop one with another nuclear super-Power, currently an unlikely event, or become an integral part of a greater whole, as Germany is and can hope to remain, or build forces of its own which could induce instabilities. The fact that Japan is not now militarily threatened does not relieve the dilemma: the United States, Russia, Europe and China are not militarily threatened from the outside either, but they are unlikely to reduce their forces to purely defensive elements or to abandon their nuclear forces. Japan clearly views its security in global, not local, terms, given its global sources of supply, markets and sources of competition.

The outline of a long-term solution to this problem is unfortunately not visible at present.[12] Incorporating Japan into cooperative frameworks for nuclear decision-making in the Pacific region or globally may help, but these frameworks will have to be based on substantially greater perceived security consensus in the region than is evident now if they are to resolve Japan's strategic dilemma. The economic, security and nuclear aspects of this dilemma cannot be separated.

Non-Russian Europe

The geopolitics of nuclear weapons in Europe outside Russia are unlike those anywhere else in the world. Europe contains three separate but related centres for nuclear decision-making—NATO, the United Kingdom and France, plus one non-nuclear Power, Germany, which is intimately involved in some nuclear decisions. The United States is also intimately involved, both through NATO and through its special relationship with the United Kingdom. The European Community (EC), some years from now, could evolve into a strategic super-Power, with or without a nuclear dimension. There is also a highly interested group of European nations, from Ukraine to Italy, which views its security future as closely linked to the nuclear weapons decisions made in and for Europe.

We focus in this analysis on the relation between underlying security perceptions and the role of nuclear weapons. Particularly topical in Europe is the question how these perceptions will shape the mechanism by which nuclear weapons decisions will be made, as well as what the decisions will be. At least three factors enter into the security perceptions of the European polities concerned with regard to nuclear weapons.

The Uncertain but Probably Positive Value of Nuclear Deterrence in Uncertain Times

At present, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are not at the top of the agenda of most European nations, with the possible exception of France. The attention of the policy makers even in that case is dominantly on economic matters.

Nevertheless, the existence of potential threats to vital interests is everywhere an input to policy. Nuclear weapons are viewed as having a potential positive value as deterrents in situations which are in the main remote but not impossible to envisage. While such a general statement is probably true everywhere, it has special relevance in Europe for at least two reasons. One is that European nations are being unpleasantly reminded by events in Yugoslavia and concerns elsewhere of their historical difficulty in averting the kind of devastating intra-European war which the alignments of the cold war had suppressed. The second is that more European nations have the wealth and technical capabilities to field nuclear forces than nations in other interactive regions.

As a result, the nuclear question cannot be taken off the European security agenda by local decisions to abstain, as was done by Argentina and Brazil in their recent agreement, or by some European countries agreeing on a nuclear-free zone. Nuclear and some non-nuclear-weapon States in Europe would be necessarily involved in any major-Power confrontation. Thus, the management of nuclear deterrence and the question of who does the managing remain major policy issues for a number of States.

The Costs and Risks of Nuclear Status

More immediately salient today than the possible benefits of nuclear deterrence, however, are the costs and risks inherent in obtaining nuclear status. The costs are diplomatic, economic and strategic. They vary from country to country, but they are very great in every case. In the case of Germany, its present status as an accepted leader of the world community and of Europe in particular would be at risk. In fact, anything but whole-hearted cooperation in avoiding further nuclear weapons proliferation would have high costs associated with it for any European country. These costs of accession to nuclear status would be considered prohibitive by most foreseeable European leaderships, although the balance of positives and negatives associated with obtaining nuclear status would depend on the circumstances. A democratic Ukraine threatened by an autocratic, aggressive Russia, for instance, would bear lesser costs than a militarily resurgent Germany.

Under any circumstances, however, nuclear status for Ukraine, Germany, or, as the Mearsheimer scenario has it,[13] Poland or Czechoslovakia, would not mean the same thing as nuclear status for France, the United Kingdom or China did. It would likely be far less of an element of great-Power status even in the dimension of security arrangements, far more of an indicator of transition to a troubling and poorly understood situation.

Desire to Participate in Nuclear Weapons Decision-Making

This desire is, and is likely to remain, a major factor, at least in determining the United Kingdom, French, German and possibly the Italian nuclear weapons policies. None of those countries is willing to cede authority for making decisions regarding nuclear weapons on a global scale to the United States, Russia and China, and on a European scale to the United States and Russia. On the contrary, there is a political impetus of several years' standing, manifested for instance in the Single European Act of 1987 and most recently reinforced at Maastricht, to unify West European foreign and security policy. While participation in nuclear weapons decisions need not always depend on having nuclear weapons or being in a nuclear alliance such as NATO, in decisions on such questions as whether and where nuclear weapons will be stationed in Europe, what the targeting and the degree of alertness will be, what provisions will be made for warning, command and control, safety, security, future production and reduction, doctrine for use or non-use, and the like, nuclear Powers and NATO have the effective authority to date.

This constitutes a powerful incentive for the United Kingdom and France to remain nuclear Powers, and for Germany (and perhaps Italy and other NATO members) to make sure either that NATO endures or else that they have a similar or greater voice in an alternative arrangement for managing nuclear weapons and other security and defence questions in Europe.[14] If neither occurs, the desire to participate in decision-making on nuclear weapons, at least as it affects Europe, on a scale commensurate with its power will be a significant factor in what Germany does about nuclear weapons arrangements.

There is thus a tension between the perceived advantages of nuclear status (ultimate deterrent value, participation in decision-making) and the multidimensional costs of attaining that status. At the same time, nuclear weapons will continue to be perceived by most Governments of Europe as being important to their security. At present, three mechanisms are serious contenders for resolving this question in Western Europe, although variants and combinations of these three may also occur. The three are:

1 *Continuation of NATO*, which in effect means continued major United States participation in nuclear weapons decisions in Europe. Here the principal questions are the willingness of the United States to stay in Europe with nuclear weapons, and the willingness of Germany to participate in NATO nuclear activities, including the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. The arrangement is well understood both by participants and outsiders, raises few questions of organization or stability, and involves comparatively few political pitfalls. While NATO's *raison d'être* has ostensibly vanished, NATO may survive just because it offers a relatively understood way to accomplish a goal several major Powers want, the cooperative management of the nuclear question in Europe.

2 *Effective West European cooperation in nuclear weapons decision-making,* through either the Western European Union (WEU) or, more likely, EC. President Mitterrand of France and President Jacques Delors of EC have recently made statements favourable to this option.[15] The historic desire of France to limit United States influence in Europe, coupled with a possible German desire to bring French nuclear forces under cooperative management, make this solution a politically possible alternative to NATO. The United Kingdom, prizing its relationship with the United States, may continue to play a balancing game, combining cooperation with the French with support for NATO.[16]

3 *Management by separate national entities,* with some more or less extensive overlay of Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) or United Nations declarative policies. In earlier times, this outcome would have had to be considered the most likely one.[17] National control could lead to

further nuclear proliferation in Europe and would carry with it the seed of further instability, at least during the transition period while Germany and others were acquiring nuclear weapons. International relations however may have changed from their historic pattern in Western Europe at least, as Robert Jervis has noted.[18] Opinion in France and elsewhere is divided on the subject of national control, but the drive to find a unified foreign and West-European defence policy to which we have alluded may tilt the scales away from this option. As Jervis also notes,[19] the less the European nations believe that a serious threat will arise from within Europe, the less threatening their interdependence will be to them, and the more willing they will be to cooperate in this area as in others.

The CSCE or the United Nations or any agency springing from these are not included as major management options, because these organizations can only be charged with the management of nuclear weapons in Europe in a derivative sense. The ultimate power and responsibility will rest with one or other of the organizational frameworks listed above, because responsibility for the management of a nuclear weapons capability cannot be carried out apart from responsibility for the management of, first, a surrounding conventional force capability, command and control elements with both military and political reporting channels and, secondly, a supporting logistics, procurement, and R&D system and a base of taxation or other reliable means of assuring their long-term support. In the absence of these, any management system would be a creature of those sources of support.

In summary, if the perceived threats to Europe are viewed as coming from outside Europe, there is some likelihood of an EC or WEU alternative coming into being. This is also the case if the EC emerges as a more and more viable and active political actor on the world scene. If intra-European threats to the major European countries develop—not at present a likely eventuality—the national alternative seems likely to occur. If nothing much happens in the way of new threats, perhaps little besides talk will occur in the area of nuclear weapons management. In that case, NATO, as an existing organization with which no one is too dissatisfied, may survive as a way to manage the details of the nuclear weapons question, and France may draw closer to NATO.

Numbers of nuclear weapons in the hands of France and the United Kingdom are not likely to go down during the present interim period. They may not go down at all until the United States and Russian numbers are considerably reduced. The United States and Soviet reductions in fact may revalue rather than devalue British and French stockpiles, as the two become more equal to those of the former super-Powers.

Greater attention is being paid to command and control and security matters than ever before. More forces may go off alert status, for cost and security reasons. What to target is a question for all nuclear Powers now. As alert levels are reduced, however, pre-targeting loses much of its saliency as a policy question. For nuclear weapons as for conventional weapons, lists of targets can be generated corresponding to the various war plans generated by military staffs, but weapons systems do not have to be pre-committed to any set of targets.

Elsewhere: New Aspects of Nuclear Deterrence

Perceptions of the stability of international relations in particular regions are likely to be the main determinants of the demand for nuclear weapons on the part of national governments in those regions. Three regions have been of particular concern on this score—the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula. In all three, nuclear supply restrictions imposed (with varying degrees of commitment) by the major Powers have failed, and demand incentives and disincentives have been the dominant factors in determining the course of nuclear decision-making. We note also the progress which some regions (South America, South Africa), where the likelihood of dire outside threats has receded, have made towards eliminating nuclear weapons programmes.

This range of variations in underlying security situations makes it clear that analysing the future role of nuclear weapons in these various parts of the world cannot be treated within the confines of this article. We limit our consideration to two less-often-treated aspects of the subject, which bear on our main topic of the relation between international stability and nuclear weapons. The first is how nuclear deterrence may operate between a smaller and a larger Power or coalition. The second is what the general policy alternatives are for dealing with nuclear proliferation when the supply and demand incentives and disincentives usually applied fail.

It may be useful to begin by recalling certain facts and common assessments.[20] A nuclear weapons programme is a medium-cost, medium-technology programme. The initial investment ranges from a few billions of dollars for a few weapons to tens or more billions (unless the weapons are bought or stolen). The nuclear materials, plutonium and enriched uranium, are the only unique, not widely available ingredients of these weapons, although other components can be traced through international trade. People in many countries know or can learn the technologies involved. The delays observed in some nuclear weapons programmes have had more to do with bureaucratic, political and social infrastructure impediments than with technical constraints. The means of targeting and delivering the weapons, if a country does not aspire to threaten countries on distant continents with massive attack, need not cost more nor be more demanding technologically than the weapons themselves. They need not be intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example: civil aircraft, ships, boats, trucks will do to threaten cities, where time and numbers of detonations are not of the essence.

A single nuclear explosion in the tens of kilotons yield range readily attainable in a first device can destroy a few square miles of a city, destroy or disable an aircraft carrier or similar ship within half a mile or more of the site of the explosion, destroy an airbase with all aircraft on the base, or destroy an array of military landing craft. Damage to non-targeted areas from a few such explosions, for example, from fires or fallout, would be limited and might be similar to levels of damage outside targeted areas in non-nuclear wars.

These features of nuclear weapons are well known. They were not at the centre of attention for the United States–Soviet confrontation, where political attention was properly focused on the likely country- or world-wide devastation attendant on the detonation of hundreds or thousands of large-yield nuclear weapons. They may play a more central role, however, in future nuclear deterrent situations. Together, they imply that:

1 Nuclear weapons can be an equalizer against high-value, concentrated targets, such as the means of great-Power intervention. Only one weapon needs to get through defences to its target. Thus, even if defences are good, only a few weapons need to be allocated to each target. An airbase or an aircraft carrier is thousands of times more valuable than the nuclear weapons needed to destroy it with high assurance. Advanced conventional, chemical and biological weapons, on the other hand, are difficult and expensive to deliver, requiring many sorties by skilled pilots and advanced aircraft for the same result, making them uncertain in their effectiveness against military targets.

2 At low or moderate levels of attack, with from a few to tens of weapons, it is feasible to restrict damage largely to military targets if that is desired. This applies particularly if the military targets attacked are intervention forces, operating initially from a few isolated airbases or from ships.

Both the "equalizing" feature of nuclear weapons and the possibility of using nuclear weapons as tactical deterrents may play a larger role in the future deterrent situations than they did in the past. In the United States–Soviet situation, nuclear weapons entered as one ingredient in a bilateral standoff between two very large, relatively distant and relatively stable polities. The United States and the Soviet Union were not usually vitally involved in the same areas. (Germany may have been an exception, and the partition of Germany was accepted early on.) Neither side had to win every battle: both had resources and opportunities to maintain its power despite occasional set-backs. Both were deterred by the immense difficulties that would have attended direct military action by either against the other, as well as by the threat of nuclear destruction. Neither was under domestic political pressure to win by war over its opponent, quite the reverse.

On the contrary, a nuclear confrontation in the Persian Gulf, for instance, could involve the perceived vital interests of both opponents. One or both might perceive that it would have to win to maintain its power. One of the polities involved might not be stable or well-informed. In these circumstances, nuclear deterrence might be perceived as less than a stable situation and, by the same token, might work against great-Power intervention.

An opponent with more time at his disposal than Saddam Hussein—who could have waited to invade Kuwait until he had perhaps tens of nuclear weapons at his disposal, some on Scuds or the like, some dispersed around the world on ships, civil aircraft, trucks or other places of which the United States had no knowledge—could have faced the possibility of intervention with nuclear deterrence at both tactical and strategic levels. "Attack my military forces, and I will retaliate against your military forces, with nuclear weapons if I must. The damage will be great but largely limited to fighting forces. I will not initiate an attack against cities. If you initiate attacks on our cities, not only will you reap the world's condemnation, but I will retaliate against some Western cities of my choosing." It is questionable whether any coalition would have held against this approach.

It can be argued that the United States and other advanced countries would not permit a situation to develop where a

Saddam Hussein would have tens of deliverable nuclear weapons. The question is how to prevent it. So-called supply-side measures, inhibitions on the creation or transfer of nuclear and other needed materials, have and will continue to delay Governments seeking to make nuclear weapons. On the demand side also, a number of promising approaches exist: fostering regional security and arms control pacts, making sales of conventional arms and economic aid conditional on adherence to these pacts or to otherwise reasonable military postures. The United States, EC and Japan (which does not sell arms but does have the world's largest foreign aid programme) have all moved in that direction.

There remains however the clear possibility that these measures will not be enough. They would have to be applied by the major arms and economic aid suppliers to countries with which they have a wide spectrum of relations, and they would have to be perceived by the recipients as durable. A system of incentives and disincentives to curb nuclear weapon demand must be seen as effective, lasting and politically acceptable to countries as varied as Iran, North and South Korea, South Africa, the Central European countries, Israel and any other country which perceives that its vital interests may be threatened either by a neighbour or by one of the big Powers, as well as to the supplier countries.

If, despite these supply and demand measures, a nuclear-weapons programme develops in some country that is deemed to be a threat to peace, two general approaches may be identified. One is deterrence and containment, the other is forcible intervention. These approaches could be complementary but they may also be incompatible with each other.

Deterrence and containment were, along with arms control, the tools used to limit the nuclear danger during the cold war. They require a clear commitment to the defence of vital areas, often manifested by the presence of forces in the areas before hostile action is initiated by the side to be deterred, and backed—at least tacitly—by the threat of nuclear force if the side to be deterred has nuclear weapons.

These steps are costly and often unpopular. Yet historical studies of deterrence have concluded that deterrence works best when prior military commitments are visible and unmistakable.[21] These studies have dealt with non-nuclear situations, but the nuclear-weapon factor probably would reinforce that conclusion. Nuclear weapons are suited to reinforcing the status quo, making the expected risk of aggressive action both very high and very uncertain. They are not suited to aggression against a nuclear Power, because of the ease and devastating effectiveness of retaliation. Thus nuclear weapons in essence help dissuade both sides from using force in vital areas.

In our example of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein, pre-positioning forces in Kuwait would have tended to have the same effect as did pre-positioning forces in Europe during the cold war. These pre-positioned forces would have made a quick victory by conventional means impossible. The putative Iraqi nuclear force would have had far less impact than if the nuclear Saddam had been able to face the United States with a *fait accompli* by means of a conventional invasion, as the non-nuclear Saddam did.

Containment goes hand in hand with deterrence. Containment has both military and economic dimensions. The military dimension comes into play after some degree of aggression has succeeded and further aggression is prevented by sufficient visible military commitments. Thus, if, in our example of a nuclear Saddam, aggression against Kuwait had not been prevented, further aggressions could have been contained militarily. The economic dimension is represented by the United Nations sanctions against Iraq or the cold-war economic isolation of the Soviet bloc from the Western economies.

Both deterrence and containment require long-term electoral support for cooperation, as distinct from dominance or unilateral action, whether it be intervention or withdrawal.

There is evidence in the United States, EC and Japan at least that electorates will follow (and sometimes lead) their leaders in supporting such cooperation, but, since it is a long-term cooperative commitment of military forces and money, and since no single great Power is likely to get its way all the time, it is vulnerable to politics and bad times.

Armed intervention is the other possibility. It requires a clear unifying cause if it is to be compatible with international cooperation. The invasion of Kuwait provided such a cause in the case of Iraq, but in the long run a strategy of intervening with armed force to prevent proliferation is likely to be divisive as nations differ over whether such drastic means are warranted. Armed intervention thus probably puts at risk the possibility of cooperative deterrence and containment policies.

Armed intervention has several other drawbacks. It could give Powers which might foresee future difficulties with the United States (or some other major Power) greater incentives to acquire nuclear weapons than would a strategy of deterrence and containment, in part because a nuclear capability, if it can be acquired, is more likely to be effective against a strategy of armed intervention than against a strategy of deterrence and containment. Thus, a strategy of armed intervention would be more vulnerable to partial failure than a strategy of deterrence and containment.

In addition, while armed intervention is not guaranteed to be successful, it is an act of war. Wars are among the most unpredictable of human activities. To use Iraq as a precedent for future interventions against third world Powers is assuming that the next war will be like the last one. That assumption has usually been wrong. Armed intervention to curb nuclear proliferation would be an extremely risky policy.

Finally, the fact that nuclear weapons are at issue could tempt the interveners to use nuclear weapons first. It could also tempt interveners to broaden the category of weapons to be deterred by nuclear weapons to include chemical and biological weapons. Both tendencies are counter-productive from the standpoint of peace and non-proliferation. First-use of nuclear weapons provides an incentive to all nations to procure them if and while they can. It is a demonstration of their effectiveness and of the fragility of international covenants against their use.

In sum, in a world where security arrangements are more uncertain than they were, and a number of countries view themselves as threatened either by their neighbours or by the major Powers, effectively enforced nuclear disarmament world-wide is unlikely. Such disarmament may not be possible so long as the possibility of wars involving the vital interests of any actor exists. Under these circumstances, nuclear deterrence may become both more popular and more unstable, and may be an effective equalizer for small Powers against large Powers.

A cooperative policy involving at least the major Powers, attentive to both supply and demand factors for nuclear weapons, and therefore of necessity also eventually for conventional weapons, backed by deterrence and containment where necessary, is likely to serve the interests of peace and non-proliferation over the long run better than recourse to armed intervention. Such a policy would of necessity require more joint commitment to long-term objectives than has been the norm except where survival was threatened. In other words, the "crystal ball" which nuclear weapons conferred on the "cold warriors", permitting them to be steadfast in alliances and prudent and cautious in confrontation, will now have to extend to their policies towards the rest of the world if a race to nuclear armaments is to be avoided.

A Word on United States Policy Choices

The prospective role of nuclear weapons, like much else in the prospects for international relations, depends to an important degree on United States policy choices. Put more starkly than is realistic for the sake of argument, the United States has three choices regarding security issues in general and nuclear security in particular: it can cling to the one-super-Power approach to international relations; it can attempt to curtail its foreign security commitments much as the United Kingdom did after the Second World War; or it can attempt to move gradually from its present super-Power position to one of leader of a grouping of like-minded States. While there is some overlap among these approaches, they also have defining distinctions.[22] We will consider them primarily from the standpoint of nuclear security, with the understanding that nuclear security cannot be divorced from other aspects of security.

The first approach, in the nuclear area, would imply strong, if needed unilateral, United States action to prevent or minimize nuclear proliferation, together with pressure on the other nuclear Powers to minimize or eliminate their arsenals. Moves by any nation to get nuclear weapons would be viewed as an attack on United States status rather than from a more general viewpoint of their effect on world stability. The United States would try to maintain an asymmetric advantage over Russia, perhaps by deploying defence.

This approach is unsustainable over the long or even the medium term. It would be in essence a return to older policies of national dominance and it would have the usual result of causing the other major Powers to come together in some combinations to balance United States power. Thus, it could spur EC or WEU to form a more integrated policy, less cooperative with the United States than it would otherwise have been. It could tempt Russia to expand its power again, perhaps to the south as it has traditionally done. It could be likely to lead eventually to war if sustained to the extent that perceived vital security interests of other nations would be infringed. The approach implies that the United States would be the ultimate judge of the validity of these security interests, a position which other nations could not accept.

This approach could be dismissed out of hand as not likely to be supported by the American electorate if it were not for its possible perceived short-term economic benefits. If there are structural reasons for the current economic downturn, and if these are not remedied because the remedies are politically unpalatable, then increased government military expenditures, in the name of real or fancied security risks, could be seen as a way to rally political support, deflect criticism of current ills, and over the short term stimulate the economy. There could occur a situation in which bad times, an unreasonable fear of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and an unreasoned resentment of foreign economic competition could make an appeal to "remain number one" attractive and could gain electoral support in the United States for a more actively militaristic policy in a number of areas, including the nuclear area.

It is more likely however that this combination of factors (as well as others) could lead the United States into a period of retrenchment from international security activities. The wholesale retrenchment of a United Kingdom, which itself took many years, may not be in the cards soon, but there could be a diminished role for the United States abroad via a steeper than planned reduction in United States forces and a withdrawal of troops and security guarantees, for instance, from Europe and East Asia. To a degree, this is certain to occur in view of the end of the cold war. The main question is whether it will occur in cooperation with United States allies or despite their objections. The resolution of this question will affect such things as the future of NATO, and the nuclear policies of Germany, Japan, Russia and China. Without cooperation, the chances for international management of nuclear weapons questions are lessened, and of nuclear proliferation, especially among the larger Powers, increased.

This leaves the third, and most difficult, approach as the most desirable one if the linked causes of stability, peace and nuclear non-proliferation are to be served. Cooperation is more frustrating than dominance or withdrawal. It requires more in the way of continued attention and political commitment. The alliances with NATO partners and Japan were difficult to manage politically during the cold war, when these alliances benefited from a politically widely accepted security rationale. The political commitment needed to manage nuclear questions cooperatively now will be even more demanding. Yet, the stakes are still very high. The other two approaches we have defined are likely to lead to serious misunderstandings among the major nations, the first because other nations are not likely to accept United States dominance for long, the second because a sudden transition from the present situation is likely to cause some overreactions abroad, which in turn will have their repercussions in the United States.

Conclusion

The return to a multilateral world order, with at least five, qualitatively different, major Powers, at different stages of their history and with different world views, will put stresses on the strategic nuclear stability that has characterized the past 45 years. Yet policies that will ensure, in actuality and perception, against threats to the autonomy and survival of nuclear and nuclear-capable nations are necessary if nuclear weapons are to remain in a deterrent, or stability-reinforcing, role, and not become a disastrously destabilizing force. As we see from the foregoing brief survey, challenges to these policies arise all over the world, in the troubled CIS, in rapidly evolving East Asia, and, not least, in the parts of the world where the present major American and European Powers have held sway historically over local polities.

We conclude where we began: the future role of nuclear weapons is hostage to perceived stable relations among the world's major Powers and to lack of perceived serious threats among nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. The word "perceived" refers here to the perceptions in the several Governments involved, not in the United States alone. In short, nuclear weapons must neither be forgotten nor be the cause of hysteria. Paradoxically, in order for nuclear weapons to remain in the background of relations among major Powers, where all wish them to remain, maintaining cooperative management of questions relating to them and to central security generally must retain a high priority on the political agendas.

It is not likely to be true, as some have argued,[23] that military security in the "first world" now takes a back seat to "economic security". Rather, they are different but essentially linked aspects of common security. So long as cooperation and perceived stability can be maintained, management of either can be carried out without interference from the other: in terms of the trillions in world trade, the costs of cooperative security and especially of cooperative nuclear security are minor. Mismanagement of either, however, carries serious risks of adversely affecting the possibility of managing the other successfully.

Notes

1 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System", *International Security*, vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.

2 Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces, 30 December 1991, published in *Arms Control Today*, January/February 1992. Testimony by Reginald Bartholomew, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs, before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 February 1992.

3 Statement by George Bush, 27 September 1991 and subsequently. Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, 5 October 1991. Statement by Boris Yeltsin, 29 January 1992.

4 Press reports of 12 March 1992. Trip report of visit to Russia and Ukraine by United States Congressional Delegation, Senator Nunn and others, 6-10 March 1992.

5 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 ("Nunn-Lugaar Amendment"), signed into law on 12 December 1991.

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8 Susan Shirk, "Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen", *Beyond the Cold War in the Pacific*, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, *Studies in Conflict and Cooperation*, University of California at San Diego, Number 2, 1991, pp. 41 ff.

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13 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.

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15 Speech by President François Mitterrand at the "Rencontres nationales pour l'Europe", Paris, 10 January 1992; and comments by European Commission President Jacques Delors on the same day. Reported in the press: for example, *AFP*, 10 January 1992.

16 Levine, op. cit., pp. 141-167.

17 Mearsheimer, op. cit.

18 Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?", *International Security*, vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73.

19 Jervis, op. cit., pp. 46-52.

20 The literature on this subject is very extensive. A basic reference is Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990" (Oxford, Westview Press, 1990). For a brief recent review of ways and means of nuclear proliferation, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Containing Nuclear Proliferation", Adelphi Paper 263 (London, Brassey's for the IISS, 1991) especially pp. 16-22. For information on nuclear effects, see, for example, Dietrich Schroeer, "Science, Technology and the Nuclear Arms Race" (Wiley, 1984).

21 A review is given in: Jack S. Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure", *Perspectives on Deterrence*, Paul C. Stern and others, eds. (Oxford, New York, 1989), pp. 98 ff.

22 Charles Maynes, "America Without the Cold War", *Foreign Policy*, No. 78 (Spring 1990), pp. 3 ff.

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The Korean Peninsula: Security Concerns and CBMs

On Ensuring Security on the Korean Peninsula and National Reunification

Choi U Jin

At the sixth Inter-Korean High-Level Talks, held in Pyongyang on 19 February 1992, the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South, an epoch-making event and a milestone in the establishment of peace and the reunification of the country, and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula came into effect.[1]

The North-South Agreement and the Joint Declaration have opened bright prospects for the peaceful reunification of the country and elimination of the threat of war. The commitment of the North and the South to reconciliation and cooperation for the sake of reunification has proved that neither foreign Powers nor differences of ideologies and systems could keep our nation separated. Inspired by the sixth North-South High-Level Talks, our nation has taken a valuable first step towards peaceful reunification. Towards that end, both sides should implement that first Agreement and endeavour to make it fruitful.

Our great leader President Kim Il Sung said:

> "The Government of our Republic regards these historic agreements as precious results of our efforts to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of our country and will make every effort to implement them."

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The most urgent task facing the North and the South is to bring about the reunification of the fatherland and restore peace to the nation. If another war were to break out in Korea, national reunification, not to speak of the very existence of the nation, would be in jeopardy.

Early solution of the problems of peace could save our nation from the threat of a nuclear war, and the elimination of military confrontation could help to bring about national reunification and unity on the basis of mutual confidence. Now that the North and the South are firmly committed to non-aggression, they have neither a reason to compete with each other nor a need to waste the resources of the fatherland on meaningless confrontation.

In conformity with the spirit of the Agreement, the North and the South should put a halt to the arms race and reduce their troops and military equipment. This would be the most reliable guarantee of non-aggression and of the complete elimination of the threat of aggression by either side.

We have made active efforts in this regard, witness the phased arms reduction proposal put forward in July 1987, the comprehensive peace package offered in November 1988, and the further detailed proposal made in May 1990 by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). We unilaterally reduced our troops by 100,000 in 1987, and since 1986 we have mobilized 150,000 soldiers of the People's Army to work for socialist economic reconstruction.

The issues of phased arms reduction, confidence-building exchanges of military information and the elimination of nuclear weapons, which are the main elements of the disarmament proposals we put forward, are reflected in the North-South Agreement and the Joint Declaration. The old "armistice" system of the cold-war era should be abolished in order to make way for the creation of a favourable climate for implementation of the Agreement.

Now that the North-South Joint Military Commission, a new body dealing with military affairs, is to be set up, the armistice-supervising regime has lost its original meaning. Moreover, the United States troops ("United Nations Forces") have no reason to remain in South Korea any longer. It is high time for the United States to put an end to its old policy with regard to Korea and adapt to the changed situation.

Since the problem of Korea's reunification is historically linked with the international relationship, the countries concerned should do their part to create a favourable atmosphere for Korea's reunification. In particular, the United States, the party directly responsible for the situation in Korea, should, albeit belatedly, play the role assigned to it in helping to bring about the reunification of Korea.

Today, however, the relationship between the DPRK and the United States is not in keeping with the current trend and the desire of the people, a fact which indicates that there still exist certain problems on the Korean peninsula that are not in accord with the reconciliation and *détente* of the present time.

The collapse of the cold-war structure based on confrontation between the super-Powers helped create the conditions for improved relations between the DPRK and the United States.

If there is to be a change in the international situation the United States should amend its policy with regard to Korea in order to create a basis for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula. It should not lay down preconditions in the process of putting an end to the hostile relations between our two countries. The DPRK and the United States have no reason to remain hostile to each other just because they once fought against each other. Now that the DPRK has become a Member of the United Nations, the United States should reconsider the status of "United Nations Command" and "United Nations Forces" and take appropriate measures. We are pleased with the successful outcome of the DPRK-United States high-level talks held in New York early this year.

It is our consistent stand that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a denuclearized zone of peace. We have neither the intention nor the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. We value independence more than physical life. We do not refrain from doing what we should do because of pressure from others nor do we do things we should not do.

When the main obstacles to our signing the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were removed recently as we demanded, and when propitious circumstances and fair conditions for settling the issue of nuclear weapons were created, we signed the agreement in Vienna, on 30 January 1992, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and we announced publicly that we would accept IAEA inspections as soon as the safeguards agreement was ratified and a written notification of its ratification sent to IAEA in conformity with the relevant articles of the agreement regarding its entry into force.

In accordance with the request of the Deputies of the Supreme People's Assembly, the safeguards agreement between the Government of our Republic and IAEA was examined at the session of the Assembly's Standing Committee held on 18 February, and the Committee decided to submit it to the Assembly for discussion at its session to be held early in April. On 9 April the agreement was ratified.

The North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission, established to implement the Joint Declaration, will make the necessary provisions for the denuclearization process.

In the future, too, we will carry out our duties under the non-proliferation Treaty in good faith, thereby contributing in a positive way to turning the Korean peninsula into a denuclearized zone, abolishing nuclear weapons and defending the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world.

The other important thing in ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula is to achieve national reunification. Only when reunification has been achieved can there be enduring peace. With the recent adoption of the North-South Agreement, the necessary conditions have been created between the North and South to put an end to the confrontation that has gone on for almost half a century and to achieve national unity in an atmosphere of reconciliation.

Once a decision has been taken on the formula for reunification, we could say that agreement on the issue of reunification between the North and the South is feasible. Without deciding on the modalities of the reunification, the North and the South cannot, however much they talk about reunification, work together towards the common objective. Now that the North and the South are facing national reunification, they should agree as soon as possible upon the method of reunification and make every effort to bring it about.

Reunification by way of confederation could be achieved peacefully in the present circumstances. The ideologies and systems are different in the North and in the South of Korea. If neither side is willing to make concessions on its own, reunification should be realized by way of confederation on the basis of one nation, one State, two systems and two governments, with neither side the victor or the vanquished.

It would be unrealistic to advocate reunification under one system while ignoring the stark reality that there are different systems in the North and in the South. Moreover, unification of the systems, in any way, cannot be acceptable to either side inasmuch as it would be based on the assumption that one side had won over the other.

Reunification by way of confederation is a very practical and realistic way of national reunification. Our nation is one nation and cannot be divided. Ours is a homogeneous nation, one that has been living on the same territory since olden times, creating a national culture with one blood and one language.

Though there are different ideologies and systems in the North and the South, the nation is still one and its homogeneity still exists. Its heterogeneity related to the different ideologies and systems that have existed for more than 45 years is not a major problem when we consider the national homogeneity that has been consolidated throughout thousands of years. The differences in ideologies and systems cannot be either a condition for separating a nation into two parts or an obstacle that cannot be overcome on the road to reunification.

Insisting only on the "reunification of systems" without taking account of such practical circumstances and possibilities would indicate opposition to reunification and the intention of protracting the division. Reunification through the victory of one side over the other would only deepen the North-South confrontation and lead to a military conflict and even the national tragedy of a fratricidal war.

Taking these points into consideration, we advocate reunification by way of confederation on the basis of one nation, one State, two systems and two governments. We are convinced that national reunification can be achieved peacefully and most rapidly if this principle is observed.

We have already put forward a proposal for the establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo as a means of reunification that is in conformity with this major principle. This proposal can serve as the groundwork for a national agreement and certainly as a means of reunification.

The South Korean people and many people throughout the world support our proposal for confederation. Reunification through confederation could be achieved by vesting the regional autonomous governments of the Confederal Republic with more rights on a tentative basis and then increasing the functions of the central government in the future.

North-South dialogue on the process of national reunification should involve a comprehensive negotiation in which not only the authorities of both sides but also broad political forces would participate. The authorities of the North and of the South, all political parties, social organizations and people in all walks of life should develop bilateral or multilateral contacts and dialogues with a view to convening a political consultative conference for national reunification, one which would truly reflect the will of the entire nation and decide on the manner of national reunification.

Through the recent North-South Agreement, the two sides agreed to recognize and respect each other's system on the common understanding that the relation between the North and South is not a relation between States but one within the nation, involving phased arms reduction and cooperation with a view to promoting national unity.

In our view, the historic documents recently agreed are valuable achievements on the road to independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland and we will make every effort to implement them.

The Korean peninsula, which has been an area of sharp confrontation, is now joining in the present trend towards *détente* and peace.

The signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and South and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the recent suspending of the "Team-Spirit" Joint Military Exercises definitely show that a step has been taken towards peace. In any case, the North and the South should neither halt nor reverse this positive trend, but should rather redouble their efforts to remove military confrontation as soon as possible and to achieve a durable peace. The South Korean authorities should stop the "Team-Spirit" Joint Military Exercises not only this year but for good and should take epoch-making measures to discontinue all other large-scale military exercises.

The United States, which has a direct responsibility with regard to peace on the peninsula, should make a practical contribution to the reunification of Korea in conformity with the new reality that the North and the South have committed themselves to non-aggression and reconciliation.

In the future, as in the past, we shall continue to maintain our peace-loving position and make every possible effort to remove the tension between the North and the South in accordance with the spirit of the North-South Agreement and to turn the Korean peninsula into a denuclearized zone of peace.

Note

1 The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration were circulated in a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147). The Agreement was reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2. The Joint Declaration is reproduced in the present issue (see "Documentation Relating to Disarmament").

The Korean Peninsula: Security Concerns and CBMs

Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Seoul's Perspective

Dong-Won Lim

In his annual New Year's address in 1990, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea, then in the middle of his term of office, stated that the 1990s would be the decade of hope, suggesting a bright outlook for the security environment of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean relations. Indeed, there have been a series of positive developments on the Korean peninsula over the past two years.

This article examines Seoul's perspective on peace and security on the Korean peninsula in the light of the recent developments affecting the international environment, security interests, and prospects for arms control between the two Koreas; it also explores the tasks that the Korean Government must tackle in the years to come.

Recent Developments Affecting the Security Environment

Four major developments characterize the recent security environment of the Republic of Korea. First, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow in September 1990 generated a wave of change on the Korean peninsula. Seoul's primary goal in normalizing relations with Moscow was

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to enhance its security and legitimacy *vis-à-vis* Pyongyang. This has been pursued under the name of *Nordpolitik*, a policy which has produced some spectacular successes in the past few years. Seoul has established diplomatic relations with all of the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union and has set up a semi-official trade office with China. Seoul-Beijing relations have yet to be normalized, but the only question that remains is one of timing.

Seoul's successes in *Nordpolitik* have prompted Pyongyang to begin to adjust to the rapidly changing world, and have facilitated the phenomenon of "cross-recognition" of the two Korean States by the major international Powers. When cross-recognition of the two Koreas is achieved by the major Powers concerned, peace and security in North-East Asia will be further assured and multilateral dialogue on regional issues could develop.

Secondly, the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations on 17 September 1991 marked the culmination of the changing international environment. In particular, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to join the United Nations signified a major departure from its long-held position on the issue and could signal other possible changes in the direction of North Korea's foreign policy. North Korea had consistently objected to the granting of admission of the two Koreas simultaneously or to each separately, contending that such admission would perpetuate the division of Korea—even though the two Germanys and the Yemens were unified despite their separate membership in the United Nations.

The simultaneous entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations is an important symbol of the thawing of the cold war on the Korean peninsula. The parallel membership of the two Koreas could provide a new momentum for the normalization of relations and the ultimate reunification of South and North Korea. Seoul can help Pyongyang come out of its self-imposed isolation by supporting its membership in such United Nationsaffiliated organizations as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in which the Republic of Korea has already been playing a significant role.

Thirdly, with the emergence of East-West *détente* at the global level, the reduction of the United States forces on the Korean peninsula seems inevitable. In accordance with the Nunn-Warner amendment to the Fiscal 1990 Defense Authorization Act, the United States has begun to draw down its ground troop presence and modify command structures to move from a leading to a supporting role for its forces in the deterrence of war on the peninsula.[1] The military presence of the United States in the North-East Asian region will eventually be transformed into principally a substantial air and naval presence.

Since the United States is a maritime Power and the former Soviet Union is a great Eurasian Power, it seems very difficult for them to reach any kind of agreement on arms reduction in North-East Asia. However, the two countries do share the need to keep peace on the Korean peninsula and are taking a common stance in support of the North-South dialogue. In particular, the United States is encouraging the arms control process led by South Korea so as to ensure that the reduction of American forces on the peninsula will not lead to military instability or to a reckless arms race between Seoul and Pyongyang. The United States believes that the one place in East Asia where European-style confidence-building measures—and, in time, arms reduction initiatives—seem relevant is in Korea.[2] With the cooperative relationship between the United States and the republics of the former Soviet Union, there is a growing chance for Koreans to secure peace and solve the unification question.

Fourthly, and most important, there have been two developments on the Korean peninsula widely hailed by the South and the North as major progress in inter-Korean relations: one is the adoption of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-

Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North—appropriately known as the "Basic Agreement"—at the fifth round of the South-North High-Level Talks on 13 December 1991, and the other is the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreed on the very last day of 1991. Both agreements came into effect on 19 February 1992, at the sixth round of the High-Level Talks.[3]

The South-North Basic Agreement is the first official document governing basic inter-Korean relations consented to by the two Korean Governments. It covers three basic areas of inter-Korean relations: political, military, and multifaceted exchange and cooperation, overcoming sharp differences in past positions. For its part, the Joint Declaration stipulates, among other things, that neither side would possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities and that a joint nuclear control commission should be established, mandated to carry out inspection to verify that the Korean peninsula is nuclear-free.

The entry into force of the agreements explicitly confirms the opening of an era of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. As an institutional and conceptual starting-point for the inter-Korean system of cooperative relations, the agreements are to transform the present armistice regime into a solid peace structure on the peninsula. Moreover, the significance of the agreements is manifold. Among other things, if they proceed as they are meant to, the agreements will contribute greatly to the improvement of inter-Korean relations, and will lay a firm foundation for the process of peaceful unification of the peninsula. At a subregional level, the agreements will also go far towards making the area a safer and more peaceful place.

Despite these positive and encouraging developments, additional measures have to be taken simultaneously to achieve the ultimate unification of the peninsula, as well as peace and security in East Asia as a whole. Furthermore, striking a balance between the exigencies of local *détente* in Korea itself and those of global *détente* will require careful diplomacy on the part of Seoul. These upcoming diplomatic tasks can be identified by examining Korea's security interests.

Security Interests

The security interests of Korea lie in building peace and prosperity on the peninsula and throughout the globe and in the unification of the peninsula. More precisely, it is in Korea's interests to establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; regional stability; and peaceful unification of the peninsula.

Establishing a Solid Peace System

Reducing the risk of war and establishing a permanent peace structure are in the vital interest of the Republic of Korea. Since the legacy of the Korean War still remains and since significant military asymmetries continue to exist along the demilitarized zone, there is a real danger of renewed armed conflict and confrontation. In these tense circumstances, nothing is more important than preventing renewed conflict from occurring, and transforming the existing precarious armistice into a solid peace structure. Against this backdrop, Seoul has vigorously pursued inter-Korean *rapprochement* as was envisaged in the South-North Basic Agreement.

The Agreement, as previously noted, is the most significant step in establishing a peace system between the two Koreas and it could put an end to the four-decades-long inter-Korean confrontation. The Agreement provides that both sides shall recognize and respect each other's system, and endeavour together to convert the present armistice into a durable peace. However, written pledges alone will never bring peace. Sincere and smooth implementation of the Agreement is the key to genuine peace and reconciliation. It should also be noted that the present armistice will continue to be maintained until such a transformation takes place.

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Immediate Concern

In establishing a solid peace system on the peninsula, the Republic of Korea has some immediate security concerns. The most urgent relates to North Korea's nuclear programme.

For the past several years, Seoul has identified North Korea's nuclear weapons programme as the greatest threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as in North-East Asia. According to information from various sources, North Korea is rapidly gaining the capability to produce nuclear warheads.[4] To prompt Pyongyang to end its nuclear weapons programme, President Roh Tae Woo issued, on 18 November 1991, the Initiative for Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula, and one month later, on 18 December, announced that there were no nuclear weapons in South Korea. The two Koreas consequently adopted the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, mentioned above.

Under the Declaration, the two Koreas agreed to ban the possession or development of nuclear weapons and to allow inspections of suspected nuclear facilities. They also agreed to form a joint nuclear control commission to oversee such inspections. In addition to this development, Pyongyang recently signed and ratified its long-delayed safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Korea should open its nuclear operations to outsiders and accept not only IAEA inspections under the safeguards agreement, but also South Korea's "challenge" inspections as a complement. Pyongyang should realize that elimination of its nuclear weapons programme will promote peace on the Korean peninsula and in North-East Asia as a whole. It is the duty of the international community not to allow Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons and become a potential source of nuclear-weapon technology for other countries.

Regional Stability

Regional stability in North-East Asia is crucial to Korean security. A balance of power and interests among the four major Powers surrounding the Korean peninsula is indispensable to peace and stability in Korea and the North-East Asian region. As Korea has frequently been a victim in great-Power rivalries in the past, Korean security depends on the emerging of a stable regional environment among China, Japan, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the United States. The presence and forward deployment of the United States troops in Korea, in particular, serves the role of balancing other Powers and especially constraining Japanese military ambitions, for no other Power can play the role of "an honest broker and the final guarantor of security" without threatening Korea.

China and the republics of the former Soviet Union, for their part, as neighbouring countries that have historically maintained interests in the Korean peninsula, can also play an important supporting role in promoting the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. Their contribution in this regard will serve the interests of all concerned. Seoul is seeking mutually beneficial relations with these countries on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

Peaceful Unification

Ultimately, Korea's security cannot be ensured without peaceful unification. The two Koreas have ruled out war or "absorption" as a means of unification and are groping for a truly peaceful method of unification. By the term "truly peaceful method" we mean unification through dialogue and agreement between the two sides, as articulated in the South-North Basic Agreement.

Peaceful change in North Korea is also in Seoul's security interests and it is more desirable than violent change as a means to achieve unification. The unification process in this sense must proceed in ways that will not create any instability on the Korean peninsula and in the North-East Asian region.

Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula

For achievement of the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula, arms control is imperative. A peace system without any military confidence-building measures or any arms reduction between the South and the North would be unstable and vulnerable.

Fortunately though, the South-North Basic Agreement contains various measures of confidence- and security-building and arms control with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. For instance, article 12 of the Agreement provides that the two sides shall "discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof".

In addition, the Agreement specifies that a telephone "hotline" shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent the outbreak and escalation of accidental armed clashes and a joint military committee shall be established in order to discuss concrete measures for the elimination of military confrontation. To initiate and assure arms control on the Korean peninsula, such measures as those listed above should be implemented as early as possible. On the basis of the faithful implementation of these confidence-building measures, further steps for effective arms control—that is, control of the structure of the military forces—can be explored.

In general, there are three important ways to control the structure of military forces: freeze, limitation and reduction.

Freeze is the concept of limiting forces and armaments to current levels or to the levels that existed at a specific date. A freeze can be applied when there is parity in the military balance between conflicting forces. On the Korean peninsula, however, there is a significant disparity in the military balance between the North and the South. Hence, this approach is not relevant for the peninsula.

As for limitations, these are agreed measures that would quantitatively and qualitatively restrict weapons, troops and other supporting activities. The concept is an expansion-oriented arms control approach, allowing certain ceiling levels higher than those that currently exist. Since arms competition can continue even with limitations, however, this concept may be less relevant for the Korean peninsula.

The flaw in the concepts of a freeze or limitations is that arms control on the Korean peninsula should result in reductions, that is, structural control of the armed forces on the peninsula should take a reduction-oriented approach, aimed at securing a balance through achieving parity in military strength at lower levels. For effective arms reduction between the two Koreas, the following working principles and objectives need to be considered.

1 The final objectives of arms reduction should be the strengthening of stability and security on the Korean peninsula through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of defensive forces at appropriately lower levels.

2 An initial stage of the phased reduction should eliminate disparities on the higher side so that parity at levels substantially below present levels of the lower side could subsequently be established.

3 In the establishment of mutual agreement on the appropriate level of military strength to be maintained in the subsequent stages, the need for self-defence as an independent unified nation should be satisfied, taking into consideration the geostrategic location of the Korean peninsula, the history of

foreign intervention, and the changes in the surrounding environment.

4 As a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action should be eliminated, together with the reduction of weapons of mass destruction.

5 Overall levels of offensive equipment such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers, which are verifiable and which are central to the seizing and holding of territory, must be radically reduced in the first stage of reductions.

6 The number of troops may be reduced in accordance with reductions in armaments and equipment.

7 The reserve forces may be reduced in parallel with the reduction of regular forces.

8 Foreign military forces may be gradually reduced and withdrawn in accordance with the progress made in the structural arms control between the two Koreas.

9 Compliance with all agreed measures of arms reduction should be verified through an effective and strict verification regime which, among other things, would include on-site inspection rights and the exchange of information. Appropriate sanctions should be applied to non-compliance and violations of agreements.

10 Towards this end, it is desirable to form and operate an international supervisory group that includes the two Koreas.[5]

Conclusions: The Task Ahead

As previously noted, there has been a series of developments in recent years that have had a positive effect on the security of the Korean peninsula. It is very important for the Koreans to take advantage of this opportunity in the post-cold-war era. In this sense, the first challenge for Seoul is to persuade Pyongyang to fulfil the promises of the two inter-Korean agreements. Pyongyang should also realize that written pledges alone will never bring peace or unification. Upon the sincere and complete translation of the agreements into action, the two Koreas can cultivate more areas of common interest, including arms reduction on the peninsula.

At this moment, the most urgent task for Seoul is to solve the problem of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. As long as the threat of nuclear war persists, it will be impossible to move even one inch towards reconciliation, peace, exchanges and cooperation between the South and the North. Seoul needs to manage its cooperative efforts with the international community effectively so that Pyongyang will eventually be persuaded to give up its nuclear programme.

Notes

1 United States Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century* (April 1990), pp. 9-15.

2 Richard H. Solomon, "Sustaining the Dynamic Balance: An Overview of the U.S. Policy for East Asia and Pacific", testimony before the United States House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 22 February 1990.

3 The full text of the agreements was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147). The text of the Basic Agreement is also reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2, 1992. The text of the Declaration is reproduced in the present issue (see "Documentation Relating to Disarmament").

4 See, for instance, *The International Herald Tribune*, 24 February 1992, p. 3.

5 For further details on the framework for arms control on the Korean peninsula, see Dong-Won Lim, "An Urgent Need for Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: A Framework for Implementation", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. III, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 49-66.

The Korean Conundrum: Prospects for *Détente* and Arms Control

Donald S. Macdonald

Strategic location, rather than wealth, has made Korea the focus of international rivalry since the late nineteenth century. Three of the great nations of the world—China, Japan and Russia--surround Korea. The United States has also become heavily involved in Korea's destiny as an aftermath of the Second World War and the strategic and economic American stake in the Pacific region. The division of the country after the Second World War was a result of super-Power rivalry and ideological differences; it led to the Korean War and the subsequent decades of bitter confrontation.

For the Koreans, resolution of their conflict is virtually synonymous with reunification of the country. For other countries, however, there is no compelling argument for reunification, except as a tension-reducing device; indeed, there is some doubt that the Japanese, for example, want to see a neighbour and potential competitor increase its national power. So far as the international community is concerned, reduction of tension and the avoidance of renewed war are the objectives.[1]

The conflict between the Democratic People's Repub-

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lic of Korea and the Republic of Korea can be regarded as a surrogate for all of Korea's historic difficulties: the economic and social injustice that the Korean people suffered at the hands of their own traditional aristocracy and then of Japan; the trauma of adaptation to modern industrialized society, with values and styles that are perceived as uncomfortable and foreign; the humiliation of foreign invasion and domination; and the split between the communist and capitalist-liberal approaches to nation-building, intensified by the consequences of the Korean War.

These perceptions have fuelled the accusations of each Korean regime against the other; they have driven the continuing hostility towards Japan, and, more recently, towards the United States as well; they have supported the continuing dedication of the North to communism; they have engendered doubts among intellectuals and students in the South as to the merits of capitalism. Even the dramatic economic success of South Korea in the past thirty years, though it has made Korea economically as well as strategically important, has not yet greatly changed these attitudes.

In the nineteenth century, the misgovernment of a senescent dynasty had engendered poverty and social confusion, much as in China, and the Korean army had declined almost to non-existence. Korea sought refuge in self-seclusion; it was in no position to defend itself against the newly aroused imperialist rivalries of its neighbours, Japan, Russia and China. Japan wanted both Manchuria and Korea for resources and living space; Russia wanted ice-free ports and access to the Pacific Ocean; China wanted to preserve Korea as a buffer zone. All three countries sought hegemony over Korea. Japan's triumph in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars enabled it to take over the country in 1905, and to annex it in 1910.

In forced submission, the Koreans' bitter resentment towards Japan endured and festered. Its most remarkable manifestation was the unarmed national uprising of 1 March 1919, in support of national independence. The Japanese brutally suppressed it. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was perceived by some Korean nationalists as offering new hope for the revival of their nation through revolution. The ideology of communism was added to terrorism as a weapon for national liberation. The resulting split among Korean leaders between communism and anti-communism, left and right, thereafter plagued the independence movement along with factional rivalries.

Liberated from Japan and occupied by Soviet and American military forces in 1945, the Koreans demanded and expected immediate restoration of their independence. However, they were once again unprepared to organize and defend their country. The Japanese had systematically excluded opportunity for the development of native political leaders or institutions above the village level. Polarization between left and right made national unity exceedingly difficult. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had the will or the understanding to bridge the gap.

To replace the Japanese, the United States—with the agreement of the Soviet Union—proposed a four-Power, five-year international trusteeship, which was violently opposed by most Koreans as a perpetuation of colonial status. Disavowed by the United States, which had conceived it, trusteeship became a Soviet negotiating ploy. The three-way imperialist rivalry of the nineteenth century was now replaced by the growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which reinforced the existing Korean ideological division between right and left. Despite the universal Korean desire for a united Korea, and the initial commitment by both super-Powers to a unified Korean regime, two years of negotiation ended in deadlock.

In 1948, a United Nations commission—denied admission to the North—supervised elections in the South resulting in the creation of the Republic of Korea, led by the ardently anti-communist Syngman Rhee. Subsequently, a Democratic

People's Republic of Korea was established on a Stalinist model in the North, led by the communist ex-guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung. Each Government claimed to be the only legitimate one. Both Korean States strengthened their armed forces; both proclaimed their intention to assert control over the entire peninsula; but the United States refused to provide the South with offensive arms. After both occupying Powers removed their troops, the North—trained and equipped by the Soviet Union, spearheaded by Korean troops fresh from battle in the Chinese civil war—mounted a massive surprise attack on the South in June 1950.

The United States, despite earlier indications that it would not intervene, determined to resist the northern aggression, with United Nations support. When the United Nations counter-attack swept into the defeated North, the People's Republic of China came to the North's aid. Two years of negotiations concluded with the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953. The war left both halves of Korea devastated and at least 3 million soldiers and civilians dead, not to speak of millions more mutilated and disabled. It reinforced the enmity between the North and South Korean regimes. The armistice did nothing to resolve the underlying conflict; nor did the ensuing 1954 political conference at Geneva.

After making rapid economic progress with a centrally planned economy for twenty years after the Korean War, North Korea has encountered increasing economic difficulties. Yet so far, the collapse of the socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe appears to have had little impact on North Korean policies. South Korea, meanwhile, has far outstripped the North on the basis of export-led, government-coordinated capitalism, and seems finally to be achieving political progress as well, after many years of authoritarian rule. At present, the national product of the Republic of Korea is estimated at five to ten times that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with a per capita ratio of as much as five to one. South Korea is twentieth among world nations in terms of national product, and twelfth-largest international trader.

Despite the enormous military power still deployed on both sides of the military demarcation line, the 1953 truce has held, with only minor violations, for nearly 39 years—probably the longest-lasting armistice in history. Nevertheless, unless and until the basic conflict is resolved, an attempt might be made at renewal of the war if either side were convinced of the vulnerability of the other, with the intention of rapidly seizing enough assets and territory to force capitulation to a unified government of all Korea.

Although political and military confrontation between the two Koreas continues, the last few years have seen significant growth in the dialogue between them, if not in mutual understanding. South Korea formally abjured military conquest in 1960. North Korea, despite its military build-up, its attempts to foment a "people's revolution" in the South, and the attempted assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee in 1968, joined in 1972 with the South in a declaration of peaceful unification. The specifics of this agreement were soon ignored and violated, and a number of violent actions by the North in subsequent years contradicted it. Yet the agreement is still endorsed by both sides.

Both North and South have put forward proposals for reunification through some sort of confederation, and for reduction of tensions. The proposals have differed fundamentally in that those of the North begin with overarching conferences and committees, while those of the South begin with small confidence-building steps such as trade, communication, and reunions of separated families.[2] Nevertheless, sufficient convergence was achieved so that a token exchange of family members occurred in 1985, and a series of conferences at the prime-minister level began in 1990. In December 1991, agreements were initialled on non-aggression, peace and cooperation and on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; these were formally signed in February 1992, and joint committees have been established for their implementation.[3]

The military aspect of the inter-Korea confrontation, representing the capability for renewal of the war, is at the centre of concern regarding the tension on the peninsula. The focal points of this concern are the huge number of forces and weapons deployed on both sides; the North's nuclear weapons development programme; the continued presence of United States ground and air forces in South Korea; and the possibility of external involvement, should hostilities resume.

The 1953 Armistice Agreement limited personnel strength and numbers and types of weapons to those present at the cessation of hostilities. However, the restrictions were voided by the unilateral suspension of article 13 (*d*) by the United States in 1955; the Americans claimed the need to balance violations on the other side. The number of military personnel in the South—Korean and foreign combined—is less than it was at the conclusion of hostilities. In the North, although the number of Korean troops is much greater than in 1953, it is offset by the withdrawal of the Chinese forces in 1958.[4] North Korea has claimed to have demobilized 100,000 troops and to have reassigned 150,000 to civil works; these claims are not accepted by the South or by the United States.

Whatever the personnel levels, the build-up of weapons and aircraft on both sides is huge. The North has a large numerical superiority in artillery, tanks and aircraft, although many of the weapons are of old designs. It has extensive underground fortifications. The South is constantly updating and augmenting its weaponry, as is the United States, which implicitly threatened the use of nuclear weapons to bring about the cessation of hostilities, and introduced them into Korea in the 1950s. According to South Korean authorities, they were removed in 1991 as part of President Bush's policy of eliminating tactical nuclear weapons worldwide.

The four-nation Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission established by the Armistice as a control mechanism still maintains a token presence in the demilitarized zone separating the two sides, but it was deprived of any significant capacity to inspect or verify. The Military Armistice Commission, set up under the Armistice to monitor compliance, has maintained communication between the two commands, although its nearly 500 plenary sessions have served chiefly as a propaganda sounding-board. It has failed to prevent the remilitarization, on both sides, of the four-kilometre width of the so-called demilitarized zone. North Korea has proposed the expansion of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to enable it to verify arms reductions; yet it has resisted all proposals to discuss arms control measures in the Military Armistice Commission, insisting rather upon negotiation directly with the United States and South Korea.

Until recently, North Korea demanded the elimination of United States forces as a precondition for discussions of arms control and other tension-reduction proposals. However, the South regards them as important for security. Although the Soviet Union, before its dissolution, and China up to the present have both publicly supported the North Korean position, both countries as well as Japan have privately considered the continued presence of United States forces a useful deterrent to hostilities by either Korean side.

South Korea's capital region, with a quarter of the population and up to half of its industrial and economic strength, lies within two minutes' jet flying time of the front lines. A massive, highly organized North Korean thrust might succeed in moving south of Seoul to the Han River before the defence could hold it, thus greatly altering the balance of power between North and South. The heavily mechanized United States 2d Division, equipped with the most modern weaponry and constantly maintained in peak battle-ready condition, could make the difference in holding the line north of Seoul, and its participation would guarantee that of United States air and naval forces, which would be even more necessary for a successful defence.

The North Korean nuclear weapons programme is currently the most worrisome aspect of the military confrontation. It presumably began some years ago, before North Korea suffered loss of support from the Soviet Union and China and encountered its present economic straits. It must have siphoned off a considerable amount of North Korea's economic resources. South Korea, also, took covert steps towards a nuclear weapons development programme in the mid-1970s, but was dissuaded by the United States: the North Korean programme may have begun in the same time-frame, and may have been inspired by genuine fear of invasion, in view of mounting South Korean military power, and the changing international alignment demonstrated by the United States opening to China, as well as by the quest for power and prestige.

The North has for years called for a Korean nuclear-free zone, and has repeatedly asserted that its nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes, but most analysts seem satisfied that this claim, like other North Korean protestations for propaganda effect in the past, is false. Objectively, it is hard to see what real advantage North Korea would gain from the development of one or a few nuclear weapons that would offset the financial, diplomatic and moral costs; but the same could be said of North Korea's bombing of a South Korean airliner in 1987.

If hostilities were to resume, both North and South Korea would look to their respective allies for support. Both China and the Soviet Union signed treaties of mutual assistance with the DPRK in 1961. There has always been the possibility that North Korea might mount another attack on its own, then turn to its friends for needed support of a *fait accompli*. This possibility has been greatly reduced in recent years, as the support of both of North Korea's neighbours has declined.

South Korea is linked with the United States through the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and through the presence of

American combat forces in Korea. There is also a tenuous link with 15 other nations that participated in the United Nations Command, since a shadow United Nations Command still exists, and a joint statement by the 16 member nations in July 1953 says that in the event of renewed attack, "they would not be slow to resist". Japan would also be involved, because American bases there would be utilized for support; advance consultation with Japan for such use would be required.

The military effort has strained the economies of both sides ever since the Armistice of 1953, with the North apparently putting a quarter of its national product into it, against a sixteenth for the South (although in absolute amount, the annual defence spending of the South has probably surpassed that of the North). The North's military effort must surely be at the upper limit of its economic and human capacity, especially now that concessionary military aid from its allies has largely ceased. The South's military budget is also constrained by newly vocal public opinion. These limits, and restrictions on supply of advanced weaponry imposed by foreign suppliers—chiefly the United States and the Soviet Union—constitute a sort of arms control.

For some years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has advocated the reduction of forces on both sides to 100,000 persons. In 1986 and 1987, it put forward explicit proposals for a phased reduction of forces, accompanied by verification measures. These proposals, however, did not take serious account of differences in force structures, deployments and weaponry.[5] These and other North Korean proposals have been conditioned in varying degree on the withdrawal of United States forces; recently, however, North Korea has indicated a willingness to phase the withdrawal along with the reduction of Korean forces.

Neither the Republic of Korea nor the United States has responded positively to the North Korean proposals, nor has either advanced any proposals of its own, except in the area of confidence-building measures. The United States has pointed out that an existing mechanism—the Military Armistice Commission set up under the Armistice Agreement in 1953, which has representatives of both Koreas, China, the United States and other Members of the United Nations involved in the Korean War—could discuss such proposals. The position of both countries has been that North Korea can signal its intention by modifying the offensive deployment of its armed forces and accepting confidence-building steps such as reciprocal observation of military exercises. Offensive deployment, together with North Korea's long record of attempted infiltration, subversion and assassination, and its calls for popular revolution in the South, are taken as evidence that the North's proposals are propaganda rather than substance. South Koreans recall that the surprise North Korean attack of 1950 was preceded by appeals for peaceful unification and offers to exchange political prisoners. In fact, the whole history of inter-Korean proposals and counterproposals aimed at reunification and reduction of tensions is very reminiscent of the long-drawn-out and often fruitless history of arms control and disarmament negotiations between the super-Powers.

In the Korean peninsula, also, it is probable that arms control measures will result from or accompany, rather than lead to, the reduction of tensions. Economic constraints may also force military reductions, but the lessening of suspicion on the two sides is a key factor. Both considerations relate chiefly to the situation within Korea itself. At the same time, both Korean States are dependent upon outside sources for their most sophisticated weapons, and would also be dependent upon outside sources of resupply—especially the supply of oil—if a renewed war were to last more than three to six months. A United States infantry division, an air wing, and support troops support the defence of the South, and would be involved in renewed hostilities. The international community therefore has considerable potential leverage for bringing about arms control in Korea if the concerned nations agree among themselves upon the levers to apply.[6]

If, as now seems possible, a significant lowering of tensions is achieved, arms control measures will become practicable as well as important for the continuation of the process of *détente.* The obvious first step, as South Korea and the United States have proposed, would be to provide means of mutual reassurance to both sides against hostile intentions through an exchange of military observers, advance notification of major military movements, and liaison between the headquarters of the two sides by means of an open telephone line ("hot-line"). Such steps were taken in Europe as the beginning of a process of mutual and balanced force reductions, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. So far none of these proposals has been implemented in Korea, although the Agreement signed between the two Koreas in December 1991 did include establishment of a "hot-line" and notification of major military movements. Like the former Soviet Union, North Korea probably regards secrecy as a strategic asset.

Another category of initial measures would include redeployment of forces in defensive, rather than offensive, positions. The United States and South Korea took a unilateral step in this category by cancelling the annual joint "Team Spirit" military exercise for 1992.

At a later point in the process of *détente*, reductions of forces and weapons will receive serious rather than propaganda attention, in order to lessen the military threat and the burden on the economies of both North and South. The critical factors in reaching agreement, in addition to the building of sufficient mutual trust, are practicability, verification of reductions, maintenance of military balance between forces of different composition and armament, and assurance that Korea—either divided or united—can defend itself against possible future outside attack, however unlikely that may appear at present.

In this category of arms control measures, also, the

United States and South Korea have taken the lead by removing American nuclear weapons from the country and by offering to permit inspection by the North to verify their removal. As mentioned above, North and South Korea have signed an agreement to keep the peninsula nuclear-weapon free, and have agreed in principle to an inspection regime, but no specific actions have been taken beyond the organization of a joint committee. At the same time, North Korea has ratified an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to permit inspection of its nuclear facilities. In addition, the United States is removing 7,000 troops from South Korea, although plans for further down-sizing were suspended because of the nuclear weapons problem.

Other specific categories of weapons could be reduced, if not eliminated, on both sides, as is the case under current United States-Soviet treaties. However, when negotiations between the two sides reach this stage, the need for a balance of forces may necessitate discussion of mutually acceptable mixes of forces and weapons and means for verifying the achievement and maintenance of agreed limits—in other words, a process somewhat similar to the discussion of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

The role of foreign forces is an important one in the tension-reducing process; they can be both an additional source of security and a potential security threat. Clearly, North Korea regards the elimination of United States forces in South Korea as a major objective. Although the South Korean Government and the majority of its people favour the retention of United States forces for security, many South Koreans, also, would be glad to see United States troops depart if there were alternative means of assuring security. The United States has already pledged to withdraw its forces if the Koreans so desire, although the presence of United States forces in South Korea has been regarded as a significant element in the projection of United States power in the Pacific region.

North Korea has already suggested the expansion of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as a means of verifying arms reduction measures. An expanded NNSC, or some other international peace-keeping force within the demilitarized zone, could reassure both Koreas against attack, as an alternative to United States forces. Such an international force might be less offensive to Korean nationalist feelings than a continued United States presence.

Aside from the United States forces in South Korea, there are other non-Korean forces to consider for the future: the 249,000 members of Japan's Self-Defence Forces, the large armies of China and the Soviet Union, and United States forces deployed in the Pacific area (now totalling about 240,000 outside Korea). While no one of these countries constitutes a military threat at the present time, it would be prudent for Korea not to be defenceless, as it was in the late nineteenth century.

As noted, the North has already put forward a proposal for a phased three-year reduction down to 100,000 troops on each side. The proposal has several unrealistic elements, including the low target force levels; future levels for a unified Korean defence would certainly be no lower than Japanese military strength, and should probably be greater in consideration of Korea's land boundary with China and Russia. However, it would seem useful for the South Koreans to agree to a discussion of the proposal as a test of the North's sincerity in making it, and perhaps as a point of departure for eventual agreement.

To encourage and facilitate movement towards reduction of tensions and arms control in Korea, the time may well have come for a conference among representatives of the four countries chiefly involved in Korea's security—China, Japan, Russia and the United States—and the two Koreas. Such a conference—which could go beyond a single meeting and become a standing forum for discussion—could deal, not only with the Korean problem, but with other security problems of the North-East Asian region as well.[7]

If the current series of talks between North and South Korea leads to specific, tangible steps towards the reduction of tensions, the resultant atmosphere might be conducive to an international conference. The agenda might include the discussion of transitional peace-keeping arrangements, taking the place of the United States ground forces in South Korea; control of the export of armaments to Korea; and the provision of sophisticated technical means for verification of arms control agreements developed in inter-Korean negotiations. It is possible, also, that the fact of amicable consultation among Korea's neighbours might itself encourage better communication and understanding between North and South Korea.

The deep-rooted confrontation between the two Koreas can be traced in large part to causes a century old. It cannot be remedied overnight. Yet it must be ameliorated before meaningful progress can be made towards controlling and reducing the military threat. Recent developments offer grounds for cautious hope that movement towards *détente* has begun after decades of freeze, and that regional stability and peace can be achieved. The international community can provide encouragement and support; but it is only the Koreans themselves who can surmount the long-standing differences that block the path to peace in the Korean peninsula.

Notes

1 A more detailed analysis of the interest of the major Powers in Korean reunification is presented in the author's article, "The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea", *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992.

2 For a discussion of unification proposals, see Hakjoon Kim, "Korean Reunification: A Seoul Perspective", *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. XV, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-20.

3 The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147). The text of the Agreement, 13 December 1991, as read

on the Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Network, is given in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report*, 13 December 1991, pp. 11-13. The text of the Joint Declaration, 31 December 1991, is given in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report*, 2 January 1992, p. 21.

4 According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, North Korea has 1,111,000 active-duty military personnel, and South Korea has 750,000. The total United States forces now deployed in South Korea number about 36,000.

5 The 1986 proposal was contained in a letter from O Chin-u, Minister of the People's Armed Forces, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to Yi Ki-paek, Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, dated 9 June 1986. It called for "military authorities' talks" to address "such issues as . . . suspending the military exercises and expansion of arms, . . . reducing troops and armaments, and . . . observing the Korean Armistice agreement in accordance with the demands of its original content. . . .". Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report*, 17 June 1986, pp. D6-D7. The 1987 proposal was a statement by the North Korean Government on 23 July calling for reduction of both Koreas' armed forces "through three stages from 1988 to 1991" and maintenance of forces levels "less than 100,000 from 1992"; phasing out of United States troops in Korea, with withdrawal of "all [United States] forces including nuclear weapons . . . and military bases in South Korea" when Korean force levels reached 100,000; public reporting of the reductions; "phased inspection" by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission "to confirm the military cutdown"; and a "multinational disarmament negotiation . . . in Geneva in March 1988", with the participation of both Koreas, the United States, and the members of the NNSC. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *East Asia Daily Report*, 23 July 1987, pp. C1-C4.

6 For a discussion of possible arms control measures, emphasizing confidence-building and drawing on the European experience, see James Goodby, "Confidence and Security Building in the Korean Peninsula: The Negotiating Agenda", *Science and International Security*, Eric H. Arnett, ed. (Washington, D.C., American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990), pp. 171-192.

7 Cf. James E. Goodby, "The New World Order in Northeast Asia", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. III, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 11-20.

The Korean Peninsula: Evolving from Antagonism and Danger to Reconciliation and Security

Tao Bingwei

The year 1991 was an extraordinary one in contemporary Korean history. Over the previous 46 years, tension, antagonism, confrontation and even war had pulled the Korean people into an abyss of misery and misfortune. An aspiration cherished by 70 million Korean people, both in the North and in the South, has been to remove tension, antagonism and estrangement, to prevent the outbreak of a fratricidal war, to achieve reconciliation and cooperation at an early date and, eventually, reunification. Following the Joint Communiqué proclaimed by the two sides on 4 July 1972 on the principles of self-determination, peaceful reunification and national unity, and after a series of talks held on and off in secret and in public, the Korean people is about to realize its long-cherished hope.

The United Nations accepted simultaneously the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea as full Members on 17 September 1991. Then, on 13 December 1991, the fifth inter-Korean talks made a significant breakthrough. The Prime Ministers of the two sides signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the North and the South[1] in Seoul. This wide-ranging pact includes recognition and

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respect for each other's system, the end of military and political antagonism and confrontation, the conversion of a cease-fire into consolidated peace, the establishment of offices and other specialized committees, a comprehensive exchange between the two sides, and resumed contacts for families that have been separated. On 31 December 1991, the two sides signed another agreement, the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (see the "Documentation" section of this issue). On 19 February 1992, after completion of their respective legislative procedures, the two Prime Ministers exchanged instruments of ratification of the two agreements at their sixth round of talks in Pyongyang, thereby putting the two agreements into effect. They also signed and exchanged an accord on the establishment of a specialized committee on inter-Korean high-level talks.

During this period, three specialized committees, on politics, on military matters, and on cooperation and exchange, were established. The two sides also agreed to engage in negotiations for the establishment of a joint committee on control of nuclear weapons, a significant symbolic step towards the implementation of the agreements and declarations. The United States and the Republic of Korea stated that they had withdrawn all nuclear weapons in the South and that there were no nuclear weapons left, and they pledged to cancel the annual "Team Spirit" joint military manoeuvre for the time being. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea took a positive attitude on the nuclear issue and signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 30 January 1992, agreeing to accept IAEA inspection. On 9 April 1992, the agreement was ratified.

At the same time, there was considerable progress in the relations between China and South Korea. Following the establishment of trade offices, China and South Korea signed trade agreements, which resulted in an increase in their economic cooperation and in exchanges of staff. There has been some progress in the negotiations between Japan and the DPRK on the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the DPRK and the United States are both satisfied with the results of their first high-level talks.

All of the above-mentioned events mark a turning-point in North-South relations, indicating that the settlement of the Korean issue has entered a new era. The proposed summit meeting between President Kim Il Sung and President Roh Tae Woo and the results of the meeting will pave the way for full reconciliation and cooperation and for the peaceful reunification of the Korean nation, marking a new epoch in Korean history.

I

There are many reasons for the present favourable situation on the Korean peninsula. With strong national aspirations and the favourable international situation, the two sides have reached an understanding and have made concessions in favour of their national interests, and the leadership has made reasonable decisions. This is the main reason. Moreover, the people on both sides are fed up with military confrontation and the leaders have come to realize that neither side can prevail over or engulf the other.

The military confrontation that has lasted for many years has posed a threat on the Korean peninsula with some 1.5 million well-trained and equipped troops deployed along a military demarcation line of 200 kilometres, in an area of some 220,000 square kilometres.

Both sides have comprehensive armies, navies and air forces. A serious situation such as this, and one which is extremely rare in the world, leads inevitably to the following grave consequences:

First, the Korean peninsula is enveloped in a terrifying atmosphere of an imminent war. The Governments of the two sides are so worried about a surprise attack from the other side that they are engaged in a constant military build-up and are always on the alert. The people along the military demarcation line live in a constant state of anxiety.

Secondly, the protracted military confrontation has resulted in emotional misunderstandings and a lack of confidence. As a result, any gesture, even a good-will expression of reconciliation, would be suspected of being a malicious provocation or conspiracy.

Thirdly, the situation has resulted in rising military expenditures on both sides. The military expenditure for North Korea constitutes about 15 to 20 per cent of its gross national product (GNP) and South Korea spends 5 to 6 per cent of its GNP on the military. The increased rise in military expenditures has, inevitably, a negative effect on economic and social development and on the living standard of the people.

Fourthly, the situation on the Korean peninsula endangers the peace, stability and security of the whole of North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. It has also given rise to complicated, sensitive and abnormal relations among the great Powers concerned, such as the United States, China, the former Soviet Union and Japan, and has affected their relations with the two sides on the Korean peninsula.

The last ice block of the cold war—the Korean question—has now melted. The thawing of relations indicates the removal of tension, antagonism and distrust. The new cooperation promises economic development and prosperity for both sides. With the forthcoming implementation of the agreements, the two sides are working hard to put an end to the division and the separation of families and to speed up the process of reunification and national unity. Most important, the fuse of military confrontation, which could have become serious at any time, has been removed. What remains now is to become engaged in the task of disarmament. On the other hand, making the Korean peninsula nuclear-free has become a reality rather than a dream. All of these facts are indications of a good beginning in the evolution from antagonism and danger to reconciliation and security. They also show that the Korean peninsula will become a peaceful region, one that will play a significant role in maintaining the peace, stability and security of North-East Asia and of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

II

As the Korean peninsula is being transformed from a precarious element posing a threat to peace in North-East Asia, Asia and the world as a whole, to a positive factor conducive to peace, the Korean people themselves should make a great effort to prevent any possible retrogression. The successful solution to the following important problems has aroused great concern among the people.

First, disarmament. Only when the agreements signed by the two sides are fully implemented and the disarmament is completely carried out can the military confrontation be ended once and for all and overall reconciliation and cooperation be realized. In this regard, the Joint Military Committee formed by the two sides will assume a great responsibility in the future. How many phases should the process of disarmament involve? How many troops should be reduced in each phase? How to guarantee the implementation of these pacts and carry out effective inspections? These problems cannot be settled overnight.

An appropriate disposition of the reduced troops and weaponry, in particular the weapons of mass destruction, should also be worked out. Nevertheless, disarmament is a trend that cannot be halted. Turning hostile armies into forces engaged in peaceful construction and economic development is a fundamental change and will bring great benefits.

Secondly, transformation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. According to the 1991 Agreement signed by the two sides, the cease-fire will be transformed into a consolidated peace. This is closely related to the abrogation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, and to the positions and functions of the United Nations and of the countries concerned in the process. It is expected that the two parts of Korea will do a good job in solving this problem through negotiations.

Thirdly, military relations with foreign countries. With a change in North-South military relations, the military relations maintained by both sides with big Powers will certainly not remain unchanged. In this respect, military assistance, military cooperation, and agreements on military and security commitments will be affected. The future of foreign troops deployed and of foreign military bases in Korea will be put on the agenda as well.

Fourthly, reunification. The prerequisite for reunification is complete reconciliation and cooperation. Before the current agreement was reached, the two sides had, over the years, put forward their respective proposals as to how to realize peaceful reunification. "The Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" and "The Confederation of Koryo" proposed by the North and "The National Community of Korea" put forward by the South had their own distinguishing features and in some respects shared common ground. However, these versions had not been totally accepted. The main reason was that preconditions for reunification were not ripe. Today, with the pre-conditions established, a version acceptable to both sides will certainly emerge, and in this period certain transitional measures and corresponding approaches are expected to be taken by both sides.

However, because the agreements cover wide-ranging subjects, it may not be easy to implement them. If misunderstanding, disagreements or disputes occur, this will have a negative effect on the development of cooperation and reconciliation. Moreover, some unexpected incidents cannot be excluded.

All of the above indicates that it will take some time to realize reconciliation, cooperation and, eventually, peaceful reunification.

The public statements and actions by the two Koreas indicate a sincere desire on both sides to promote a smooth realization of reconciliation and cooperation and to prevent any set-back in the way of attainment of their common goal at an early date. People hope that the two sides will cooperate further on the issue concerning the future and destiny of the Korean nation.

III

The fundamental changes on the Korean peninsula will also have important effects on the international community, especially on the relations between the great Powers concerned and the two Koreas, as well as on the relations among the great Powers themselves.

The existing military relationship between the great Powers and the two parts of Korea will certainly not remain unchanged. As already mentioned in the preceding section, in the process of turning the cessation of hostilities in Korea into peace and in eliminating military confrontation and carrying out disarmament, the two Koreas will have to consider the following questions: military assistance and cooperation with the great Powers concerned, the military and security responsibilities to which they committed themselves in the relevant agreements, and the future of foreign troops deployed on the Korean peninsula.

Undoubtedly, external forces played a decisive role in determining whether or not another war would break out on the Korean peninsula in the cold-war era. It is only because the great Powers concerned wanted to see a relaxed and stable Korea rather than a peninsula fraught with problems that no war erupted after the truce. With the end of the cold war, global military conflicts no longer exist. A situation of *détente*, reconciliation and cooperation is also emerging in North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. In these favourable circumstances, especially when North and South Korea have stood side by side, it is impossible for external forces to provoke new military hostilities or war on the peninsula. Besides, the great Powers concerned are unwilling to do so since a stable and peaceful peninsula is in their interest.

From the viewpoint of politics, the development of the situation on the Korean peninsula creates a favourable opportunity for the international community to normalize relations with the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. In the past, when the two parts of Korea were antagonistic, the relationship between the international community, the great Powers in particular, and the two parts of Korea remained a sensitive and thorny problem. Under the new situation, it is expected that this difficult problem will be solved in the near future. Moreover, as soon as the relations between the two parts of Korea and the international community, in particular the relevant great Powers, are normalized, a new pattern in international relations will emerge which will be beneficial to peaceful coexistence in North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

A favourable situation on the Korean peninsula will be conducive to economic cooperation in this region. The possible simultaneous participation by the two sides of Korea in economic organizations and activities in the North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions will round out the membership of these organizations. Effective regional economic cooperation on a wide-ranging basis will greatly enhance economic growth and prosperity in this region.

The international community, especially the great Powers concerned, should also do their best to support and promote the smooth realization of all-round reconciliation and cooperation between the two parts of Korea at an early date. Undoubtedly, a brand-new, peaceful, cooperative and prosperous Korean peninsula will provide favourable conditions for the maintenance of peace and stability by formulating confidence-building and security measures, including an extensive and effective security mechanism in which all the countries in the region can take part.

As a close neighbour of the Korean peninsula, China greatly appreciates the developments of North-South reconciliation and cooperation and sincerely hopes that the situation on the peninsula will evolve smoothly and that reunification will be achieved as soon as possible. This attitude has been clearly explained in statements by Chinese leaders and in the public declarations of the Chinese Government. Undoubtedly, China will make positive contributions to helping and promoting the realization of the long-cherished wish of the Korean nation.

Note

1 An English translation of the text of the Agreement is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2, 1992. The texts of the Agreement and of the Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1147).

Argentina and Brazil: Nuclear Non-Acquisition and Confidence-Building

Nuclear Cooperation: One of the Pillars of the New Argentine-Brazilian Relationship

Julio C. Carasales

It is clear, even from a superficial review of the history of the relations between Argentina and Brazil that, except in certain periods, they were never very cordial and that, on the contrary, they were frequently characterized by rivalry and distrust. Each saw the other as a competitor in "leadership" of Latin America and as the most likely enemy in any international situation affecting it. In the conflict scenarios of the Military Staff of each country, a clash between them always seemed the most likely possibility.

This relationship lasted for a century and a half, from the time the two nations began to exist independently early in the nineteenth century. Both had inherited a centuries-long conflict between Spain and Portugal in this part of their colonial empires, with the epicentre in the zone of Río de la Plata. In 1826 Argentina and Brazil joined in the war over this issue, which ended with the independence of Uruguay.

In the 1950s and 1960s two attempts were made to heal

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the breach, first with President Juan Perón and President Getulio Vargas, and later with President Arturo Frondizi, and President Juscelino Kubischek and President Janio Quadros. These efforts, which were not successful, were evidently premature. Nonetheless, it was anachronistic that the two largest States, which were, in many fields, the most advanced and powerful in South America, remained divided by resentment and suspicions, which were for the most part inspired by prejudice and preconceptions rather than actual facts.

By 1980 the situation had changed. Factors that called for cooperation rather than separation were becoming stronger and the obstacles of many years appeared less and less sound. The factors of *rapprochement* were becoming evident in various fields.

Curiously enough, one of the first contexts in which a policy of *rapprochement* took shape was the nuclear field—"curiously" because, in 1980, Argentina had a military government and the President of Brazil was an army general. The new policy also drew attention because world opinion had always held that there was a race between the two countries to see which would develop a nuclear weapon first, as a further manifestation of the rivalry and competition so often evident.

Two of the main impressions held abroad about the existing situation in Argentina have no basis in fact. First of all, the Argentine nuclear programme had never been under the control of the armed forces. The post of President of the National Atomic Energy Commission had for a long time been held by admirals, usually already retired. Only one was an active naval serviceman (at a time when the Government was in direct charge of the armed forces and active servicemen held many public posts). The fact that the National Atomic Energy Commission was directly under the President of the country and never under the navy was not taken into account, just as the staff of the Commission comprised mainly civilians and received no instructions or directives from any sector of the armed forces.

Furthermore, the naval personnel who were in charge of the Commission had technical and scientific titles and several of them later served as consultants to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or to foreign Governments.

Secondly, the lingering suspicion that Argentina was engaged in developing a nuclear weapon or taking steps towards that objective was groundless. That accusation was reported again and again but never could a single concrete fact be adduced to prove that affirmation. The most that could be done was to mention suspicions or rumours or technical or scientific advances inherent in the peaceful use of nuclear energy or the fact that Argentina had not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was forgotten that Argentina had never denied the possibility of ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which it is now about to do) and that the non-proliferation Treaty deserves criticism and has errors and omissions which more than justify a country's refusal to accede to it. Moreover, all of the development of nuclear weapons in the world has resulted from a programme specifically intended for that purpose and was never a result of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The first Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between Argentina and Brazil was signed on 17 May 1980. That Agreement outlined the subjects and procedures through which the two countries would channel the cooperation which it would be desirable to establish in a field as delicate as that of nuclear energy.

The 1980 Agreement did not produce the benefits expected and there were no positive changes in the earlier situation, perhaps because, in that particular period, the two Governments were concerned with the many problems that arose from the transition from military to civilian government and the authorities had to give their attention to other priorities.

Not until there were democratic civilian governments in

Argentina and Brazil was it possible for the first specific steps to be taken in this field, however much they might have been outlined in 1980. On 30 November 1985, the Heads of State of Argentina and Brazil issued a vitally important Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy in the city of Foz do Iguaçú. Five years later, on 28 November 1990, two subsequent presidents signed another highly important Joint Declaration.[1] It adds to the title "Nuclear Policy", already used to indicate its content, the word "Common", clearly showing that the two countries do not have separate nuclear policies on which they must cooperate, but that they have the same nuclear policy, a joint nuclear policy.

One significant element must be taken into account. The step from rivalry to cooperation in the nuclear field was not an isolated phenomenon that occurred while antagonism prevailed in other sectors. That was not so. The atmosphere was right for a greater and more comprehensive *rapprochement* like the one, on 31 July 1986, when the two Presidents signed the important Act for Argentine-Brazilian Integration, together with 12 protocols of cooperation on the most diverse subjects, including the nuclear issue. The number of protocols kept on increasing and new documents were being added until, on 26 March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay drew up a Treaty for the Constitution of a Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) to be established by 31 December 1994. There is no need to underline all that the establishment of a common market involves, or to recognize that Argentina and Brazil were the nucleus and driving force for it.

The presence of the nuclear element in the Argentine-Brazilian *rapprochement* is not therefore an exclusive or isolated fact. It is part of a wider process. It should be emphasized, however, that the nuclear field did not seem the most propitious one in which to initiate this process nor—as in fact happened—one of the most advantageous as regards the magnitude and speed of the advances achieved. Without the influence of public and private economic and commercial interests, which sometimes impede and delay integration, the speed at which work has been accomplished on nuclear matters demonstrates the genuine spirit of cooperation that prompts the authorities of the two countries.

The Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú on nuclear policy was followed by four others, always the result of visits of the Head of State of one State or the other: Brasilia (10 December 1986); Viedma (17 July 1987); Iperó (8 April 1988) and Ezeiza (29 November 1988). The sixth, of Foz do Iguaçú (28 November 1990), will be the subject of a special commentary.

It is not the intention of this article to analyse all of these declarations, but it can single out some elements that are common to all of them:

a Constant reaffirmation of the peaceful purposes of the nuclear programmes of Argentina and Brazil;

b The strengthening of mutual confidence-building as one of the principal objectives of Argentine-Brazilian cooperation;

c Use of the technical advances derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of the peoples of both nations;

d The possibility of extending cooperation in nuclear matters to other countries of Latin America;

e Coordination of a common external policy on nuclear matters; and

f Concern for peace and security throughout the region.

The impact of the successive joint declarations was not reduced to mere statements of good intentions or the reiteration of well-intended phrases. There emerged—or at any rate there accumulated—a steady exchange of visiting specialists and students, of industrial cross-fertilization, of information exchanges, of joint projects which, while sporadic in the past, were now increasing and becoming continuous. The Heads of State themselves led delegations which went through the sensitive installations of each other's country. Very specifically, a joint working group (later upgraded to the level of a standing committee) was established under the authority of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and with the participation of national commissions and nuclear enterprises "for furthering the relations between the two countries in that area, promoting their nuclear technological development and the introduction of mechanisms for guaranteeing the higher interests in peace, security and development of the region", as stated in the Declaration of 30 November 1985.

The Standing Committee, which met from time to time in Argentina and Brazil, served as a forum for analysis of the successive steps which the two countries were taking in order to make collaboration in the nuclear field as genuine as possible. It was there that the international instruments which were being concluded were negotiated. It is no exaggeration to say that the Committee depended on the ministries of both countries, which ensured, at least in principle, a high political vision, which on occasion prevailed over one-sided interests or points of view. It is now current practice, in various international forums, for the delegates of Argentina or Brazil to speak on behalf of each other. It has even happened, in some technical meetings, that the same person represented the two countries, which is certainly unusual.

Although the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been basic, it should not be thought that the cooperation of the technical authorities, that is, the National Atomic Energy Commission, was lacking or, what would have been more serious, that they frequently opposed the measures advocated. Regardless of the logical and understandable differences on certain points, which were overcome without problems, the speedy headway made would have been impossible without the constant good will of the competent officers. Nor can it be said that the Argentine armed forces impeded or rejected the duly adopted governmental policy. In the previous decade, their subordination to the democratic governments had been total, and as mentioned above, the military authorities never formally advocated the acquisition of nuclear weapons or participated in the management or guidance of the Argentine nuclear programme.

The work of the Argentine-Brazilian Standing Committee culminated in the preparation of the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy issued at Foz do Iguaçú on 28 November 1990, which became the keystone on which important international instruments signed in 1991 were based, leading to further negotiations with a view to ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1993.

The Joint Declaration of November 1990 is of particular significance, not only because it heralds specific objectives but also because—and this is unusual in this kind of instrument—the promised steps have in fact been taken with unusual speed. The first step involved the establishment of a Joint Accounting and Control System (SCCC) to be applied to all the nuclear activities and installations existing in the two countries, for the purpose of verifying that the nuclear materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices. This Joint System was adopted on 18 July 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico, when the Presidents of the two countries signed an agreement which also established the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), situated in Rio de Janeiro, for implementing the Joint Accounting and Control System. This Agreement was ratified by the parliaments of both countries.

Under article I, paragraph 3, of the Guadalajara Agreement, the two countries waived the possibility of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions, even though the Treaty of Tlatelolco permits them and both countries had always defended the right to carry out such explosions.

The second step provided for in the Foz do Iguaçú Declaration included entering "into negotiations with IAEA with a view to the conclusion of a joint safeguards agreement based on the Joint Accounting and Control System". That purpose was fulfilled in Vienna on 13 December 1991 with the signature, on behalf of the two Heads of State and the ABACC and IAEA authorities, of a quadripartite agreement to apply full-scope safeguards against the nuclear activities of the two countries for the purpose of verifying that the said materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices. The speed with which the action took place is remarkable, given the complexity of the political and technical issues covered and reflected in a document of 117 articles and more than 40 pages of text, which, in addition to being approved beforehand by a collective body such as the Governing Board of IAEA, usually requires negotiation much longer than the few months taken in this case.

It should be remembered that the Argentine Government had always been in favour of negotiating with IAEA the safeguards agreement provided for in article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco prior to its ratification, and had tried to do so, but the discussions had been bogged down by IAEA's insistence on keeping to the model agreement based on the non-proliferation Treaty. Argentina wanted an agreement adapted to the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and not to those of an instrument which it had rejected. The long-drawn-out deadlock was overcome with the conclusion of an ad hoc agreement satisfactory to all the parties concerned.

The third and last step provided for in the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú, the only one still awaiting implementation, is contained in the undertaking: "after the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with IAEA, to take appropriate action to permit the full entry into force for the two countries of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), including action to update and improve the wording".

The full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for Argentina and Brazil thus appears to be the culmination of a process which passed through various stages, but I believe it would be a mistake to look on the regime of that Treaty as the final and paramount purpose of this joint effort. There are reasons for thinking that *rapprochement*, cooperation and reciprocal confidence-building between the two countries were the primary motivation for this undertaking. The steps now agreed upon and those which may emerge in the future under this same procedure would probably be sufficient to provide both countries with security and progress in the nuclear field, but at the same time it would be senseless to remain outside a regional agreement which, in the main, does not involve any commitments for the two countries greater than those already acquired bilaterally and with IAEA. The decision to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco must then be seen as a contribution to regional and also world-wide peace and security, and simultaneously as an effort to enhance the international perception of both countries as sincere and trustworthy partners in the common undertaking to prevent the use of nuclear energy for hostile purposes.

Argentina and Brazil have said that they wish to update and improve the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Thus far, no one has said publicly which provisions of the Treaty might be modified. Suffice it to say that one paragraph of the Joint Declaration which the two countries issued on 14 February 1992 to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of Tlatelolco (see the "Documentation" section of this issue) indicates the kind of improvements and amendments envisaged. The Presidents of the two countries said that as soon as possible they would submit to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) some amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, *of an eminently technical nature and having nothing to do with its principles and objectives*. They asked all the countries of our region for the support needed for this initiative, which is intended to facilitate implementation of the Treaty. It seems likely that the amendments desired apply to certain articles relating to the control system.

It is more than probable that the work of amending the Treaty of Tlatelolco will be tripartite, as Chile has also expressed an interest in joining in the effort. Whatever the amendments advocated may be, the text will of course have to be considered by all the parties to the Treaty. Not until agreement is reached by all the participants will it be relevant to convene a special conference to consider and formally adopt the proposed changes. It is worth noting that the parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have already decided, on two occasions, to introduce separate amendments to the text of the Treaty.

The process is not likely to be simple or rapid but, as long as there is evidence of good will, it will not be difficult. In Argentina it is hoped, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has said, that the new text of the Treaty will be submitted for parliamentary approval in the course of the current year. With ratification by Argentina, with the immediate and full accession of Brazil and Chile, and with the well-founded expectation that in the near future Cuba and France (in respect of Additional Protocol I) will follow suit, the requirements set forth in article 28, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would be met for its entry into force with full effect for the immense zone of application set forth in article 4.

A journey on the road opened up in 1967 will thus have been completed. The nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America will be a reality. Over the years, many countries and individuals have worked intensively towards this goal. That it was possible for the final steps to be taken is due, to a large extent, to the joint enterprise of Argentina and Brazil, the two Latin American countries most advanced in the nuclear field and, precisely for that reason, the ones most affected by whatever regional instrument is devised for controlling nuclear activities.

The two countries decided to reverse the attitude that had predominated in their bilateral relations, uniting and, more often, separating them. It is noteworthy that one of the areas in which this new spirit was first able to express itself was that of nuclear activity, one of the most delicate and sensitive. This is a clear expression of the sincerity and energy with which both Governments, even though their highest leaders changed, are facing this process. Obviously, although no two situations in the world are the same and the similarities are not always notable, it has often been stressed that the activities carried out by Argentina and Brazil may very well set an example for other cases, not as a model to be copied—which is often neither good nor productive—but rather as a guide for efforts directed towards the same purpose.

Such activities transcend the national interest of the countries involved. They often make a particularly important contribution to the peace and security of an entire region and to the strengthening—as in this case—of an international instrument in which the world community as a whole has an interest.

Note

1 Argentine-Brazilian Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy issued at Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil, on 28 November 1990. The text is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XIV, No. 1, 1991.

Beyond Confidence-Building: Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Cooperation

Georges Lamazière and Roberto Jaguaribe

Introduction

Brazilian-Argentine cooperation in the nuclear field is widely viewed today as a textbook case of a confidence-building process. The concept of a confidence-building measure itself, however, created in the context of progressive *détente* in East-West confrontation, has seldom been mentioned by the two States themselves. This reflects both the fact that the whole process developed without outside inspiration or sponsorship and the different logic it expressed, which values cooperation over confrontation, the economic over the military aspects and what we might roughly call the "idealistic" over the strong "realistic" point of view prevailing elsewhere.

Brazil and Argentina went beyond confidence-building, as currently understood, as "a modest—some would even say cosmetic—technique for improving the atmosphere for East-West negotiations on arms reduction" (Akashi, 1991).

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They have written this article in their personal capacity and it does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Brazilian Government.

They launched an ambitious programme of nuclear cooperation as a central part of the move to integrate the two economies. It is not a coincidence that the model for the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control was EURATOM, and not any of the institutions developed in the course of East-West *détente*.

The process that developed between Brazil and Argentina has been presented by many authors as a model for other regions of the world and deservedly so. We must not, however, neglect the specific conditions present in the case in point.

The process of nuclear cooperation has to be seen in the light of the overall evolution of Brazil's relationship with Argentina. It would go beyond the limited dimensions of this article and its specific scope to discuss their historical background. Suffice it to say that it was traditionally characterized by the need for external stability derived from internal political requirements and by the inheritance of Portuguese-Spanish colonial rivalry, which in the nineteenth century gave rise to a dispute for regional supremacy. While not witnessing, after the mid-nineteenth century, any disruption, the bilateral relations underwent pronounced oscillations. In the 1960s and 1970s, they were marked by the delicate question of the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant and the legal dispute over the use of fluvial waters. This had a direct bearing on all other aspects of the relation between Argentina and Brazil and made it very difficult to enter into a process of cooperation in such a sensitive area as that of nuclear policy.

In spite of a bilateral situation which rendered cooperation difficult, both countries maintained similar positions in relation to restrictions imposed by nuclear suppliers and to the non-proliferation regime supported by the great Powers. It is true that they chose different types of reactors for electric-power generation: Argentina's, based on natural uranium and heavy water; Brazil's on enriched uranium and natural water. Nevertheless, there had always been an interchange of scientific information and material.

After the Itaipu question had been aptly solved in the late 1970s, the tendency towards cooperation was immediately followed by both countries. Increased understanding and cooperation in the nuclear area were perceived as a necessary pre-condition for the implementation of other policies. Two important factors made this feasible:

—the level of coincidence in the appreciation of matters concerning nuclear policy in the international scenario and multilateral forums; and

—the comparable level of industrial and technological capacitation of the two countries.

Main Characteristics of the Process

The first distinctive characteristic of the Brazilian-Argentine process is that the logical, chronological sequence was roughly cooperation, transparency, confidence-building, verification, in contrast to the approach advocated in international forums—according to their historical experience—by northern countries: verification, transparency, confidence-building, cooperation. We may say that the different approaches reflected not only different conceptual frameworks, but also different realities. In addition to never having been an area of frequent inter-State violence, if we take military expenditures as an indication of the general level of threat perception in a region, the Southern Cone of Latin America presents relatively modest levels expressed as a proportion of gross domestic product (see Schmitter, 1991). The most remarkable fact, according to Schmitter, is that "when Argentina entered into a military buildup prior to the Malvinas, Falklands War, Brazil did not seem to feel threatened and did not increase its expenditures".

This particular reality hinders comparisons with other regions of the third world, where both the former levels of mistrust and the levels of weapons-stockpiling are considerably higher. At the same time, it shows the inadequacy of comparisons made by some authors with the French-German project of the mid-1950s of finally "burying the hatchet", for the former levels of conflict between the two European countries since 1870, including central involvement in two world wars, bear no comparison to the situation in the Southern Cone.

We could say, thus, that the second characteristic of the Brazilian-Argentine process is that the incentives to cooperate and face together outside pressures on their national nuclear programmes were clearly greater than the incentives to pursue individual, parallel or, even worse, confrontational paths. This was made possible by the absence of a deeply ingrained conflict mentality, that would have made cooperation and accommodation unacceptable to domestic public opinion.

Another characteristic of this process is that, contrary to the "idealistic"—Kantian—assumption, it was launched while the two countries were still under military regimes, namely by the governments of General Figueiredo and General Videla. The fact that these regimes "opened the path to the redefinition of the nature of the relations between the two nations, gradually replacing premises directed to conflict or rivalry by interests favourable to political cooperation and economic integration" (Hirst, 1990) only gave more solidity to the process when civilians came to power. It could be presented and seen, not as a reaction against the former decision-makers, but as an acceleration of their initial thrust. If prestige considerations declined as motivators (see Selcher, 1989), it was reassuring to observe that the institutions most attached to notions of prestige and military might shared the awareness that national power would be better served by economic development than by traditional ways of acquiring international prestige. At the same time, the sensitivity of the issue indicated that the military regimes were well placed to shift the course of action from mutual suspicion to cooperation.

Another characteristic (see Bocco, Héctor Eduardo, 1989) was that the nuclear theme acquired increased visibility while the economic aspects had to address the inherent difficulties of any process of integration. The nuclear area presented itself as the ideal topic on which to promote integration at a fast pace. First, the central position occupied in this field by State bureaucracies and State enterprises made it easier to implement political decisions, in contrast with the trade, investment and other sectors in which Government has to wait for private business to follow; or to the areas of "complex interdependence"—investment, migration, tourism, "social communications"—which, albeit well developed and developing in the case of the Southern Cone, ultimately depend on the decisions of private individuals.

Furthermore, if most analysts agree that, like other processes of integration, the impulse of the Brazilian-Argentine programme of integration was mostly political, the nuclear area acquired high symbolic value because of its effects on the overall security perceptions at the national, regional and international levels. The nuclear area made possible positive comparisons with the regional past—the time of a "wary rivalry" (Selcher, 1985)—and even more so with the present state of the world elsewhere.

Still on this point, it is fair to say that while the will to coordinate diplomatic initiatives is strong on both sides, differences in the economic structure of both countries and the parallel projects of recuperating full international credibility can lead to separate agendas of negotiation. The nuclear issue is again the area where the similarity of conditions and perceptions makes coordination both natural and useful as a role model for other areas.

First Stages of Cooperation

The first political approaches of relevance were undertaken during the first year of President Figueiredo's mandate (1979). These led to the signing, in 1980, of an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which marked the beginning of formal cooperation in the nuclear fuel cycle between government institutions on both sides and the international coordination of nuclear policy.

Nuclear cooperation was intensified when both countries reverted to civil democratic governments and the process of economic integration began to be implemented. The Act of Foz do Iguaçú was signed on 30 November 1985. At that time, a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy was also signed. It established a working group which would lay the basis of future nuclear cooperation. The Group consists of members of the Foreign Ministry and the National Committee of Nuclear Energy of both countries. By a subsequent agreement, the Group was formalized, becoming the Permanent Argentine Brazilian Committee on Nuclear Policy. Other joint declarations on nuclear policy followed (Brasilia, 1986; Viedma, 1987; and Iperó, 1988).

When the present administrations assumed office, they found the institutional mechanisms with which to further nuclear cooperation already available. In the first meeting (June 1990) of the Permanent Committee after President Collor took office, the preliminary ideas relating to the future initiatives were already formulated. The suggestion of harmonized systems of internal national safeguards was ventilated, as was the possibility of a common effort towards a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

These two ideas were picked up in subsequent informal meetings under the aegis of the Permanent Committee. In August 1990, it was decided that the two Nuclear Energy Commissions would set up working groups for the establishment of common procedures of reporting, accounting and control of nuclear material. This laid the foundations for the Joint Accounting and Control System of Nuclear Material (SCCC). The SCCC, in turn, would be used as a basis for a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA. Early in November 1990, a high-level

Brazilian mission was sent to Buenos Aires. It negotiated the proposal for a meeting of President Collor and President Menem, to be held in Foz do Iguaçú, where they would issue an important Declaration making public the new orientation of the nuclear policies of the two countries.

The Foz do Iguaçú Declaration

The meeting of the two Presidents was held on 28 November, and the Joint Declaration of Foz do Iguaçú on Nuclear Policy[1] contained a three-step initiative designed to make the nuclear policies of the two countries transparent and their peaceful objectives verifiable:

—the establishment of the SCCC and the beginning of bilateral inspections;

—the negotiation of a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA; and

—the adoption of measures which could lead to the full implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including the improvement and updating of some of its clauses.

The Guadalajara Agreement

The SCCC was to be formalized in a bilateral agreement—the "Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy"— signed at Guadalajara, Mexico, on 18 July 1991. This Agreement essentially reproduced the political undertakings of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with the important difference that both countries renounced peaceful nuclear explosions as long as no technical difference between nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes and those for warlike purposes could be established. The abdication of this right had already been enunciated by President Collor, when he addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1990. The bilateral Agreement also created an Agency, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), to execute and administer the SCCC, thereby verifying effective observance of the basic undertaking. Both parties were also eager not to limit or hamper any peaceful application of nuclear energy or research on it. This was explicitly included as an article in the Agreement, as was the definition of propulsion or operation of any type of vehicle as a peaceful application of nuclear energy. This was important in order to preserve the nuclear-propulsion programme of both countries. The Guadalajara Agreement came into force on 12 December 1991.

The Joint Safeguards Agreement with IAEA

The Iguaçú Declaration presented an initiative that was to be taken in three successive steps. Both Governments decided, however, to enter the second step (negotiations with IAEA) before the conclusion of the first (ratification and entry into force of the bilateral Agreement, conclusion of the SCCC, making ABACC fully operational). The first meeting was held in Vienna, early in March 1991. Brazil and Argentina had opted for the EURATOM Agreement (INFCIRC/193) as a model for their joint safeguards agreement with IAEA. The Agency had no objection to that, reaffirming only that its ability to reach its own independent conclusions was an indispensable requirement for any safeguards agreement. Argentina and Brazil insisted on having the requirement for the preservation of technological secrets included as one of the guiding principles of the agreement.

Agreement on the final text was reached in November 1991. President Collor and President Menem went to Vienna to witness the signing of the agreement on 13 December 1991. The agreement includes all of the relevant elements of other comprehensive safeguards agreements, such as the basic undertaking to accept safeguards "on all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities within the territories of the States Parties", the special procedures to be used in certain activities, such as nuclear naval propulsion, and the requirement to restrict exports of safeguarded material only to recipient countries that keep it under safeguards. In this last respect, Brazil and Argentina went even further, since they do not discriminate in favour of nuclear Powers.

These initiatives were perceived in the international community as breakthroughs in both Argentina's and Brazil's nuclear policies. How was this process perceived from within? What were the political motivations that led to this profound alteration in both countries' approaches towards the prevailing mechanisms for non-proliferation? This question has to be seen in the light of the three dimensions in which the question evolved: internal, bilateral and international.

Internal Dimension

In the case of Brazil, the single most important internal factor was the new constitutional requirement (1988) for the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Here, it might be useful to have a general description of some of the key aspects, often perceived as controversial, of the Brazilian nuclear programme. Brazil's nuclear programme relied very much on external cooperation. Nevertheless, there had always been internal autonomous research. In 1975, Brazil signed an important agreement on cooperation with Germany, through which it would acquire German equipment, technology and know-how in several areas of importance, such as nuclear enrichment and power generation. Initially, the agreement was to include the transfer of ultra centrifugation enrichment technology. Since Brazil was not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and did not accept full-scope IAEA safeguards, there was strong international pressure against the transfer of such technology. Germany therefore reconsidered and decided not to proceed with the original proposal. The final agreement included the transfer of the "jet nozzle" technology for enrichment, a much less proven one.

When, in the early 1980s, it became evident that this technology would not be industrially or commercially feasible, the Brazilian Government determined that the ultra centrifugation enrichment technology be developed internally. This reinforced the autonomous nuclear programme, which was to be dubbed by the press as the "parallel" nuclear programme. There have been several assertions that the real objectives of the autonomous nuclear programme were not clear. At no stage was there a government directive to build nuclear weapons in Brazil. The sensitivity of the programme, the central role played by the armed forces, the absence of an internal safeguards system and the relative independence of several subprogrammes, however, were elements that gave room for speculation.

These uncertainties and grey areas were to cause serious concern internally, especially in the scientific community. Concerns were kept under control under the military governments, but surfaced when President Sarney took office and even led to a congressional investigation. When President Collor took office, he determined that the Brazilian nuclear programme should be fully transparent and accountable to civil supervision. This reflected a very perceptible aspiration of Brazil's civil society. All nuclear activities should be accountable to the National Nuclear Energy Commission. This was carried out with the establishment, for the first time, of an internal safeguards system applicable to all nuclear activities.

Bilateral Dimension

The bilateral dimension evolved as a concatenation of natural steps. As we have seen, the initial steps were taken by military governments (under President Videla and President Figueiredo). They were pursued and strengthened by the first democratic governments (President Alfonsín and President Sarney) and brought to full conclusion by their successors (President Menem and President Collor). A uniform motivation was maintained throughout the whole process, but specific interests and objectives were behind each stage. In the first stage, the main goal was to consolidate the new cooperative process into which both countries entered after the Itaipu question was solved. Cooperation was, however, limited and both countries pursued their sensitive programmes independently.

During the period of the first democratic governments, the decision to enter a process of economic integration and political harmonization was taken. It was evident to several observers of this process that the latent misgivings and suspicious perceptions of each other's nuclear programmes had to be overcome if the economic integration was to have any meaning. It was at that stage (1987 and 1988) that the first reciprocal visits to each country's most sensitive nuclear facilities were undertaken. These reflected the determination to dispel the dispute and the competition for supremacy in nuclear technology. But this was exclusively a restricted bilateral opening. Only in the third stage was there an effective opening to the international community by the process of cooperation. The objective here was to convey to the international community the message that Argentina and Brazil were reliable countries and presented no threat to regional or international peace and security. Only at this stage was the decision to accept IAEA safeguards taken, since both countries realized that safeguards were the only effective means of providing the international community with the assurances it wanted.

External Dimension

The external factors were primarily related to the perception of the new international scenario that emerged with the end of the cold war. A new framework of convergence of political interests among the dominant Powers, clearly enhanced by the war in the Persian Gulf, concurred for a greater concentration of power. The war in the Gulf also redirected security concerns and policies. In this context, both countries were interested in avoiding being perceived as potential regional menaces and destabilizing factors. This was especially true in the nuclear area, where Brazil's and Argentina's programmes had been identified, together with those of India, Pakistan, Israel and South Africa, as potential threats of proliferation. Furthermore, there has always been the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which Brazil signed and ratified. Although it is not in force, Brazil has committed itself to abide by its principles and objectives.

Some observers believe that external pressure from nuclear suppliers and countries with which there were traditional ties of cooperation was an important factor leading to the establishment of the new Argentine-Brazilian policy. It seems to us, however, that when the process took off, the imperative requirement for continued external cooperation had considerably declined in the two countries, both on account of the technological and industrial levels they had reached and on account of the relative loss of importance of the nuclear lobbies internally. On the other hand, there was a general perception that the decision not to accept international verification of the peaceful objectives of their nuclear programmes was having an adverse effect on their ability to obtain access to advanced products and technologies outside the nuclear area, such as high-speed computers.

Combining the internal and bilateral developments with the new external environment, the policy adopted by Brazil and Argentina seems to follow a very natural course. In other words, if you are internally committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, why not give your neighbour and partner assurances to that effect and obtain reciprocity in the process? Thus, you dispel the latent anxieties and suspicions in this area and pave the way for economic integration and concerted political action.

The extension of this process to the global level represents a larger step, on account of the traditional position of both countries (with widespread internal support) as regards the prevailing non-proliferation system and its built-in inequities. The issue had to be approached cautiously, both on account of internal repercussions and on account of the concern that the presence of international inspectors would actually represent an intrusion into Argentina's and Brazil's most sensitive and valued facilities, which had been developed in spite of severe constraints imposed from abroad.

The course of action followed provided satisfactory solutions to all of these problems. The joint safeguards agreement did not represent the acceptance of the political guidelines of the non-proliferation system, more specifically of the non-proliferation Treaty, but of the verification of internal and bilateral commitments by the qualified international agency. In short, both countries accept to provide assurances fully equivalent to those required by the NPT, without having to endorse the political elements of that Treaty, which they consider discriminatory. In the case of Brazil, it might also be argued that the concept of a safeguards agreement with IAEA had already been accepted, since article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which it signed and ratified, calls for such an agreement. The question of intrusion was also given much attention and the fact that the agreement was a joint venture gave a better negotiating position to both States, which, as already mentioned, insisted on and obtained a specific clause stating the preservation of technological secrets as one of the principles of the safeguards agreement.

Relation with Other Security Issues in the Region

The process of nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina has already produced an offspring, the "Mendoza Accord", of 5 September 1991,[2] first signed by both countries and Chile, and adhered to by Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. The signatories commit themselves not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain biological and chemical weapons and engage themselves to be among the original parties to the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, now in the concluding phase of negotiations at the

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This initiative complements the process in the nuclear area and grants to the subregion the status of the first inhabited area to be declared free of weapons of mass destruction.

Some authors have speculated on the possibility that the economic integration process (the Common Market of the South) may give birth, at a later stage, to some sort of security arrangement. At the present stage, however, this does not seem probable, taking into account the already high degree of mutual confidence; the absence of both intra- and extra-regional security threats; the low levels of military expenditures and conventional weapons stocks; and the common perception that the subregion faces its major challenges in the areas of economic and social development.

Conclusions

If we agree with the assumption that in a process of regional integration expectations are that the universe of "high politics" will have decreasing importance on the agenda of the partners and, even more, that premature emphasis on defence and strategic themes can minimize the chances for success in such an experience of integration (Hirst 1991), we can conclude that after playing a necessary role as a bilateral confidence-building measure, nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina in the future will probably concentrate both on the more concrete area of bilateral cooperation and on the more "politicized" area of "common nuclear diplomacy" in the international arena. In this last capacity, it will still function as a confidence-building measure, only turned outwards, and not towards each other. Thus it will contribute to assuring unimpeded and regular access to advanced technology for both countries, in the nuclear and other fields. It can also be perceived as a step towards a broader non-proliferation system, where regional arrangements must play a major role, always with a view to reaching a non-discriminatory system.

As Schmitter has observed (1991), this part of the world is so atypical that the usual realistic assumptions do not apply. Some idealistic assumptions do not seem to apply either, such as the one that tends to attribute—since Kant—the monopoly of cooperative, non-conflictive, approaches to international relations to republics or democracies. Other idealistic premises, nevertheless, seem to be the case in the Southern Cone, such as the one that attaches high value to cooperation and integration as emerging forms of international behaviour which can progressively supersede power politics and military competition. In this the Brazilian-Argentine process of cooperation in the nuclear field is a good example and, with due attention to its specificities, can be of help as a prototype for other regions of the world.

Notes

1 The text of the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy issued at Foz do Iguaçú, Brazil, on 28 November 1990 was reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XIV, No. 1, 1991.

2 Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Mendoza Accord. The text was issued in United Nations document A/46/463, annex. It is also reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 1, 1992.

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Regional Conflicts: Peace-Keeping and Disarmament

Peace-Keeping and Disarmament in the Peace-Building Process

Christian Harleman

Introduction

Since 1988, the international community has witnessed tremendous developments in the field of peace-keeping. The number of peace-keeping operations and their size are an indication of the expanding harmony between the major Powers and their desire to solve conflicts, and also of the increasing need to cope with conflicts at various levels.

In this article an attempt is made to outline some ideas on means to respond to the new requirements of United Nations peace-keeping in a more flexible way, thereby avoiding "peace-keeping fatigue" among Member States. It also discusses ways that peace-keeping and disarmament might facilitate regional peace-building processes.

Development of the Peace-Keeping Instrument

Peace-keeping operations as now carried out by the United Nations were not foreseen by the founders of the Organi-

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zation and are not mentioned at all in the Charter. They were conceived and developed by the United Nations at the beginning of the cold war, mainly because disagreement among the permanent members of the Security Council had rendered the United Nations collective security system, outlined in Chapter VII of the Charter, unworkable. Thus peace-keeping operations became a practical mechanism for containing conflicts and facilitating their settlement. Former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson and former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold introduced and promoted the idea of using a multinational force to control and supervise a negotiated cease-fire between hostile States, thus preventing an escalation of conflict while keeping the peace. Their ideas were based primarily on two principles: that a United Nations peace-keeping operation should take place only with the consent of the States concerned; and that force should not be applied to end a conflict.

From 1948 to 1985 some 13 peace-keeping operations were established. In general, each was organized as a military observer mission, as a peace-keeping force or as a combination of the two. Each operation was provided with a mandate outlining the means to be used to assist in the control and resolution of conflicts between hostile States; or, as in Cyprus, between hostile communities within a single State, each backed by an outside Power.

United Nations efforts in the maintenance of peace have passed through four development phases. The first period, between 1948 and 1956, was an experimental phase, in which the United Nations introduced an international observation and reporting system with a view to maintaining fragile cease-fires. From this period, there are two important missions which are still in existence: the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with headquarters in Jerusalem, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in Jammu and Kashmir. These missions were initiated by the Security Council and financed from the regular budget.

The next ten years—1956 to 1967—were characterized by escalating tension between the two super-Powers. Increasing rivalry for hegemony in the third world fuelled conflicts, which, in some regions, tended to escalate out of control. In order to help achieve the cease-fire and maintain international peace in this political climate, the first peace-keeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), was launched in the Sinai in 1956, and became the first example of a valuable mechanism for constraining hostilities and thus to make possible conditions necessary for negotiations and/or mediation towards the peaceful settlement of conflicts—in other words, peace-making. In addition to UNEF I, two new forces—ONUC in the Congo and UNFICYP in Cyprus—were established by the Security Council, as well as four observer missions. The international community began to realize that peace-keeping operations, combined with the mutual deterrence of nuclear power, produced a new type of security—negative stability.

As the peace-keeping instrument was further refined and sharpened, terms such as "buffer zone", "interposition" and "multidimensional" were used for the first time. In the beginning, great expectations were placed on the United Nations, but the deteriorating East-West political climate, the impaired financial situation of the United Nations, and the 1967 war in the Middle East hampered the further use and development of the peace-keeping mechanism. Peacekeepers thus entered what might be called the "dormant" period. During these years (1967-1973), no new operations were initiated and only three remained in effect. The cold war effectively prevented any positive approach towards international peace under the auspices of the United Nations. In 1973, when the Yom Kippur War threatened to escalate into an all-out super-Power confrontation, the usefulness of United Nations peace-keeping was re-discovered as a practical means for dealing with the situation. Consequently, peace-keeping was encouraged and revitalized as the world community became familiar with the new operations in Sinai (UNEF II), Lebanon (UNIFIL) and on the Golan Heights (UNDOF). However, tension between the super-Powers remained, and the rearmament continued, at tremendous cost. Even though other conflicts surfaced which threatened international peace and security, the political rivalry between the major Powers and the lack of financial resources remained major hindrances to the creation of additional peace-keeping operations.

Up to the present time, peace-keeping operations have been initiated only with the consent of the parties involved, and until the mid-1980s utilized as contributors of troops small countries that were neutral to the conflict. Peace-keeping worked as a mechanism for reassurance, brought an end to the hostilities in the areas concerned and simultaneously provided some measures for confidence-building.

In these years, the peace process focused primarily on peace-keeping, and to a lesser extent on peace-making, but peace-building was almost wholly neglected. Consequently, disarmament, which was foreseen by the founders of the United Nations as one of the major pillars of the peace process, was not developed as an integral part of the process.

In the last five years the decreased tension between the two super-Powers created a new political environment, which provided the basis for the developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The harmony that followed the end of the cold war contributed to unity and the process of consultation in the Security Council, as well as to its capability for solving longstanding conflicts. Consequently, the United Nations was inundated with requests for peace-keeping operations.

Another development at this time was the increased use of civilians in the new peace-keeping operations. Although the United Nations Military Observer Group in Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) was still a traditional operation, others were less traditional. In the operations in Namibia, as well as in Central America, we witnessed a new type of peace-keeping, which had a more complex structure and a more comprehensive mission. Here, the United Nations was asked to advance international peace and security on a wider scale by promoting a sound political and legal constitutional system. Such comprehensive and challenging goals required combining traditional peace-keeping with some novel methods such as upholding basic legal standards, monitoring by police, supervision of elections, and humanitarian assistance.

In the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf, we saw the United Nations performing in the role envisaged by its founders. For the first time (excluding the United Nations-sponsored action in Korea), the enforcement measures in Chapter VII were authorized and the international community involved undertook massive intervention by a coalition force—operating within the framework of international law and the United Nations Charter and with the consensus and authorization of the Security Council. This activity was encouraging in that it enabled the United Nations to embark on a system of collective security. Another pioneer action taken during the Gulf crisis—an action which is still in effect—was the disarmament and verification mission in Iraq to ensure the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile weapons and certain stockpiles of arms.

Within the last ten years, the world has seen a variety of arrangements for meeting threats to international peace and security. It has witnessed traditional and experienced peace-keeping operations; multidimensional operations; and the enforcement action in the Gulf. What will the future security system be like?

Future Development

Even though the international political climate has changed and improved, the changes have brought to the surface other kinds of conflicts.

Ethnic, religious, economic and social conflicts have become more apparent, and border disputes have again become an issue. Autocratic regimes contribute to domestic and intra-State conflicts, resulting in insurgency, civil war and subversive warfare. Thus, there is an indication of the need in the future for various kinds of national, regional and international security arrangements which must have the capacity to cope with conflicts at various levels. In order to promote these measures, practical arrangements are required to deal with demobilization, including disarmament and arms control, election and human rights monitoring, and humanitarian assistance. Although the United Nations has been involved in the practical implementation of conflict management in terms of peace-keeping, little has been achieved in terms of peace-building.

Within this context, disarmament has been discussed for decades. However, the new political climate has also changed the prospects for it. The establishment of imposed disarmament and verification mechanisms within the United Nations framework in the case of Iraq, although based on enforcement action to reverse aggression, may provide some precedents, ultimately leading to machinery for multilateral arms control and verification.

It is likely that future peace-keeping activities—broadly defined—will include a number of new operations, some of which fall outside the traditional field of peace-keeping.

The Gulf crisis has indicated that there is a new era of political and military cooperation in which collective security actions are feasible through the United Nations. However, although the war in the Gulf provided a number of lessons, the question still remains whether the United Nations will have, or should have, the capacity to deal with the full range of such local, regional and international conflicts. In addition, we must bear in mind that since 1988 the United Nations has established 12 new operations, of which those in Yugoslavia and Cambodia are the most extensive. Both operations are huge and may involve up to 34,000 men and women working in different parts of the world at tremendous expense. Consequently, one must consider whether Member States are willing to contribute greater financial, human and material resources to conflicts in remote areas when the value for their own political, economic and strategic environment is not readily apparent to their people.

It seems obvious that the current situation and its future development call for a new collective security system, one in which national and regional security arrangements assume more responsibility within their own areas. Such a system must take into consideration the new environment, which is no longer under the mantle of the "negative stability" of the cold war—a fact that has left a vacuum in regional security arrangements. This vacuum must be filled, because regions must deal with a broad spectrum of conflict management, requiring new thinking in terms of capacity and responsibility. Local or regional threats need to be met with a flexible response, corresponding to each particular situation and local conditions. Even though the Charter provides for a peace-making role for regional organizations—a fact which has been emphasized by the Secretary-General, as well as at the recent summit meeting of the Security Council—very little has been achieved in terms of implementing the concept.

Security Arrangements at Various Levels

If all of these ideas are to be put into effect, the responsibility may be shared on five different levels.

It is clear that the United Nations must continue to take the responsibility for international peace and security in the future. But a security arrangement of this kind must be flexible, adapting its action to the nature of the conflict, and must not only involve the United Nations and the international community, but, whenever useful and/or possible, must also utilize regional and national security systems. Within this framework, the following arrangements might be considered for ensuring global security at several levels.

The First Level: National

Many Governments are already prepared for the twenty-first century, while others are still in the process of nation-building, including the forming of national security arrangements. A national government must be responsible for its own security. Armed forces must be the insurance against foreign intervention as well as against domestic insurgency, civil war or subversive warfare.

At the same time, the armed forces of the developing countries could also play a more sophisticated role by participating in building the national infrastructure of their countries, an area in which military knowledge and capacity in engineering and transport will be essential. Finally, as a member of a regional security organization and of the United Nations, a nation must be prepared to participate in the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, national forces are the first and basic level in global security: a nation must deal with its own security, but should also be prepared to participate in regional or international security arrangements. Therefore national forces must be trained to participate, not only in national defence, but also in regional and international peace activities which may involve regional or international peace-keeping, and which may involve disarmament activities.

The Second Level: Regional

The second level would involve the regional organizations, which must support the development of regional security systems as part of global security arrangements. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter provides, particularly in its Article 52, for such arrangements, assuming that they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Although some "regional agencies" embody agreements in specific issue-areas—such as international law and economic integration—there are very few regional organizations with an institutional mechanism for handling violent conflicts. However, there are examples of the settlement of disputes in which regional bodies have been involved. The Organization of American States (OAS), the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) all have in common the purpose of promoting regional security. Although these organizations may have the institutional mechanisms for dealing with regional conflicts, they do not necessarily have the knowledge, experience and understanding required to implement practical peace-keeping and other arrangements. For the successful management of a conflict it is essential to incorporate not only political considerations but also a practical or operational dimension in which political arrangements will be implemented. Such an instrument now exists at the international level (the peace-keeping forces) but does not yet exist in the various regional arenas.

Apart from the ongoing operations in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, it is not certain whether such large and costly peace-keeping operations will be repeated in the future. These types of operations will probably be too expensive for the United Nations, as well as for the contributing States. It is to be hoped that serious disputes of such proportions will be handled at an earlier stage at the regional level, assuming that the constitutional and operational resources exist or can be mobilized.

In order to be able to implement the practical or operational security arrangements that must follow a political decision, each regional organization would have to develop a centre from which to deal with these regional questions. Such a centre should be able to deal with all the means of implementing traditional peace-keeping, but also with the newer aspects, such as disarmament and verification, the monitoring of elections, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. Since the new political climate has fundamentally enhanced the prospects for the implementation of confidence-building arrangements, it is possible today to provide the machinery for bilateral or multilateral arms control verification. Regional peace-keeping centres must therefore be related and coordinated with existing or future disarmament centres, not only to promote peace-keeping and peace-building activities, but also to relate theory and practice in a natural way.

Regional disarmament and peace-keeping centres should explore the theoretical and practical processes of ending hostilities, and of enhancing the capacity of regional organizations to conduct regional peace-keeping/peace-building operations, and when required, to contribute to the international peace process. In the more practical aspects of such a mandate, a peace-keeping centre should provide the framework and coordination necessary to establish a regional stand-by peace-keeping force. This force should consist of 5,000 to 10,000 troops and be equipped and trained to operate on short notice, both regionally and globally. The centre should also have the capacity to provide the necessary tools ("verifiers") for some peace-building activities, for example verification of regional or bilateral disarmament and arms limitation treaties. In its peace-building efforts, the centre would also develop other practical mechanisms for resolving disputes in a non-violent manner, and in such a way as to promote and develop military integration in the region.

In order to facilitate regional peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building activities, the United Nations could assist regional organizations by giving them supplementary funding and some logistical support. It would also be useful—and more far-reaching—for the United Nations to be represented in the regional organizations.

The Third Level: Regional and International Combined

The third level will be a combination of regional and international security arrangements. If a conflict occurs in which the regional organization decides to establish a regional peace-keeping force, such a force must carry out its mandate in an effective and impartial manner. In some cases the conflict might be so complex, particularly when the roots of the conflict are of ethnic origin, that the impartiality of the force would be questioned. In such cases, the United Nations Security Council would need to authorize the Secretary-General to provide, with the consent of the parties, and in coordination with the regional organization, an international body of observers who, under his command, would ensure the objectivity of the regional peace-keeping efforts.

However, this impartial body should not only ensure objectivity; it should also provide the United Nations with the capacity to promote the peace process by using these observers as monitors of human rights, elections and the verification of arms limitation.

The Fourth Level: International

International peace-keeping should be the fourth level in the global security structure. In some cases, international peace and security are threatened in ways that call for a truly international response, requiring peace-keeping units from the international community and the various regions. Peace-keeping units which are trained and prepared in the region and which are efficient and impartial would be provided to the United Nations in order to carry out the peace-keeping task, either in a traditional role or in a wider and more multifaceted way. The recent changes on the international scene have introduced some new elements into international peace-keeping, which make it feasible to use peace-keeping forces in new areas of peace and security, including the third component in the peace process—peace-building.

Peace-keepers have been used to monitor elections, human rights, demobilization and other activities that have promoted peace and stability in a given area. So far, we have seen the peace-keepers monitor and supervise the demobilization in Central America; it is hoped that they will do the same in Cambodia, demobilizing up to 70 per cent of the existing forces.

But peace-keeping could be expanded even further. For example, it should be explored whether it is possible to use peace-keepers to supervise economic sanctions, or to use them in a situation relating to an environmental disaster resulting from violent conflict. But again, perhaps it is most important to use international peace-keepers for verification of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements and treaties, thereby giving the United Nations an accurate and practical instrument with the knowledge and capacity to carry out ad hoc investigations of arms limitation or disarmament. The feasibility of naval peace-keeping has also been discussed, and of verification of sea-based cruise missiles. The technical and practical arrangements are difficult to foresee, as yet, but should be explored.

The Fifth Level: Enforcement

The fifth and last level in global security is enforcement action, in which a coalition could use force in order to impose a decision by the international community under the authority of the Security Council. As this step is within the purview of global security and accepted as the last resort in crisis management, it must be sanctioned and decided by the United Nations. It is very important that the United Nations should assume the responsibility for peace-building activities as soon as possible after the imposition of such a violent solution. In order to build confidence in the area, enforcement action, as well as peace-keeping, should involve peace-building steps to be implemented immediately after the conflict has ended. Moreover, disarmament must be one of a number of measures necessary for the achievement of peace and development in the area.

Preventive Measures

So far we have examined methods for limiting a conflict. We must now explore the possibilities of preventing a conflict. Some have suggested the idea of using peace-keepers in preventive efforts, that is, using a peace-keeping force at the request of a single State or group of States threatened with an attack. In this respect, the force—whether a peace-keeping force or military observers—would serve as a "trip-wire" to warn an aggressor against attacking. A back-up force could be deployed behind the "trip-wire", to act if the peace-keepers are overrun; although this idea seems feasible, it would be best if preventive activities could be implemented at an earlier stage.

Almost all Governments use a number of resources to collect information about the international situation. The most common and acceptable means of obtaining knowledge about countries is through embassies. Ambassadors act on behalf of their national Governments to collect information that is important to their own country's foreign policy. As a rule, the information may be taken as reliable and reasonably objective, providing national Governments with data on which they can base decisions concerning foreign policy. The United Nations should use the same system. United Nations officials should be appointed as United Nations ambassadors to critical areas in order to provide the Secretary-General with objective and non-filtered information about the actual situation. If required, these special representatives or ambassadors might be authorized to act as mediators and to carry out the Secretary-General's good offices with a view to preventing a threatened conflict. If an emergency occurs, they could act as the Secretary-General's focal point for various emergency actions relating to peace-keeping, disaster relief, or other activities that require coordination at the highest level. United Nations representatives should not work only in areas of crisis management; they could also facilitate the peace-building process, implementing various confidence-building measures.

Conclusion

As indicated, the peace-keeping of today and tomorrow is a rather complex and multifaceted undertaking. The international climate requires not only temporary problem-solving measures, but also a variety of tools for promoting lasting peace and security. Peace-keeping is one of the means that has proved workable. However, peace-keeping is only one fragment of the peace process. The complexity of the international situation requires a combination of available instruments and a flexible response to various types of conflicts.

Moreover, disputes must be identified before they have escalated into conflicts. Peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building are the pillars of the peace process: peace-keeping forces and negotiators/mediators are the natural mechanisms for both peace-keeping and peace-making, just as disarmament activities are among the mechanisms for peace-building. Each of these three tools has a far better chance of success if the three are approached as an integrated entity.

Peace-Keeping Operations mentioned in the article

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
January 1949 to present

First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)
November 1956–June 1967

United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
March 1964 to present

Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)
October 1973–July 1979

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
June 1974 to present

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
March 1978 to present

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
August 1988–February 1991

Disarmament and the Peace Process in Central America

Raúl Benítez-Manaut

Background

The decade of the 1980s in Central America was the period of the twentieth century most involved in conflict. Confrontations, especially militaristic, the dominance of powerful groups over economic and political affairs (oligarchy), the absence of democracy in political systems, together with intolerable economic conditions such as widespread poverty and economic reform the benefits of which never reached all groups of society provoked many crises. At the same time, crises were exacerbated by the activities of many countries which saw their dominance at stake (the United States in particular) and others which, owing to propinquity, realized the need to act because of the potential danger to their national security (those which originally constituted the Contadora Group), or those which sought to influence the political processes by expanding their network of allies (Cuba and the Soviet Union). Accordingly, when the crises erupted in 1979 and 1980, the unrest soon spread to other countries and acquired the character of geopolitical confrontation. The first conflict, which emerged from national confrontation involving three countries (Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador) developed into an international

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conflict. Thus unprecedented militarization broke out in the region as is demonstrated by the increased troop strength after 1980.

Military Balance in Central America:
Troop Strength 1977, 1980, 1985, 1992

	1977	*1980*	*1986*	*% Growth 1977-1986*	*Estimates 1992*
Guatemala	14 300	14 900	51 600	260	52 000
Nicaragua	7 100	—	62 850	785	21 000
Honduras	14 200	11 300	23 000	61	23 000
El Salvador	7 130	7 250	59 650	736	53 000 26 500
Costa Rica	5 000	5 000	20 000	300	10 000
TOTAL	47 730	38 450	217 100	354	

Source: *The Military Balance*, IISS, London (1977-1978; 1980-1981; and 1985-1986). In the case of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, police, security and civil defence forces are not included. The estimates for 1992 have been made by the author. In the case of Costa Rica the figures are for security and police forces, not armed forces.

Another new element in Central America was the presence of foreign forces, which participated in the arms race and added to the military personnel: the United States stationed troops and carried out military manoeuvres in Honduras; the United States Military Group was established in El Salvador in 1980; Cuba incorporated military advisers in Nicaragua in 1981 (who withdrew in 1990); and the Soviet Union provided military aid to Nicaragua.

By way of cooperation, many countries rendered economic aid to Central America and urged *détente*.[1] The first peace effort that won strong support from the international community was the work of the *Contadora Group*. Contadora was established on 9 January 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. Contadora focused its work on an effort to bring about a dialogue between the five Governments involved in the conflict (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and suggested that a peace pact be signed which would include many provisions designed to promote *détente* between the Governments, the reduction of armies, the expulsion of foreign military forces, integration of the guerrillas into civilian life by widening political opportunities, and the like. The Contadora Agreement was not signed. A last effort was made on 7 June 1986.[2] Nevertheless, the effort of the Contadora Group was not in vain, for several reasons: first, the dialogue between the Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, with Nicaragua succeeded; secondly, it prevented a military clash between Honduras and Nicaragua; and thirdly, it prevented military intervention by the United States in Nicaragua. The Peace Agreement of the Contadora Group was not signed owing to the fact that, because of the internal conditions, the five Central American countries were not ready for peaceful co-existence inasmuch as both the Governments and the insurgent movements placed their trust in military strategies: (*a*) the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) versus the army of El Salvador; (*b*) the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) versus the Guatemalan army; and (*c*) the counter-revolutionaries versus the army of Nicaragua.[3] To this was added the United States "containment of communism" strategy against the Government of Nicaragua and the guerrillas of El Salvador and Guatemala, known as a "war of low intensity".

The crisis in Central America can thus be divided into the following periods: Period of regional militarization (1979-1987); period of civil war in Nicaragua (1978-1990), El Salvador (1981-1992) and Guatemala (1979- . . .); period of regional *détente* (1987 onwards); and period of implementation of the national peace processes (1987 onwards).

Esquipulas II

On 7 August 1987, the historic document entitled "Procedure for the Establishment of a Strong and Lasting Peace in Central America", known as Esquipulas II, was signed in Guatemala. The peace process initiated in Esquipulas brought about regional *détente*. The process carried out by the Contadora Group was noteworthy because the Central American Governments agreed among themselves that there was a need to eliminate the tensions, mainly as regards Nicaragua, and to implement the mechanisms appropriate for that purpose.[4] The International Verification and Follow-up Commission (CIVS) for the peace process in which representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States and members of the Contadora Group participated, was established. Similarly, amnesties were decreed for the rebel groups and it was proposed that national dialogues on peace should be initiated by the Governments with the guerrillas. At this first stage, mediation was internal: in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua mediation was initiated by the Catholic church, and the institutions established for that purpose in the three countries as a result of the signing of Esquipulas II were named the *National Reconciliation Commission.*

Another result of Esquipulas II was the establishment of a regional consultation mechanism at the presidential level: the summit meetings of Central American presidents. They began with the first Esquipulas meeting on 24 and 25 May 1986. In 1991, Panama joined in the tenth presidential meeting, held at San Salvador from 15 to 17 July. At the presidential summits the process of economic integration and cooperation for development was then discussed.[5] These presidential meetings were the most important indicators of the new climate of *détente* prevailing in the region. There was a giant leap from that regional effort to "nationalization" of the peace.

Peace and Demilitarization in Nicaragua

In Nicaragua the peace and demilitarization process was more rapid. The Sandinist Government (19 July 1979–25 April 1990) was faced with the war waged by the counter-revolutionaries at a very high cost. The country was completely militarized, both politically and economically. From 1985 to 1989 over 50 per cent of the Government's budget was assigned to defence, the political struggle was reduced to a "state of emergency", and the Government received direct advisory assistance from Cuba (estimated to consist of about 200 military advisers) and technology from the Soviet Union. The counter-revolutionaries received full support from the United States Government (including covert action)[6] and its strategy against the Sandinist Government consisted of destroying the country's economic infrastructure. For that reason Nicaragua became the most heavily indebted country in the entire third world (more than $10 billion for a population of 3 million, or $3,300 per capita). The United States made $447,690,000 available for the counter-revolution between 1982 and 1990.[7] The exact amount of Cuban and Soviet aid to Nicaragua is unknown. The Nicaraguan Government calculated the economic cost of the war to be $9 billion.[8]

The counter-revolutionaries used sophisticated anti-air weapons (SAM-7) and the Government used Soviet high-technology helicopters against the Contras. In 1989, in the period of maximum mobilization for the war, the Sandinist army is estimated to have had 120,000 reservists and 60,000 regulars.

The peace process developed along with two elements: democratization and demilitarization. After the signing of Esquipulas II, the first step taken by the Nicaraguan Government was to establish the National Reconciliation Commission headed by Cardinal Obando y Bravo in August 1987. In September of the same year an amnesty was decreed and in October a national dialogue was convened, with 11 political parties of the opposition. On 23 March 1988, the first partial agreement with the counter-revolutionaries was signed: the "Sapoá Agreement",[9] whereby the forces agreed not to engage in offensive military activities. This first achievement was frustrated by the counter-revolutionaries in June. In February 1989, a change of date was announced for the presidential elections; the National Assembly, municipalities and governors of the autonomous region on the Atlantic coast rescheduled it from November to February 1990. In March 1989, an amnesty was announced for 1,894 members of the Somoza National Guard and, in August, the Government signed an agreement with the opposition parties guaranteeing impartiality in the elections. In December, nine opposition parties formed the National Opposition Union (UNO), and Violeta Chamorro was nominated to the presidency. In February 1990, Chamorro won the elections and became President on 25 April 1990. Demobilization of the counter-revolutionaries was completed between April and June of 1990, and they were granted political and civil guarantees and given a piece of land, bringing the peace process to a successful end in July.[10] The demobilization included 22,000 counter-revolutionaries, of whom, as the International Support and Verification Commission of the Organization of American States pointed out, fewer than 10,000 were combatants.[11]

The demilitarization process took place at the same time as the change of government and the demobilization of the counter-revolutionaries. The Sandinist army decreased from more than 100,000 men (regulars and reservists) at the beginning of 1990 to 20,000 at the end of 1991, the largest reduction in the entire Central American region (not including Panama, where, as a result of the United States military intervention in December 1989, the army was disbanded). In budgetary terms, the demobilization was very important because economic resources were then assigned to other priorities such as health and education.

Peace and Demilitarization in El Salvador

The civil war of El Salvador, which began in January 1981, was the military process with the largest geopolitical repercussions in the region after the conflict in Nicaragua had ended. The fighting between the army and the FMLN began to have great repercussions. It can be said that the regional process of Esquipulas II was not successful in the case of El Salvador. Moreover, in El Salvador, unlike Nicaragua and Guatemala, the National Reconciliation Commission was not effective. The casualties—dead and wounded—in the civil war amounted to an average of 4,000 per year for the two armies (44,000 *guerrilleros* and servicemen killed or wounded between 1981 and 1991), and over 70,000 civilian victims of repression and of the fighting. The highest peak of military warfare was during the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 in San Salvador, the capital of the country.[12] Among other negative events, the governmental army murdered six Jesuit priests, accusing them of being "intellectual originators" of the guerrilla offensive.[13]

Unlike the fighting in Guatemala and Nicaragua, according to most analysts, the civil war between the FMLN and the army was a tie, because the negotiation for ending the war had been determined by a balance struck between the forces and it had not been easy for the Government to ask the guerrillas to surrender. Furthermore, the country was bound by a strong effort on the part of the United States to prevent a "communist regime" from winning, an effort in which more than $6 billion were invested. From the war in Viet Nam to the war in the Persian Gulf, it was the highest investment of the United States in the third world.

> "Since 1981 policy makers believed instead that victory in El Salvador could be won by influencing the regime to do what was necessary to win its people's hearts and minds; and the United States believed that the $6 billion in support it provided brought considerable leverage in

> that effort. But the Salvadorans had America trapped. They realized that the United States was involved in their war for its own national security interests."[14]

The peace efforts were initiated in 1984. From 1981 to 1984 the FMLN tried to contact the Government without success. On 15 October 1984 the President of El Salvador, José N. Duarte, offered the FMLN a peace proposal, inviting it to participate in the political process in exchange for delivering the arms. This proposal was carried out one month later, at the second dialogue.[15] By 1987 the talks came to a stop, when the third dialogue was held at the seat of the Apostolic Nuncio in San Salvador, on 4 and 5 December 1987.[16] Later, in January 1989, the FMLN agreed, for the first time in the course of the war, to participate in the electoral process and abide by the legislation in force.[17] After the change of government in June 1989, the new President, Alfredo Cristiani, formed a delegation for dialogue with the FMLN, a delegation that met in September and October 1989. In that delegation the possibility was mentioned that the guerrillas might comply with legality if they handed in their weapons. At the same time the repression against the trade-unionists increased. The Catholic church was the mediator at all these meetings, but its mediation was suspended because of the murder of the Jesuits on 16 November 1989.

In 1990, the need for a new mediating and negotiating body became felt. Finally, the guerrillas and the Government admitted that the United Nations should participate in the negotiations, as from 4 April 1990, when the "Geneva Agreement"[18] was signed. Beginning with the United Nations mediation, the final stage of the war began and it ended on 16 January 1992.

The peace process lasted for 12 months. The two peace commissions held 23 meetings with the United Nations delegation. Of these meetings, 13 were held in Mexico City, 4 in Costa Rica, 2 in Caracas, 3 in New York and 1 in Geneva. Before the final peace act was signed, five partial agreements were signed, which led to progress in the talks: (1) the "Geneva Agreement", whereby the commitment to mediation was signed; (2) the "Agenda" and the "Timetable" of the peace process, signed in Caracas on 21 May 1990; (3) the "Agreement on Human Rights", signed on 26 July 1990 in Costa Rica; (4) the "Agreement on Constitutional Reforms", signed on 27 April 1991 in Mexico City; and (5) the "New York Agreement", signed on 25 September 1991 in New York.[19] Moreover, as part of the final process, the "Act of New York" was signed on 31 December 1991, with a view to the signing of the comprehensive peace document. In the peace process the fact that a balance of military forces existed was very important. The mutual surrender of principles occurred basically as follows: the guerrillas agreed to be incorporated in the existing political process and to hand over their weapons, and the Government promised to make fundamental changes in the armed forces and security squads. Moreover, the United Nations Observer Mission (ONUSAL) was established as well as a national body in which all the political parties, the Government and the FMLN participated: the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).

In order to achieve the foregoing it was necessary, as observed by Marcel Merle, for the parties gradually to initiate "a process for moderating their positions and cooling their passions", as well as to form a mediation body that would have legitimacy for the parties and for the international protagonists having influence on the conflict.[20] Similarly, in the case of El Salvador, the "stabilizing" concept of the negotiation process carried weight and, through the United Nations, good use was made of experience, because "the art of negotiation, which is not very susceptible to systematic treatment, is the fruit of talent, experience of the world and the thoughtful perusal of earlier negotiations".[21] This important and favourable United Nations mediation had the firm support of four countries: Colombia, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela, known as the "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" and, at its final stage, the United

States gave decisive signals in favour of negotiation from September to December 1991.

The peace agreement indicates that the peace process is to begin on 1 February 1992 and end on 31 October 1992.[22] Reducing the army personnel of El Salvador is very important. The Government pledges to reduce the present complement of 53,000 armed forces and to disband all the security squads and paramilitaries. In addition, a new national civil police force is to be established. Similarly, the FMLN is to be disbanded gradually from 1 February to 31 October 1992 to become a political party.[23] The balance of this peace process is very favourable. In fact, according to many analysts, the signing of the Act of Peace was a great triumph on the part of the civilians of El Salvador and of the international community, and a disadvantage only for those who had benefited from 12 years of war.[24]

The Slow and Inconclusive Peace Process in Guatemala

From 1954 onwards, when the *coup d'état* overthrew a democratic government, until 1986, when the civilian Vinicio Cerezo became President, the political process in Guatemala was dominated by the military. It was the country with the highest record of human rights violations in Latin America. In this context, since the 1960s there has been a guerrilla movement which has had many ups and downs in its military activity, but the counter-insurgency strategies used by the army have been unable to rout it. From the late 1970s onwards the guerrillas had the strong backing of the indigenous maya-quiche people. For this reason the guerrilla war became better organized and more intensive. In 1981 the four existing guerrilla groups, partly imitating the unity of the El Salvador guerrillas, were unified and the National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala (URNG) was established. The Government launched a vast military counter-insurgent campaign and managed to prevent an expansion of the guerrilla movement. The combination of forces therefore favoured the army but it lacked the capacity to rout the guerrillas, so that the only way of overcoming a state of civil war was through a pact of peace.[25]

The process of dialogue between the URNG and the Government began in Madrid on 9 October 1987, after which the National Reconciliation Commission was established, by the Esquipulas II process, with the mediation of the Catholic church. Subsequently, the National Reconciliation Commission met with the guerrillas several times and consecutive peace talks were held between the Government and the URNG: in Oslo, Norway, on 26 to 30 March 1990; in El Escorial, Spain, from 27 May to 1 June 1990; in Metepec, Mexico, from 25 to 30 October 1990; and in Mexico City, where, on 27 April 1991, the "Mexico City Agreement" was signed to prevent breaking the continuity of the talks.[26] Early in 1991, when the presidency changed, the new president, Jorge Serrano, announced a "Total Peace" plan, stating that during his administration peace with the guerrillas would be signed. The talks continued without favourable results until late in 1991. Actually the signing of the peace in El Salvador may have had a positive effect in Guatemala.

Guatemala is the place in Central America where the dialogue process is slowest. The government position is that peace can be achieved only if the guerrilla movement hands over its arms and becomes a political party. The guerrillas state that the following must be guaranteed: the processes for reducing the army and the elimination of the security system and security police, which are responsible for the human rights violations. No partial agreement between the two parties has been achieved, for which reason the transition in the peace-making process, from dialogue to negotiation, is not taking place. Thus, the Guatemalan situation is the last redoubt of the cold war which exists in Central America and which affects a comprehensive process for disarmament and demilitarization throughout the region.

Final Thoughts

Détente in Central America is a process that goes hand in hand with the consolidation of democracy, the reduction of armies, and the establishment of confidence-building measures between the various Governments. It has a favourable effect on the credibility and subsequent ability of the international organizations which have participated as mediators, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Moreover, the support of many Governments in the peace process has brought about whatever success there has been in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The establishment of peace is a long, drawn-out effort in Central America. It began with the work of the Contadora Group, was then internalized by the Central American Governments through the signing of Esquipulas II, and has counted on the successful mediation of the Organization of American States in Nicaragua and of the United Nations in El Salvador. In Guatemala, the most heavily populated and industrialized country in the region, it is necessary to expedite a signed peace which is favourable for the parties and which involves reducing the army, disarming the guerrilla movement and transforming it into a political party (or parties), and disbanding the security squads. In all of the Central American countries it is clear that without peace no one can speak of democracy, and peace is a *sine qua non* for consolidating *détente.*

In Central America it is essential that the armies be transformed into armies based exclusively on doctrines of defence, that the national security doctrine of the cold-war era be eliminated, and that they no longer constitute a burden on their Governments. It is obvious that high-technology armaments are not necessary in the region and that they only generate tension between governments. In this connection, those countries of the region which have not lived through civil wars, such as Honduras, must also realize that demilitarization and the reduction of their armed forces are a necessity. Costa Rica, which has no army (but does have security personnel), is an example, because its non-militarization goes very well with a solid democracy under which attention is given to social problems. In Panama the army was disbanded with the intervention of the United States in December 1989. Nevertheless, internal tensions may again bring about resistance to a United States military occupation.

Other peace processes have had favourable effects in Central America. The cases of Angola and Namibia and the negotiations in Cambodia have been favourably repeated. The negotiating arrangement in the case of Angola in particular was handled in a way very similar to that in the case of El Salvador.

In Guatemala, in spite of the differences with El Salvador and Nicaragua, a formula for negotiation must be sought to overcome civil war and the militarization of the State. The example of El Salvador may be repeated in some of its aspects, especially as regards army reductions, a cease-fire and guarantees of human rights. The case of El Salvador may also serve as an outline for the internal peace-keeping process in Colombia, which is still unfinished.

Notes

1 Raúl Benítez-Manaut, "Armamentismo y conflicto en América Central y el Caríbe", in Augusto Varas (compiler), *Paz, Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina* (Buenos Aires, GEL, 1987).

2 "Acta de Contadora para la Paz y la Cooperación en Centroamérica", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, No. 12 (Mexico, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), July-September 1986. In 1985 the Contadora Group was expanded, with the incorporation of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Peru (Group of Eight). Those four countries were known as the Group of Friends of the Contadora Group.

3 The FMLN was estimated to be about 7,000 guerrillas in 1988. The URNG was estimated to have 2,000 guerrillas in 1988. The counter-revolutionaries of Nicaragua were estimated to be approximately 10,000 in 1989, but figures vary greatly.

4 This matter is dealt with in: Raúl Benítez-Menaut, "La Paz en Centroamérica, Trayectoría, Límites y Perspectivas", in Ricardo Córdova and Raúl Benítez-Manaut (compilers), *La Paz en Cen-*

troamérica: Expediente de Documentos Fundamentales (1979-1989), Mexico, CIIH-UNAM, 1990.

5 Up to 1991, 11 presidential summits were held. At the first, held in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on 12 and 13 December 1991, the main subject was economic, even though it was mentioned that, as regards demilitarization, El Salvador and Guatemala must follow the example of Nicaragua. Mexico, *La Jornada*, 14 December 1991, p. 27.

6 Cynthia Arnson, *Cross-Roads, Congress. The Reagan Administration, and Central America* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1989).

7 "Previous U.S. and U.S.-Coordinated Aid to the Contras", Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus of the United States Congress, 29 January 1988, updated November 1989.

8 "Diez años en cifras", National Institute of Statistics and Censuses, July 1989.

9 Córdova and Benítez-Manaut, op. cit., pp. 240-243.

10 USGAQ, *Nicaraguan Resistance, Programs for Repatriation and Resettlement*, Washington, GAQ/NSIAD-91-234, July 1991.

11 "Los recontras: campesinos armados con amplia base social", *Envío*, vol. 10, No. 119, Managua, September 1991, p.14.

12 William M. Leogrande, "After the Battle of San Salvador", *World Policy Journal*, vol. VII, No. 2, Spring 1990.

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16 Ministry of Culture and Communications, *En el marco de Esquipulas II*, (San Salvador, October 1987).

17 "Propuesta del FMLN para convertir las elecciones en una contribución a la paz (23 January 1989), San Salvador, *La Prensa Gráfica*, 25 January 1989.

18 Government of El Salvador-FMLN "Acuerdo de Ginebra", Geneva, Switzerland, 4 April 1990.

19 The text of the New York Agreement was reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 1, 1992.

20 Marcel Merle, "De la négotiation", *Pouvoirs*, No. 14, Paris, 1980, pp. 11 and 13.

21 Ibid. p. 15.

22 United Nations, "*Central America: efforts towards peace: report of the Secretary-General*", Security Council document S/23402, 10 January 1992.

23 Government of El Salvador-FMLN *Acuerdo de Paz*, Mexico, 16 January 1992.

24 "Who won in El Salvador? Everyone". *The New York Times*, 3 January 1992, p. A 26.

25 See Gabriel Aguilera *El fusil y el olivo. La cuestión militar en Centroamérica*, San José de Costa Rica, FLACSO, 1989; and Luis Alberto Padilla, "La teoría de la resolución de conflictos y su aplicación al contexto socio-político de Guatemala", *Revista del IRIPAZ*, No. 2, Guatemala, 1990.

26 *Cronología de los procesos de Paz: Guatemala y El Salvador* (Guatemala, IRIPAZ, 1991).

Documentation Relating to Disarmament

Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Signed 20 January 1992*

The South and the North,

Desiring to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and thus create an environment and conditions favourable for peace and peaceful unification of our country and contribute to peace and security in Asia and the world.

Declares the following:

1 The South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

2 The South and the North shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes.

3 The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.

4 The South and the North, in order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, shall conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides, in accordance with procedures and methods to be determined by the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

5 The South and the North, in order to implement this joint declaration, shall establish and operate a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Committee within one (1) month of the effectuation of this joint declaration.

6 This Joint Declaration shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

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*The Joint Declaration came into effect on 19 February 1992 (CD/1147).

Signed on 20 January 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister
Republic of Korea

Chief delegate
of the South Delegation
to the South-North
High-Level Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier of the
Administration Council
of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

Head
of the North Delegation
to the South-North
High-Level Talks

Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers*

Prague, 31 January 1992

The Ministers reiterated the commitment of their Governments to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the control of missile technology. They underlined their willingness to contribute to the ongoing efforts and international cooperation to this end. In this context, they expressed their support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and for universal adherence to it. They welcomed the intention of all those Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it and urged other States that are not yet party to it, to do so as well. They also renewed their support for a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention to be concluded in 1992. They also reaffirmed their support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, welcomed the results of the September 1991 Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention, held in September 1991, and called for universal adherence to it.

They expressed their view that excessive build-ups of conventional weapons beyond legitimate defensive needs posed a threat to international peace and security in particular in regions of tension. Based on the principles of transparency, consultation and restraint, they declared their commitment to address the threat of excessive accumulations of conventional weapons and committed themselves to exercise responsibility, in particular with regard to arms transfers to States engaging in such excessive accumulations and to regions of tension.

They confirmed their support for and firmly committed themselves to provide full information to the Register of Conventional Arms. They called upon all other States to take the same action.

They agreed that effective national control of weapons and equipment transfer was acquiring the greatest importance. They declared their readiness to exchange views and to provide mutual assistance in the establishment of efficient national control mechanisms.

They agreed that in this connection the conversion of arms production to civilian production was also acquiring special importance.

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*A/47/89-S/23576, annex I.

The Ministers decided that the question of non-proliferation, including the transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers should be included as a matter of priority in the work programme for the post-Helsinki arms control process.

Joint Statement of the President of the Argentine Republic and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

14 February 1992

1 When we assumed the presidency of our countries, we gave a new, firm impetus towards a common nuclear policy, including the question of non-proliferation. We have always been guided by the desire to impart internal and external transparency to our nuclear programmes and to demonstrate to the international community the exclusively peaceful objectives that guide them, in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whose twenty-fifth anniversary we are celebrating today.

2 This programme demonstrates the determination and political will of our Governments to reinforce regional and international peace and security, including the adoption of transparent verification machinery.

3 In that context, in the Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy adopted at Foz de Iguaçú on 28 November 1990, we agreed on three specific steps:

a The establishment of a Common System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials;

b The signing of a joint agreement on safeguards with the International Atomic Energy Agency;

c The adoption of initiatives conducive to the full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in respect of the two countries, including efforts to update and improve its text.

4 The international community bears witness to the speed and effectiveness with which this undertaking has been achieved, which, as is well known, consists of:

a The Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, signed on 18 July 1991 at Guadalajara, and already approved by the Congresses of the two countries and ratified by both Governments, which represents the implementation of the first step;

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*A/47/92, annex. The joint statement was sent by the President of the Argentine Republic and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil to the meeting to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, held at Mexico City.

b The signing, on 13 December 1991, of the Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Implementation of Safeguards.

5 Today we are taking effective measures to realize the third and last undertaking of the Declaration of Foz de Iguaçú. At the earliest possible opportunity we shall submit for the consideration of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America some amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which are largely of a technical nature and in no way affect its principles and objectives.

6 We request all countries in our region to provide the support indispensable for this initiative, the purpose of which is to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty.

7 We congratulate the Government of France on its decision to ratify the Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will contribute—we hope, in the near future—to establishing definitively its legal validity for the entire region for which it is intended.

8 All these recent developments, which indicate the profound and shared desire to establish Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone free from nuclear weapons, lead us to the common conviction that the completion of the process just announced, namely, approval of the amendments to the text of the Treaty, will clear the way to its entry into force in our countries.

9 Thus, Argentina and Brazil are contributing in a clear and positive manner to the establishment of a new international climate characterized by cooperation and by the promotion of confidence among nations, as central elements to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Excerpts from the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Cambodia*

19 February 1992

C. *Military component*

1. *Functions*

52 The Agreement** deals with the military aspects of UNTAC's mandate in three sets of provisions. Article 11 of the Agreement provides the general framework; section C of annex 1 to the Agreement enumerates the main functions; and annex 2 contains the detailed provisions regarding the specific undertakings of the Cambodian parties and neighbouring States and the role and activities of the military component of UNTAC.

53 The objectives of the military arrangements during the transitional period are to stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the parties to the conflict. The achievement of these objectives is a necessary precursor to the successful conduct of the functions of the other components and, in particular, the repatriation programme.

54 The main functions of the military component of UNTAC can be grouped into four categories, as follows:

a Verification of the withdrawal and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment;

b Supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization;

c Weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing of the arms and equipment of the cantoned and the demobilized military forces;

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*S/23613, sect. II.

**Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, reproduced in document A/46/608-S/23177, annex, sect. II. The Agreement provides for the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Excerpts from the Agreement are reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, No. 2 (1992).

d Assisting with mine-clearance, including training programmes and mine awareness programmes.

55 In addition, under the Agreement, the military component is charged with the task of undertaking investigations, on complaint from one of the parties or on its own, of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to military arrangements (art. X of annex 2 to the Agreement). It is also called upon to provide assistance in relation to the release of prisoners-of-war (art. XI of annex 2 to the Agreement) and in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons (art. XII of annex 2 to the Agreement).

56 To ensure the smooth carrying out of the military component's responsibilities, the Agreement calls for the establishment of a mixed military working group, on which military representatives of all Cambodian parties are represented. The working group has already been established and is currently functioning under the chairmanship of the Senior Military Liaison Officer of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). Once UNTAC has been established, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, or his designated representative, would chair the working group. As the scale of UNTAC's activities increases, similar liaison arrangements would be made at other command levels.

(a) *Verification of the withdrawal and non-return of foreign forces*

57 As of the entry into force of the Agreement on 23 October 1991, all foreign forces, advisers and military personnel remaining in Cambodia, together with their weapons, ammunition and equipment, were to have been withdrawn from Cambodia. Once the UNTAC military component is deployed, it would have a continuing role in verifying the non-presence and non-return of any foreign forces.

. . .

(b) *Cease-fire and related measures*

61 The first phase of the cease-fire entered into effect with the signing of the agreements on 23 October 1991 and the good offices mechanism provided in the Agreement has been in place since 9 November 1991, when UNAMIC was deployed. Upon the deployment of UNTAC, UNAMIC will be absorbed into it and the good offices functions would be continued and expanded.

62 The exact time and date at which the second phase of the cease-fire begins would be determined by the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, in consultation with the parties. UNTAC would supervise, monitor and verify the second phase of the cease-fire.

63 The regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of the military forces of the Cambodian parties are essential elements both for the cease-fire and for the achievement of the other objectives of UNTAC. Moreover, timely completion of these elements is indispensable if UNTAC is to be able to carry out its mandate in an effective and cost-efficient manner. In this connection, it is noted that paragraph 1 of article V of annex 2 to the Agreement foresees the balanced demobilization of at least 70 per cent of the military forces of the parties prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections and their subsequent total demobilization.

. . .

65 During the visit of the military survey mission to Cambodia in November-December 1991, information provided by the four Cambodian parties revealed that their regular military forces totalled over 200,000, deployed in some 650 separate locations. In addition, militias, totalling some 250,000, operate in almost all villages throughout the country. These forces are armed with over 300,000 weapons of all types and some 80 million rounds of ammunition.

66 While the Agreement provides that all forces of the parties, with their weapons, should be regrouped and cantoned, the magnitude of the forces indicated above would mean that the regroupment and cantonment of all forces, including the militias, would necessitate a massive deployment of UNTAC military personnel for an extended period. It would also entail a serious disruption of the social and economic life of Cambodia, since most of the militia members are engaged in farming and other civilian activities while being organized and armed to protect their communities. In order to achieve economy in the operation of UNTAC and in order not to cripple the economy of Cambodia, practical arrangements have been worked out and agreed to by the parties whereby the militia forces would not be physically cantoned but would be disarmed in the following manner. The members of the militia forces would report to the nearest local headquarters (to be designated by UNTAC) in order to hand over their weapons to UNTAC. UNTAC would collect all weapons and transfer them to more secure centralized locations.

67 With respect to the regrouping and cantonment of the regular forces of the four parties, the military survey mission obtained the acceptance by the respective commanders-in-chief of the forces of the Cambodian parties to reduce the number of regroupment areas from their desired total of 325 to 95 and the number of cantonment areas from their desired total of 317 to 52. This reduction is expected significantly to enhance efficiency and economy in carrying out this task of the UNTAC military component. The 95 regroupment areas and 52 cantonment areas would comprise the following:

a 48 regroupment areas and 33 cantonments for the Cambodian People's Armed Forces;

b 30 regroupment areas and 10 cantonments for the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea;

c 8 regroupment areas and 6 cantonments for the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces;

d 9 regroupment areas and 3 cantonments for the National Army of Independent Kampuchea.

68 Soon after the start of phase two of the cease-fire, regroupment of forces would begin and, as agreed by the Cambodian parties and in accordance with the timetable to be drawn up by the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, would proceed on a simultaneous basis countrywide. The regrouped forces would then proceed with their commanders to the designated cantonment areas. The forces of the four Cambodian parties would use separate regroupment and cantonment areas. The four parties are expected to produce all troops, weapons, ammunition and equipment declared by them. There would be no demobilization of regular forces by any of the parties without the supervision of UNTAC. When the Commander of the military component of UNTAC has satisfied himself that proper account has been rendered by all parties, the demobilization process would begin and be conducted according to the timetable to be drawn up by UNTAC in consultation with the parties.

69 The naval forces of the Cambodian People's Armed Forces comprise a maritime branch and a riverine branch, totalling some 4,000 and equipped with 18 naval and 38 riverine vessels. These naval forces would be regrouped and cantoned in the same manner as the regular land forces, except that a limited number would be retained to patrol coastal and riverine areas, under the close supervision and control of UNTAC (see para. 76 below).

70 In addition, engineer and logistic units, although they would be regrouped and cantoned in the same manner as other units of the regular forces, would be subject to special arrangements in view of their role in the Cambodian demining programme as well as in supplying and supporting the cantoned forces.

. . .

72 The Ministry of Defence and its personnel located in Phnom Penh would also require special arrangements as far as the regroupment and cantonment processes are concerned. Since Phnom Penh will be the hub of all political activity in the country, every effort must be made to ensure that the Ministry of Defence and its military personnel there do not constitute and are not seen to pose a threat to any of the parties. At the same time, it would

be necessary to allow the Ministry of Defence as well as the command groups of the forces of the other three parties to continue to exercise command of and provide support to the troops being regrouped and cantoned in the field under UNTAC supervision.

73 In order to reconcile these conflicting requirements as far as military personnel in Phnom Penh are concerned, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC would, before the start of the second phase of the cease-fire and in consultation with the appropriate military authorities, select a number of locations in and around Phnom Penh and draw up a timetable for the regroupment and cantonment of the military personnel deployed in the Phnom Penh area. All such personnel would be required to report to one of these locations in accordance with the timetable. Commanders of the various departments and units of the Ministry would be required to account for all military personnel, arms, ammunition and equipment under their command. In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, all such arms, ammunition and equipment would be placed in the custody of UNTAC. On completion of the accounting process, all those involved in command and providing essential logistic and support services to the troops cantoned in the field would be allowed to resume their functions under the control and supervision of UNTAC.

74 The specific tasks which the military component would need to perform in relation to the regroupment and cantonment processes are as follows:

a Ensuring the demining of envisaged regroupment and cantonment areas, as necessary;

b Establishing the regroupment and cantonment areas and supervising their operation;

c Recording and verifying numbers of personnel of the military forces of the Cambodian parties and escorting them from the regroupment to the cantonment areas;

d Ensuring that all of the military forces are cantoned and disarmed;

e Monitoring and supervising the cantonments;

f Implementing a phased demobilization of 70 per cent (or more, if possible) of the cantoned forces prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections, as well as their subsequent demobilization in accordance with an agreed schedule.

75 In the regroupment and cantonment processes, the possible need to assist the parties with transporting their personnel to the regroupment areas, constructing shelters to accommodate the cantoned troops and resupplying or feeding them might require special attention. UNTAC may be required in particular to provide food. The UNTAC rehabilitation component would also

play a role in vocational retraining and reintegration of the demobilized forces (see para. 154 below).

(c) *Weapons control*

76 The UNTAC military component would have ongoing duties to monitor the cessation of outside military assistance. This would be accomplished in part through the manning of fixed posts at ingress/egress points, as discussed above, and in part through the monitoring and investigative activities of the mobile teams, also discussed above. The naval unit within the military component would supervise the patrolling of coastal areas and inland waterways by the retained units of the naval forces (see paras. 69 and 71 above). In addition, UNTAC military liaison officers stationed in neighbouring States would support activities in this area of UNTAC's mandate (see para. 60 above).

77 UNTAC mobile teams of engineers would be responsible for promptly investigating reports of caches of weapons and military supplies inside Cambodia. Any such caches found would be confiscated and destroyed.

78 Reduction and control of weapons in Cambodia is a major element of the cease-fire and related measures. The military component would undertake the following sequence of activities:

a Disarming the militia;

b Ensuring that all of the cantoned military forces are disarmed and that no weapons, ammunition or equipment is subsequently brought into the cantonments;

c Ensuring that all of the reported arms, ammunition and equipment are placed under UNTAC custody;

d Once in custody, ensuring that the arms, ammunition and equipment are secure;

e Implementing a phased reduction of the arms, ammunition and equipment held in custody at the cantonments and their progressive transfer to designated areas, in keeping with the phased demobilization of the forces, and ensuring their security during the transfer process.

79 In order to accomplish these tasks, secure facilities would be established at the 52 cantonment areas, where the weapons, ammunition and equipment of the forces would be deposited into UNTAC custody. This number may be reduced over time as the demobilization process proceeds and cantonment areas are consolidated or closed.

(d) *Mine programmes*

80 In accordance with the mandate provided to it by the Security Council on 16 October 1991, and expanded on 8 January 1992 (see resolution 728

(1992)), UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia) is already charged with the task of undertaking mine-awareness, mine-recording and marking and mine-clearance training programmes, as well as providing assistance in mine-clearance itself. Once UNTAC is established and deployed, these programmes will be taken over by its military component and expanded. Continuation and management of these programmes would be entrusted to the engineer unit within the military component. The magnitude of the mine problem in Cambodia requires that a sizeable and intense effort should be undertaken in the very early stages to facilitate UNTAC's deployment and its manifold activities.

CSCE Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies*

Helsinki, 24 March 1992

The Foreign Ministers of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty on Open Skies have issued the following declaration:

—*Welcoming* the signing of the Treaty on Open Skies by the Foreign Ministers of the States concluding this Treaty,

—*Recognizing* the importance of the Open Skies régime for the security of States participating in the CSCE process,

—*Assessing* the Treaty as an important element in the process of enhancing security and confidence between members of the international community,

—*Reiterating* the importance of the principle of equal security for all their countries,

—*Noting* the interest expressed by a number of States not full participants in the negotiations, and believing that their adherence to the Treaty as well as signature by all the newly independent States, as mentioned in Article XVII of the Treaty, would enhance the effectiveness of the Open Skies régime,

1 *Recognize* the significant contribution to the Open Skies negotiations made by a number of participants in the CSCE who are not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies,

2 *Recognize* also that these States may participate, on the basis of the active and passive quotas they would hold as State Parties, in the implementation of the Treaty and that they may take part in discussions regarding practical arrangements for the régime which will continue in Vienna within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application,

3 *Acknowledge* the interest of the States which are participants in the CSCE but not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies in information obtained through Open Skies observation flights,

4 *Welcome* the interest shown by States which are participants in the

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*Text prepared by the CSCE secretariat at the 1992 Helsinki meeting of States participating in the CSCE process.

CSCE but not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies to accede to it as provided for by Article XVII of the Treaty,

5 *Call upon* all Parties to the Treaty to allow the accession of such interested States as soon as possible and to act, in all matters related to it, in the spirit of co-operation which the Treaty commands.

Statement from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' Meeting Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*

Helsinki, 4-5 May, 1992

The Nordic Foreign Ministers focused attention on the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

The success of efforts to stop proliferation is a key factor in ensuring international peace and security. The Ministers noted with satisfaction that international efforts in this field are wide-ranging and resolute and that some success has already been achieved, for example in the field of export control.

The Ministers support further strengthening of multilateral co-operation in the field of export control.

The Ministers expressed the strong support of the Nordic countries for international treaties that ban or limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for international export control rules for missile technology and for products that might be used in the production of WMD.

They further emphasized that success should be achieved in negotiations between major weapons exporters and in the realisation of the UN Register on weapons transfers with regard to limiting and controlling international trade in conventional weapons.

Four of the Nordic countries are now members of the regime for dual-use nuclear products (NSG), the control regime for chemical and biological products (Australia Group) and the control regime for missile technology (MTCR). Iceland is considering acceding to these regimes at an early date.

The Ministers supported regional initiatives and efforts to achieve stability and arms control in the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America.

The Ministers especially welcomed the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the formal accession of China and South Africa and the announcement by France of its accession to the Treaty. It was with particular pleasure that the Ministers noted that Estonia and Latvia have recently acceded to the NPT.

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*Press release (unofficial translation) of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, dated 5 May 1992.

The Ministers also emphasized the importance of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan joining the NPT as non-nuclear states as soon as possible. It is also important that the safeguards control system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is based on the NPT, is strengthened and that the organisation is provided with financial resources which are adequate to maintain a credible level of control.

The Ministers expressed their strong expectations that the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons will be finalized this year. In view of the need for effective implementation of the Convention, it is important that it contains an appropriate system for the verification of possible violations. Here the Ministers drew attention to the experience of the Special Commission set up by the UN Security Council (UNSCOM).

The Ministers reiterated the support of the Nordic countries for the planned Scientific Centres in the Russian Federation and the Ukraine, where the aim is to help to transfer CIS-scientists from military development to research in the civilian sector.

Recent Books and Articles

Adams, James. *Engines of War: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race*. New York, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990. 307 p.

James Adams, defence correspondent and Associate Editor of *The Sunday Times* of London, uses his experience writing on covert warfare to describe a new generation of arms brokers. He argues that as one arms race comes to a close, another is just beginning.

Discussing the emergence of two trends—that all weapons systems are made today with export in mind, and that these systems are tailor-made to the environment in which they will be used—the author concludes that "the real danger for the future lies not in the arsenals held by the major powers but in the new weapons currently being developed that are just as deadly as nuclear weapons".

The book devotes one chapter to the question of nuclear proliferation among third world countries. It includes also a study of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and the means that are being developed by some countries to deliver such weapons to their targets.

Arnett, Eric H. *Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and U.S. Security*. New York, Praeger, 1991. 195 p.

Eric Arnett, author of a number of articles on naval forces and strategy, regional security and the proliferation of weaponry, continues to explore these questions in his latest book.

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles and U.S. Security assesses, *inter alia*, the crux of the SLCM issue for United States security; evaluates both United States and Soviet SLCM arsenals; and examines the role of arms control and unilateral initiatives in managing the dangers of SLCMs. The book concludes with concrete recommendations for United States policymakers.

Baylis, John, and John Garnett, eds. *Makers of Nuclear Strategy*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 206 p.

The book, a compilation of studies by several academics, analyses the writings of nine strategic thinkers—Bernard Brodie, Albert Wholstetter, Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Anthony Buzzard, P.M.S. Blackett, André Beaufre and V.D. Sokolovskii. The editors note that all of those cited were reared in the politics of the cold war and had ascribed a "realist" approach to international politics and power politics as the driving force of State behaviour. These thinkers were sceptical about the restraining or constructive influence of international law and put little emphasis on the problem of the third world and "North-South".

Brembeck, Howard S. *The Civilized Defense Plan: Security of Nations Through the Power of Trade*. Fairfax, Virginia, Hero Books, 1989. 138 p.

The Civilized Defense Plan calls for a world-wide legal system of economic sanctions and trade incentives designed to control the undesirable behaviour of those nations that continue to manufacture, possess and/or use weapons of mass destruction against their neighbours. The plan is advocated by the Fourth Freedom Forum, a non-profit foundation established to provide a medium for discussion of alternative international security.

Caldwell, Dan. *The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: the SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate*. Columbia, South Carolina, University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 234 p.

The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: the SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate focuses on the role that United States domestic political factors play in the ratification of arms control treaties. In addition to an examination of the domestic and international context of the treaty ratification debate, the book examines the Carter Administration's strategy for obtaining Senate approval of the treaty. Interviews with individuals active in the treaty negotiation process and an extensive bibliography are included in the book.

Cooper, Julian. *The Soviet Defence Industry: Conversion and Economic Reform*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992. 111 p.

The author, an expert on Soviet technology and industry, outlines the problems of conversion from military to consumer production as the former Soviet Union moves towards a mixed market economy. He looks at the prospects for the future and suggests some possible implications of the changes in the role and operations of the defence sector.

Eriksen, Viking Olver. *Sunken Nuclear Submarines: A Threat to the Environment?* Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1990, 177 p.

The book, written for the general public, examines the dangers posed by sunken nuclear submarines. On the environmental impact of a sunken nuclear submarine, the author notes that "while no such accident has been detected, an accident involving radioactive material in the shallow coastal regions could have serious consequences for the marine species in the region and could also prove disastrous for the fishing industry of the region".

Fisas Armengol, Vicenç. *El Mito de la Amenaza del Sur: Rearme y Comercio de Armamentos en el Mediterráneo Occidental.* Zaragoza, España, Seminario de Investigación para la Paz, diciembre 1991. 101 p.

Vicenç Fisas Armengol, author of various books on disarmament, defence and peace research, argues against the traditional "threat from the south"—in this case the "threat" from the Magreb to the countries of the Western Mediterranean (Spain, France and Italy). He sees this "threat" as an excuse by some southern European countries to create new enemy images to justify the persistence and reinforcement of military structures. The author uses a series of economic, social and military statistics to make his case. Mr. Fisas Armengol offers a long list of short- and long-term measures which he feels could be taken to reduce the arms trade and at the same time make progress towards disarmament in the region. Issued in Spanish, the study includes an English summary.

Fischer, David. *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: The Past and the Prospects.* London, Routledge, 1992. 336 p.

The book offers a broad perspective of the past, present and future nuclear non-proliferation regime. Part I examines the policies of nations since 1945. Part II surveys the present nuclear non-proliferation regime. Part III focuses on the main theme of the book, namely, the prospects of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the policies needed to strengthen and sustain the non-proliferation Treaty and the system it supports. Some of the questions addressed in the book include: the risks of nuclear proliferation in politically tense regions of the world; the effectiveness of international safeguards to control the spread of nuclear weapons; the control of missile proliferation and of chemical weapons and its relationship to nuclear proliferation; the status and achievements of, and prospects for, the non-proliferation Treaty; problems that may arise at the 1995 extension conference; and the short- and long-term prospects for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Gasparini Alves, Péricles. *The Interest of Nonpossessor Nations in the Draft Chemical Weapons Convention: A Brazilian Case Study*. New York, Vantage Press, 1990. 132 p.

The book discusses the implications and intricacies of chemical disarmament from the point of view of a non-possessor nation—in this case, Brazil. It examines the various positions of possessor and non-possessor countries and the consequences of these positions—including the consequences of non-adherence to a future chemical weapons convention—on chemical disarmament in particular and on arms control in general. The author highlights the interests and positions of the least developed countries.

Goldie, Mary L., and Douglas A. Ross, eds. *Pacific Security 2010: Canadian Perspectives on Pacific Security into the 21st Century*. Ottawa, Canada, The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, August 1991. 84 p. (Aurora Papers 10)

Pacific Security 2010: Canadian Perspectives on Pacific Security into the 21st Century is a collection of papers focusing on the development of Canadian relations with the Pacific region over the next 20 years. Individual papers include: a review of the principal features of the geostrategic landscape of the North Pacific region; an inventory of current naval capabilities of the major States in the region; a review of non-naval arms control agreements now in force or contemplated that bear on the security situation in the Pacific; an examination of the environmental aspects of Pacific security; a summary of the history of Canadian "neglect" of the Pacific; and a detailed review of the debate on the establishment of a North Pacific forum. In its concluding chapter, the editors review the major findings of the study and make several observations about the broader strategic options facing Canadian policy planners and politicians.

Hampson, Fen Osler, Harald von Riekhoff and John Roper, eds. *The Allies and Arms Control*. Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. 375 p.

The book is the result of a collaborative venture sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. It contains papers presented to a conference held at Chatham House in London. Experts from the United States, Canada and Europe explore the past and the future of NATO arms control policies. They focus on the record of bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations in specific cases; trace the national and regional arms control politics of individual countries and analyse the effect of domestic political concerns on government behaviour; and assess NATO's practice of consultation and policy coordination and its effect on the general state of the Alliance. The authors conclude with a commentary on the implications of the latest political and military developments in Europe. In addition to the book's editors, contributors include: Arne Olav Brundtland, Hugh de Santis, Lawrence Freedman, Elisa D. Harris, Gert Krell, James MacIntosh, David D. Newsom, Sanford C. Reback, Jane M. O. Sharp, Phil Williams and David S. Yost.

Harbottle, Michael. *What is Proper Soldiering?* Chipping Norton, Oxon, England, The Centre for International Peacebuilding, 1991.

The author, a former Chief of Staff of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, and also the writer of the instructional manual *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, focuses in this study on some special activities of the armed forces for the 1990s, namely, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and environmental security. He acknowledges that this involves "a substantial readjustment in military thinking and doctrine".

"Proper soldiering", his term for the proposed new role, includes such activities because, in his view, the concept of defence is not purely territorial, but "also implies a responsibility to react to any circumstance which is seen to threaten the security of the nation's way of life". It is the author's contention that in the interest of security—broadly defined—the armed forces "can extend the purely military limits of their *modus operandi*".

Hartley, Keith. *The Economics of Defence Policy.* London, Brassey's (UK), 1991. 190 p.

Keith Hartley, Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Defence Economics at the University of York, applies economic analysis, critical appraisal and empirical testing to the problems that nations confront as they ponder major reductions in defence spending and the challenges of maintaining security with limited resources.

The book—designed for students, practitioners, industrialists, policy makers and general readers—seeks to show how, in non-technical terms, simple economic analysis can be applied to defence issues. It has three aims: to identify the types of questions raised by economists when studying defence policy; to show how simple economic analysis can be used to answer these questions and to contribute to our understanding of defence issues; and to provide a critique and evaluation of defence policy.

Jockel, Joseph T. *Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s*. East Lansing, Michigan, Michigan State University Press, 1991. 217 p. (Canadian Series No. 1)

Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the 1990s assesses the continued cooperation between the United States and Canada in this area. The book includes an overview of Canadian approaches to the strategic defence of North America, comparing similarities and differences between United States and Canadian approaches. It also explores the role that Canada and the Canadian armed forces could play in the air, ballistic-missile and naval defence of North America. The book concludes with recommendations for United States policy with regard to ongoing defence cooperation with Canada.

Kidron, Michael, and Dan Smith. *The New State of War and Peace: An International Atlas*. London, Grafton Books, 1991. 127 p. (A Pluto Project)

The New State of War and Peace presents a full-colour survey of arsenals, armies and alliances throughout the world. Published early in 1991, this international atlas looks at, and measures, military arsenals and missiles, military spending, chemical and nuclear weapons and the legal and illegal arms trade up to 1990. Individual maps are accompanied by a legend indicating areas of conflict, a short commentary and explanatory notes.

Krause, Joachim, ed. *Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons Ban*. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1991. 109 p. (Westview Special Studies in International Security)

Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons Ban discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the negotiations on the draft chemical weapons convention negotiated in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. The book contains seven articles that deal with various aspects of the debate on chemical weapons, including the security implications of such a convention for the Western Alliance and the third world nations and the role that chemical weapons play in the military doctrines of these countries. The book also addresses the question of chemical weapons proliferation, and contributors offer political measures for preventing such proliferation.

Joachim Krause notes that while "such a convention might not solve all problems . . . neither will it discourage us from further attempts to seek solutions" to the growing proliferation of chemical weapons.

Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. *Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953-1991*. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. 351 p. (Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies)

The author offers a historical overview of United States relations with Ethiopia and Somalia in the post-World War II era and argues that the United States used arms transfers to secure its security objectives in the Horn of Africa. He offers a theoretical framework to explain the sources and games of influence in the arms relationships between great-Power suppliers and small-Power recipients, and he also provides a case study of the internal and external forces that have shaped United States security relations with Ethiopia and Somalia over the past four decades. The book concludes with an exploration of the usefulness of this supplier-recipient model and an assessment of the outlook for United States arms transfers to the region in the light of recent developments.

Lundin, S. J., ed. *Verification of Dual-Use Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of Thiodiglycol*. Oxford, Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1991. 144 p. (SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 13)

The report is based on an international effort to investigate those dual-use chemicals that have a legitimate civilian use but can also be used to produce chemical warfare agents. The authors have attempted to apply to a selected substance—thiodiglycol, a precursor of mustard gas—the agreed provisions of the draft convention on chemical weapons under preparation by the Conference on Disarmament in order to arrive at a practical approach to verifying the production and non-production of chemical weapons. The report is based on the work of the Pugwash-SIPRI Thiodiglycol Project, which met several times in Geneva, Switzerland, during 1990.

Maswood, S. Javed. *Japanese Defence: The Search for Political Power*. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990. 113 p.

The book discusses attempts by the Nakasone Administration to restructure or "normalize" Japanese defence policy. It opens with a general overview of Japanese defence policy, continues with a look at the post-war Japanese defence establishment, and closes with an examination of the regional implications of the Japanese defence build-up. In conclusion, the author—a lecturer on Asian and International Studies at Griffiths University, Brisbane, Australia—believes this trend of normalization in Japanese defence policy reflects the realities of Japan in the contemporary period.

Müller, Harald, ed. *How Western European Nuclear Policy is Made: Deciding on the Atom.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 241 p.

The book surveys the nuclear decision-making processes of eight EC member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) and two non-members (Sweden and Switzerland). It explores the factors that account for differences in their orientation and activities with respect to nuclear energy programmes and in their policies with regard to nuclear weapons.

Navias, Martin S. *Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991. 269 p. (Nuclear History Program 1)

Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning 1955-1958 is a reference work on the development of post-war British defence policy in that period. Martin Navias, Research Associate in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London, analyses the increasing role of nuclear weapons in British defence policy between 1955 and 1958. The book examines the contribution of the Sandys Defence White Paper of 1957—which first introduced nuclear weapons as an element of British defence policy—on future British defence policy. The book is the first in a series of studies of "training, research and discussion concerning the development and deployment of nuclear forces, the elaboration of policies for their management and possible use, and their role in the evolution of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the countries of Europe".

O'Sullivan, Patrick. *Terrain and Tactics.* New York, Greenwood Press, 1991. 182 p. (Contributions in Military Studies, Number 115)

Patrick O'Sullivan, Professor and Chair of the Department of Geography at Florida State University, offers a study of military geography—the use of geographical knowledge to describe and analyse the deployment of armed forces. He explores the effects of geographical circumstances on the outcome of violent conflict and examines the lessons learned from recent wars. Central to the book is an examination of modern weapons and tactics, focusing on guerrilla/counter-insurgency operations and warfare on urban terrain. The book includes a geographical survey of wars since 1945.

Palma, Hugo. *Confianza, Desarme y Relaciones Internacionales*. Lima, Peru, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1991. 322 p.

The study deals with general, conceptual and regional aspects of confidence-building measures and international relations. The author devotes one chapter to the implementation of confidence-building measures in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The study includes a 70-page documentation annex and a bibliography.

Perkins, Ray, Jr. *The ABCs of the Soviet-American Nuclear Arms Race*. Pacific Grove, California, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991. 241 p.

This reference guide offers a non-technical account of the nuclear-weapon policies of the Soviet Union and the United States. Individual chapters end with a "questions for discussion and review" section; the book also contains an extensive glossary.

Reid, Brian Holden and Michael Dewar, eds. *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe: Towards the Twenty-First Century*. London, Brassey's (UK), 1991. 257 p.

The papers contained in the book are a mixture of military and academic viewpoints presented to a conference organized jointly by the British Army and the Department of War Studies of Kings College, London. The book provides a commentary on Britain's future contribution to NATO in general, and to the central region of Europe, in particular. Part I focuses on the strategic context of the debate. Part II examines the operational level of military strategy in Europe and discusses such concepts as "follow-on-forces attack (FOFA)", "counter-offensive" and "command and control".

Shimko, Keith L. *Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration*. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1991. 277 p.

Images and Arms Control examines the attitudes of senior officials in the Reagan Administration towards the former Soviet Union. It explores the relationship between "enemy" images and the policies and preferences these individuals advocated in debates over the SALT II Treaty, the INF and

START negotiations and the Strategic Defense Initiative. The book is divided into three sections: questions of theory and method; a presentation of the author's research on images; and an examination of the debates within the Reagan Administration on five arms control issues. In each case, the author attempts to determine whether and how the decision makers' images of the Soviet Union influenced their orientation towards arms control, in general, and their policy choices on specific issues. An extensive bibliography is annexed to the book.

Simon, Jeffrey, ed., *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989*. Washington, D.C., The National Defense University Press, 1991. 640 p.

Twenty-two academics and government officials from the United States and European NATO, seeking to stimulate further discussion and new perspectives for managing the emerging European security challenges of the 1990s, examine how the revolutions of 1989, which ended the cold war, have changed older security relationships in Europe. They focus on five areas: the impact of the 1989 revolutions on NATO and the Warsaw Pact and, correspondingly, on the roles of the United States and the USSR in Europe; the effect of German unification on the European landscape, especially France and the United Kingdom; the effects of these developments on other members of the alliances—Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, and Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark from NATO; the problems on the flanks, focusing on Norway in the north and the Balkans in the south; and the challenges to NATO's southern region and the potential security consequences in the western Mediterranean.

Jeffrey Simon, a Senior Fellow in the Strategic Capabilities Assessment Center, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, notes in the concluding chapter of the book that "while the revolutions of 1989 have kindled hopes for unifying a divided Europe . . . they have also brought into being a new Europe with significant instabilities and insecurities". He warns that until "a pan-European structure has been erected and has become operational and institutionalized, NATO and the United States face new and, perhaps, greater challenges to keep the peace".

Steiner, Barry H. *Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy*. Lawrence, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1991. 367 p.

This book examines the work of Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) and its impact on other strategic thinkers both past and present. Mr. Brodie is best known as a proponent of making the policy of deterrence credible by threatening the use of nuclear weapons to prevent aggression. A bibliography is provided in the book.

Verification Technologies: Cooperative Aerial Surveillance in International Agreements. Washington, D.C., Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, July 1991. 115 p.

The report examines the potential and limitations of cooperative aerial surveillance as a means of supporting the goals of a variety of international agreements. It surveys the types of aircraft and sensors that might be used in the verification process. It also reviews issues raised by the Treaty on Open Skies, under negotiation at the time of publication, which provides an extended example of an aerial surveillance regime. The report concludes with a quantitative analysis of one possible use of cooperative overflights: the search for potential arms control violations. The report is one in a series of reports prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress on the question of techniques and technologies for monitoring international agreements.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Meryl A. Kessler, eds. *Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers in association with the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1991. 183 p.

Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era is the result of a collaborative effort between Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and the World Peace Foundation. Initiated in 1990, the project explores the possibilities of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in mitigating or resolving third world conflicts, and it assesses the effects of the dawning of the post-cold war era on the security of States in the third world. It is the aim of the editors to contribute to the emerging debate in the United States over the shape and scope of its foreign policy in the post-cold-war world. Many contributors make reference in their presentations to the renaissance of the United Nations as an instrument for conflict resolution.

Further Publications

Disarmament is unable to publish summaries of all books and articles sent to the Editor. The following is a list of items received recently.

Alves, Dora, ed. *Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: The 1989 Pacific Symposium*. Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1990. 344 p.

Andreeva, I. S., and Unto Vesa, eds. *European Security and Cultural Values*. Tampere, Finland, Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1991. 287 p. (Research Report No. 45)

Ball, Desmond. *Provocative Plans: A Critique of US Strategy for Maritime Conflict in the North Pacific*. Canberra, Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991. 138 p. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 79)

Bibliography of the Bulletin of Peace Proposals 1970-1991. Oslo, Norway, International Peace Research Institute, October 1991. 59 p. (PRIO Inform No. 4)

Córdova Macías, Ricardo and Raúl Benítez Manaut. *La Paz en Centroamérica: Expediente de Documentos Fundamentales, 1979-1989*. Ciudad Universitaria, México D.F., Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Humanidades, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1989. 460 p.

Dannreuther, Roland. *The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis*. London, Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991/92. 88 p. (Adelphi Papers 264)

Deustua C., Alejandro. *Tres Aproximaciones a la Seguridad Externa del Perú*. Lima, Peru, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1990. 134 p.

Dunn, Keith and Stephen Flanagan, eds. *NATO in the 5th Decade.* Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1990. 242 p.

Dunn, Lewis A. *Containing Nuclear Proliferation*. London, Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1991. 75 p. (Adelphi Papers 263)

Dupont, Alan. *Australia's Security Interests in Northeast Asia*. Canberra, Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991. 131 p. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 84)

Dupont, Alan. *Australia's Threat Perceptions: a Search for Security*. Canberra, Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991. 105 p. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 82)

Ferrero Costa, Eduardo, ed. *La Seguridad del Perú frente al Nuevo Contexto Internacional*. Lima, Peru, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1991. 178 p.

George, Bruce, with Timothy Watson and Jonathan Roberts. *The British Labour Party and Defense*. New York, Praeger with The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991. 121 p. (The Washington Papers/153)

Goodman, Allan E., and Sandra Clemens Bogart, eds. *Making Peace: The United States and Conflict Resolution*. Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 132 p. (Case Studies in International Affairs)

Hartley, Keith, and Nick Hooper. *The Economics of Defence, Disarmament and Peace*. Aldershot, United Kingdom, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1990.

Heininen, Lassi, and Jykri Käkönen, eds. *Arctic Complexity: Essays on Arctic Interdependencies*. Tampere, Finland, Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1991. 153 p. (Research Report No. 44)

Laurenti, Jeffrey. *The Common Defense: Peace and Security in a Changing World*. New York, The Global Policy Project, The United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1992. 61 p.

Ledeen, Michael. *Superpower Dilemmas: the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at Century's End*. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1992. 244 p.

Lindsey, George, and Alex Morrison. *Verifying Limitations on Military Personnel*. Ottawa, The Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, December 1991. 62 p. (Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers No. 9)

Obando Arbulu, Enrique. *Industrias Militares en América del Sur*. Lima, Peru, Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1991. 74 p. (CEPEI Documentos de Trabajo 14)

Oberdorfer, Don. *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: the United States and the Soviet Union 1983-1990*. New York, Poseidon Press, 1991. 514 p.

Pach, Chester J. *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press, 1991. 322 p.

Rudnianski, Michel. *L'Aide a la Décision dans la Crise Internationale*. Paris, Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, janvier 1992. 256 p. (Dossier 44)

Wilkes, Owen, Megan van Frank and Peter Hayes. *Chasing Gravity's Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing*. Canberra, Australia, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991. 209 p. (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 81)

Wolpin, Miles D. *America Insecure: Arms Transfers, Global Interventionism, and the Erosion of National Security*. Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1991. 385 p.

Other Recent United Nations Publications on Disarmament

Office for Disarmament Affairs

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The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook
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Studies*

Study on Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms (forthcoming)
Potential Uses of Military-Related Resources for Protection of the Environment (forthcoming)

Disarmament Facts*

Number 79: *Transparency in International Arms Transfers*

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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Research Reports

National Security Concepts of Argentina, by Julio C. Carasales, United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.9)
National Security Concepts of Sri Lanka, by Vernon L.B. Mendis, United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.12)
Military Industrialization and Economic Development. Theory and Historical Case Studies, by Raimo Väyrynen, 1992, 121 p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)

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* Also available in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish.
** Also available in French, Russian and Spanish.

European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe, Proceedings of the Rhodes Conference, 6-7 September 1991, by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (ed.)/*La sécurité européenne dans les années 90: Problèmes de l'Europe de Sud-Est*, Actes de la conférence de Rhodes, 6-7 septembre 1991, sous la direction de Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 1992, 219 p., United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E/F.92.0.14)

Research Papers

No. 11—*The Implications of IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687*, by Eric Chauvistré, United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.6)

No. 12—*La Résolution 687 (3 avril 1991) du Conseil de sécurité dans l'affaire du Golfe: Problèmes de rétablissement et de garantie de la paix*, par Serge Sur, 1992, 65 p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente GV.F.92.0.8

UNIDIR Newsletter

Vol. 5, No. 1, April/avril 1992, *Conference on Disarmament/La Conférence du Désarmement*, 63 p.

Vol. 5, No. 2, June/juin 1992, *Environmental Aspects of Disarmament and Security/Aspects écologiques du désarmement et de la sécurité*

About United Nations Publications

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Selected Security Council Resolutions on the Special Commission on Iraq

Security Council Resolution 707 (1991), 15 August 1991
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New York, 25 September 1991

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Resolution 271 (XII), adopted by the Agency for the Prohibition
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at its twelfth regular session, entitled "Foz de Iguaçú Declaration
on the joint nuclear policy of Argentina and Brazil",
Mexico City, 9 May 1991

Agreement between the Government of Hungary and
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Bucharest, 11 May 1991

Excerpt on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
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